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Abstract 
Vote-selling in Nigeria pervades and permeates the electoral space, where it has become 
the primary instrument of electoral fraud. Previous research has indicated a strong 
correlation between vote-buying and underinvestment and poor delivery of public 
services. There remains, however, a significant gap in the current literature regarding the 
nature of the relationship between vote-selling and the delivery of public services. The 
purpose of this study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by investigating their common 
and lived experiences with respect to the provision of infrastructure, delivery of public 
services, and voting during elections. Using Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism, 
the research explored the connection between environment and vote-selling. Data were 
collected through semistructured interviews with 10 individuals who participated in the 
most recent elections in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. The 
data were analyzed using Moustakas’s transcendental phenomenological process. Key 
findings suggest a reciprocal relationship between vote-selling, and infrastructure and 
public services. The study findings also revealed that vote-sellers’ feel justified because 
vote-selling is perceived as a product of disappointment, lack of trust and voters’ apathy, 
willingness to accept their own share of “national cake,” and poverty. These findings are 
consistent with Bandura’s proposition that people create the society and equally react to 
environmental factors. This study contributes to the existing literature and may enhance 
social change initiatives by improving the understanding of the connection between the 
provision of infrastructure and the delivery of public services and vote-selling.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of vote-selling is currently the most apparent and predominant 
electoral strategy that political parties and their candidates employ to prosecute elections 
in Nigeria. The vote-selling phenomenon pervades Nigerian elections (Onapajo, Francis, 
& Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). No single factor determines vote-buying. Researchers have 
found that it “is a function of a mix of socioeconomic, cultural and institutional factors” 
(Hicken, 2007, p. 58).  
Vote-selling is an open form of bribery that substantially corrupts the Nigerian 
electoral system (Uchenna-Emezue, 2015). In the same vein, corruption impacts the 
electoral system. Fundamentally, there is a close nexus between political corruption and 
infrastructure (Ogbuagu, Ubi, & Effiom, 2014). Unbridled political corruption among 
Nigerian public office holders leads to inadequate provision of roads, water, healthcare, 
electricity, and other infrastructure (Ajisebiyawo, 2016).  
Through this phenomenological study, I sought to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating common and lived experiences of voters who had resided in the Akoko 
North West Local Government for at least the last 5 years and had participated in the 
most recent elections. The most recent elections were those that the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) conducted in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo 
State, Nigeria, between 2012 and 2016, which were the 2012 governorship election; 2015 
House of Assembly, House of Representatives, Senate, and presidential elections; and 
2016 governorship election.   
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In this chapter, I explain the background of the study by summarizing relevant 
research literature, describing the gap that the study is intended to address, and pointing 
out that the connection between vote-selling and the provision of infrastructure has not 
previously been explored. I conclude that none of the existing literature has explored 
vote-selling from voters’ perspectives in relation to the provision of infrastructure. This 
study views the phenomenon of vote-selling through the theoretical lens of reciprocal 
determinism. Further, this phenomenological study focuses on common experiences of 
voters that shaped their behaviors during elections.  
Background 
 All elections in Nigeria have historically been characterized by electoral 
irregularities (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007). It is noteworthy that the 1961 regional elections; 
1964 general election; 1965 Western House of Assembly election; and 1979, 1983, 1979, 
1999, 2003, and 2007 general elections were characterized by electoral malpractice 
(Awopeju, 2011). It is evident that candidates and political parties adopt various means or 
strategies to rig elections in Nigeria (Ajayi, 2006). They corrupt the electoral process 
with vote-buying (Echegaray, 2015). Incumbent governments obtain public funds while 
in power to maximize vote-buying during elections (Devadoss & Luckstead, 2016). They 
illegally convert public funds for personal gain at the expense of the provision of 
adequate infrastructure (Ajisebiyawo, 2016). 
 Existing research shows that a mix of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, old age, 
early-stage democratization, and a winner-take-all electoral system has contributed to 
vote-buying (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007; Kennedy, 2010; Onapajo et al., 2015; Owen, 
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2013). Available research equally shows that vote-buying, among other factors, brings 
about poor public service delivery (Omotosho, 2014) and adversely affects good 
governance (Kramon, 2013). Hicken, Leider, Ravanilla, and Yang (2014) argued that 
vote-buying leads to inefficiencies in the public sector and low infrastructural quality 
(Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). Vote-buying is a product of political corruption that brings 
about inefficient public service delivery, poor public services, and inadequate 
infrastructure (Gillanders, 2014; Hanusch & Keefer, 2013; Lucky, 2013).  
 Khemani (2015) found that there is a connection between vote-buying and poor 
delivery of public services. Although Bardhan, Mitra, Mookherjee, and Nath (2015) 
concluded that good public services ordinarily increase voter support, it is noteworthy 
that existing literature has not examined the connection between public services and vote-
selling. Moreover, none of the available research has explored the vote-selling 
phenomenon from voters’ perspectives.  
 The study provided a better understanding of, and highlighted the connection 
between, the provision of infrastructure and public services and vote-selling. The study 
may help those in developing democracies to understand the nexus and interrelationship 
between vote-selling and infrastructure with a view to placing more importance or 
emphasis on improving infrastructure and public services. 
Problem Statement 
Political parties use various illegal means to ensure electoral success in Nigeria 
(Oromareghake, 2013).  Vote-buying and vote-selling are especially prominent in the 
Nigerian electoral space (Lucky, 2013). They are the bane of authentic electoral 
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outcomes in Nigeria. Vote-selling is subtle and intrinsically linked to the electoral 
successes of political parties at all levels of the electoral process. Jensen and Justesen 
(2014) and Kramon (2013) contended that vote-buying is widespread in many emerging 
democracies. Scholars use various definitions for vote-buying and vote-selling. Lack of 
uniformity in definitions of these phenomena among scholars has led to definitional 
ambiguity with respect to vote-buying, vote-selling, and clientelism (Nichter, 2014). It is 
arguable that pre-election promises and vote-buying are on the same pedestal in regard to 
the adverse effects they have on the electoral and democratic process. Lippert-Rasmussen 
(2011) pointed out that some researchers take the view that vote-buying is antithetical to 
good democratic governance, whereas others opine that vote-buying is similar to election 
promises, which are good for democracy. He asserted that vote-buying and election 
promises equally “distort democratic deliberation” and "violate the norm of political 
equality" (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011, p. 144).   
Further, there is no consensus on the factors that precipitate vote-selling. Some 
researchers have opined that vote-buying is a product of poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment, old age, early-stage democratization, and/or a winner-take-all electoral 
system (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007; Kennedy, 2010; Onapajo et al., 2015; Owen, 2013). 
However, the connection between vote-selling and infrastructure has not been explored 
adequately. Poor delivery of health services allows politicians to buy votes, and voters 
“may behaviourally prefer immediate monetary benefits to other types of public services” 
(Khemani, 2015, p. 92). Additionally, Lucky (2013) argued that voters have become 
cynical vote-sellers in Nigeria. However, Khemani (2015) concluded that there is a 
5 
 
connection between vote-buying and poor delivery of public services. Bardhan et al. 
(2015) took the view that good public services ordinarily increase voter support. 
Accordingly, “the equilibrium consequences for public policy performance when 
governments gain (or lose) office in elections with widespread vote-buying has received 
relatively little attention” (Khemani, 2015, p. 85). 
Nevertheless, none of the existing literature has explored the phenomenon of 
vote-selling from voters’ perspectives with particular reference to meaning ascribed to 
the connection between the provision of infrastructure and delivery of public services on 
one hand and vote-selling on the other. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences with respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, the delivery of public services, and voting during elections in Akoko North 
West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. The aim of the study was to explore the 
connection between the provision of infrastructure and delivery of public services and 
vote-selling.  
The research garnered information from a purposeful sample of individuals who 
understood and could illuminate issues concerning infrastructure, public services, and 
vote-selling. The focus was on the recollections of individuals of their experiences 
involving the provision of infrastructure, public services, and vote-selling in Akoko 
North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria, which were gathered through in-
depth interviews. In-depth interviews with the purposeful sample of individuals provided 
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a greater understanding of the connection between the provision of infrastructure and 
public services and vote-selling.  
Research Question 
The central question in this study was the following: How do individuals who 
participated in the most recent elections describe their lived experiences of vote-selling in 
relation to the provision of infrastructure and public services in Akoko North West Local 
Government? 
Nature of the Study 
 This study was designed as a qualitative transcendental phenomenological study. I 
sought to explore the “common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences 
of a concept or a phenomenon” (Creswell, 2013, p. 87). There was a need to capture and 
describe the lived experiences of individuals about the phenomenon—that is, how they 
perceived, remembered, and described the phenomenon—to explore common meanings 
ascribed to the vote-selling phenomenon (Patton, 2015). Phenomenological research 
describes common experiences of several individuals regarding a phenomenon through 
the collection of data or information through multiple interviews (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 
2015). The phenomenological approach was best suited for the study because it allowed 
voters who participated in the most recent elections to express—in their own words, 
based on their common and lived experiences—their understanding of vote-selling, the 
state of the provision of infrastructure, and the delivery of public services. This approach 
enabled the study to throw light on the common experiences of voters that shaped their 
behaviors during elections. 
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 I confined myself to researching individuals who had experienced vote-selling and 
the state of infrastructure and public services because the review of the literature 
identified a close nexus between vote-buying and public services. I selected individuals 
who had participated in the most recent elections and had been approached for vote-
selling. They were able to share their personal experiences regarding vote-selling, the 
state of the infrastructure, and the delivery of public services. 
 I employed a purposeful sampling to perform deliberate selection of individuals 
who had resided continuously in the community for at least 5 years, had been exposed to 
the phenomenon of vote-selling, and had participated in the most recent elections. Patton 
(2015) pointed out that a maximum-variation (heterogeneity) sampling strategy captures 
common themes from narratives of individuals from different backgrounds. Patton 
identified criterion sampling, group sampling, and time-location selection strategies as 
three purposeful sampling strategies. I used these three purposeful sampling strategies to 
select the interviewees. Criterion sampling enabled me to identify registered voters who 
meet the inclusion criteria, the group sampling strategy enabled the selection of 
participants with different profiles, and the time-location strategy enabled the selection of 
persons who had resided in the community continuously for at least 5 years.  
 I used an inductive strategy to conduct interviews with individuals who had 
extensive knowledge about the phenomenon of vote-selling and the state of infrastructure 
in the community with a view toward eliciting information about and in-depth 
descriptions of the vote-selling phenomenon and the state of infrastructure and public 
services. I prepared an interview protocol (located in Appendix A) for guidance, and I 
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used it before, during, and after the interviews. I used semistructured, open-ended 
questions to prompt the interviewees to remember and describe their experiences and 
how they impacted their voting behavior. 
I recorded and transcribed the interviews. I carefully and thoroughly read the 
transcriptions. I used the four main steps of Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental 
phenomenological data analysis process—(a) epoche, (b) transcendental 
phenomenological reduction, (c) imaginative variation, and (d) synthesis of meanings—
to analyze the interview data. The detailed methodology of the study is provided in 
Chapter 3. 
Theoretical Framework 
In this study, I examined the phenomenon of vote-selling through the theoretical 
lens of Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism. The central theme of the theory is 
that there is a connection between environment and behavior, whereby the environment 
influences human behavior (Bandura, 1974). The theory helps readers to understand the 
connection between environmental factors—infrastructure, public services, and elected 
public office holders—and personal experiences of voters. 
Bandura (1974) accepted that external consequences are not the sole or 
independent determinant of human behavior. He posited that the intervening influence of 
cognition changes human behavior (Bandura, 1974). He explained that people play a 
dialectic role in being actively involved in the creation of society and reacting to 
environmental stimulants (Bandura, 1978). 
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Bandura (1974) took the view that external consequences are most effective in 
affecting human behavior when they conjoin with personal experiences.  Bandura (1977) 
argued that “behavior partly creates the environment, and the resultant environment, in 
turn, influences the behavior” (p. 40).  
From this perspective, all human accomplishments result from “reciprocal 
interaction of external circumstances with a host of personal determinants including 
endowed potentialities, acquired competences, reflective thought, and a high level of self-
initiative” (Bandura, 1974, p. 867). Reciprocal determinism explains how the 
environment produces effects. The theory of reciprocal determinism was suited for this 
study because it presupposes that environmental factors drive voters’ behavior. 
Definition of Terms 
Infrastructure: Road networks, transport networks, schools, hospitals, social 
housing, and government buildings (Khoteeva & Khoteeva, 2017).   
Public services: Services “in the field of transport, energy, water, 
telecommunications, and health” (Babatunde, Perera, Zhou, & Udeaja, 2015, p. 669). 
Vote-buyers: Individuals—mainly party agents and candidates for public 
offices—who offer and make cash payments to voters to purchase their votes (Owen, 
2013).  
 Vote-sellers: Individuals who show a willingness to sell votes or receive cash 
from vote-buyers or intermediaries in exchange for their votes (Vincent & Wantchekon, 
2008).  
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 Vote-buying: A process whereby individuals or political parties pay cash to voters 
to purchase their votes (Owen, 2013).  
 Vote-selling: A process whereby voters receive cash from vote-buyers or 
intermediaries in exchange for their votes (Vincent & Wantchekon, 2008).  
Assumptions 
It was assumed that the nonfulfillment of electoral promises, inadequate provision 
of infrastructure, and poor delivery of public services as a result of corruption might 
shape voters’ behaviors. Bandura (1977) contended that “behavior partly creates the 
environment, and the resultant environment, in turn, influences the behavior” (p. 40). It 
was assumed that vote-selling is prevalent and that voters are knowledgeable about vote-
selling (Lucky, 2013). Further, it was assumed that voters would freely talk about vote-
selling because it is pervasive. It was assumed that the interview participants would 
provide credible information about their lived experiences of the phenomenon of vote-
selling because of their participation in the most recent elections and exposure to vote-
selling. It was equally assumed that the interview participants would provide rich 
information about the provision of infrastructure and public services because they had 
resided continuously in the local government for at least 5 years. Moreover, it was 
assumed that the theory of reciprocal determinism would be most appropriate for this 
study because it will help to highlight the interaction or connection between the provision 
of infrastructure and delivery of public services and vote-selling. 
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Limitations 
 Limitations identify the weaknesses inherent in a study that may impact the 
research findings. This phenomenological study explored the lived experiences of 
individuals who participated in the most recent election in Akoko North West Local 
Government. The study was confined to Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo 
State, Nigeria. The findings of the study were restricted to the locality. The confinement 
of the study to the particular locality might make it difficult to transfer or generalize the 
research findings to other locations. The study did not address the ramifications of these 
limitations, which may impact the extent of the transferability or generalizability of the 
study results. 
 The study was conducted without any reference to documentary evidence or any 
other evidence to corroborate or verify the statements of the interview participants. 
Moreover, although the interviewees were asked some follow-up questions in response to 
the open-ended questions, they were not cross-examined to ascertain the veracity of their 
answers.  
The research findings lack quantitative analysis and are limited to interpretation. 
Scope and Delimitations 
A review of the literature identified a connection between vote-buying and 
delivery of public services (Khemani, 2015). The connection between vote-selling and 
public services has not been explored from the voters’ perspectives, and most of the 
literature has focused on vote-buying rather than vote-selling. I confined the selection of 
the interview participants to individuals who had experienced the vote-selling 
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phenomenon in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. I used a 
purposeful sampling method to select the interview participants who could provide 
detailed and in-depth information regarding the phenomenon of vote-selling, the state of 
infrastructure, and the delivery of public services from the voters’ perspective. 
The delimitation of participants to selected individuals who gained knowledge of 
the vote-selling phenomenon through their participation in the most recent elections and 
exposure to vote-selling enabled the isolation of the research findings from existing 
studies dealing with vote-buying. This study was conducted in Akoko North West Local 
Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. Given that the study and findings are restricted to the 
designated locality, it may be difficult to transfer or generalize the findings to other 
locations.  
Significance of the Study 
 The study makes an original contribution and fills a gap in the literature by 
addressing the nexus between the provision of infrastructure and the delivery of public 
services and the phenomenon of vote-selling.  
The study may contribute to positive social change by highlighting and providing 
a greater understanding of the connection between the provision of infrastructure and 
delivery of public services and vote-selling. The study may enable political parties in 
Nigeria or other developing democracies to understand the overarching connection 
between the provision of infrastructure and delivery of public services and voters’ 
behaviors. It may therefore help Nigerian political parties, or political parties in 
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developing democracies, to place more weight and importance on the delivery of pre-
election pronouncements and public policy performance. 
Summary 
 Through this qualitative transcendental phenomenological study, I sought to fill a 
gap in the literature by investigating the connection between the provision of 
infrastructure and the delivery of public services and the phenomenon of vote-selling. 
The study is divided into five sections. In Chapter 1, I provided an introduction to the 
vote-selling phenomenon and argued that it has become prevalent in Nigerian politics.  
 The available research reveals that corruption has existed historically in the 
electoral process. Although it is difficult to identify a single cause of vote-selling in the 
literature, it appears that there is a connection between the delivery of public services and 
vote-buying. The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ 
behaviors by investigating their common and lived experiences with respect to the 
provision of infrastructure, delivery of public services, and vote-selling during elections 
in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria.  The research question for 
this study was the following: “How do individuals who participated in the most recent 
elections describe their lived experiences of vote-selling in relation to the provision of 
infrastructure and public services in Akoko North West Local Government?” I used the 
theory of reciprocal determinism as a theoretical lens to examine the phenomenon of 
vote-selling. 
 In Chapter 2, I provide an extensive review of the literature on vote-buying and 
vote-selling. I explain the conceptual definitional ambiguity with respect to vote-buying, 
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the attributes of vote-buying, and the relationships between vote-buying, election 
promises, and fraud. I provide a detailed review of the factors that enable and influence 
vote-selling, discuss the consequential effects of vote-selling, and address how the 
menace associated with the phenomenon might be reduced or eliminated. The chapter 
ends with an examination of the gap in the literature. 
 In Chapter 3, I describe the methodology used in this research and provide a vivid 
description of Moustakas’s’ (1994) phenomenology paradigm. I explain how the 
phenomenological approach enabled the individuals participating in the research to return 
to their experiences and provide relevant information that could be used to gain insight 
into the phenomenon of vote-selling. I describe how Moustakas’s transcendental 
phenomenological data analysis process was used to analyze the data. I present a detailed 
analysis of the research findings in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss the research findings, draw conclusions, make 
recommendations, and address the implications of the study for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences with respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, the delivery of public services, and voting during elections in Akoko North 
West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. There is no consensus on the factors that 
cause vote-selling. Available research indicates that the vote-selling phenomenon has 
been caused by several factors, including, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, old age, 
early-stage democratization, and a winner-take-all electoral system (Danjibo & Oladeji, 
2007; Kennedy, 2010; Onapajo, Francis & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Owen, 2013). The 
connection between vote-selling and infrastructure has not been explored adequately. It is 
important to understand the reasons that voters sell their votes despite the fact that vote-
selling leads to poor representation and bad governance, with resultant effects on the 
wellbeing of the populace (Lucky, 2013; Hanusch & Keefer, 2013). The aim of the study 
was to explore the connection between the provision of infrastructure and voters’ 
behaviors. The central research question was the following: “How do individuals who 
participated in the most recent elections describe their lived experiences of vote-selling in 
relation to the provision of infrastructure and public services in Akoko North West Local 
Government?” 
 There has been extensive work on the electoral concept of vote-buying, the 
factors that enable vote-buying, and the consequent effects of vote-buying (Bratton, 
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2008; Finan & Schechter, 2012; Hicken, 2007; Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Kennedy, 2010; 
Khemanni, 2015; Kramon, 2013; Nichter, 2014; Vicente, 2014).  
In the first section of the chapter, I commence the literature review with a 
discussion of the impact of elections on the economies of new democracies and good 
governance. In the second section, I enumerate the search engines used and the strategies 
employed to conduct the literature review. In the third section, I explain that the study 
used the theoretical lens of reciprocal determinism to explore the phenomenon of vote-
selling. In the following section, I offer an overview of the concept of vote-buying and 
discuss its definitional ambiguities, its attributes, and the relationships between vote-
buying, election promises, and fraud. In the fifth section, I examine the factors that 
restrict or enable vote-buying, such as the use of a secret ballot, the level of 
democratization, political competition, vote-switching, urbanization, trust, reciprocity, 
incumbency, social ties, support base, credibility, corruption, electoral rules, and voting 
methods. In the sixth section, I discuss the main causes of vote-selling—poverty, age, 
income level, and education—and the abstract cost of vote-buying. In the seventh section, 
I examine the consequential effects of vote-selling. In the following sections, I highlight 
the election strategies used by political parties in Nigeria, focus on election as a 
democratic vehicle, and describe the impacts of corruption on infrastructure. In the 
eleventh section, I briefly address the factors that may reduce or eliminate vote-buying 
and vote-selling. In the final section, I provide a summary of the chapter. 
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Literature Search Strategy 
I used various search engines to find sources for the review of the literature, 
including Google Books, Google Scholar, and the databases of Walden University—in 
particular, Thoreau Multi-Database Search, EBSCO, Political Science Complete, Sage 
Premier, ProQuest Central, and Academic Search Complete. I focused my literature 
review on peer-reviewed articles, journals, dissertations, and scholarly books. The 
literature search strategy involved the use of terms and keywords, which included but 
were not limited to vote-buying, vote-selling, buying votes, selling votes, clientelism, 
election rigging, election malpractices, voting behavior, and Nigeria elections. 
 I broke down the dissertation topic—“Vote-Selling: Infrastructure and Public 
Services”—into the following search terms and keywords: vote-selling, vote-selling and 
infrastructure, and vote-selling and public services. I subsequently brainstormed 
alternative search terms and keywords that were related to my dissertation topic and 
added the following keywords and terms: vote-buying, clientelism, election rigging, 
election malpractices, voting behavior, and Nigeria elections. 
 I accessed Google Scholar using the following keywords: vote-buying, vote-
selling, and Nigeria elections. A review of related articles and articles cited within 
articles that I found through my initial searches enabled me to find additional up-to-date 
articles. 
 Thoreau’s multidatabase search provided many of the articles that I used in the 
study. The advanced search mechanism was most useful. It enabled me to use Boolean 
operators to conduct the following searches: vote-selling OR vote-buying OR clientelism, 
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vote-buying AND infrastructure, vote-buying AND public services, Nigeria elections 
AND election rigging AND election malpractices, and voting behavior. 
 I found the Walden online library particularly helpful. The Walden online 
library’s article-by-topic tools through the Policy and Administration Database helped me 
to identify the following databases: Political Science Complete, Sage Premier, Academic 
Search Complete, and ProQuest Central. It enabled me to find articles that I could not 
locate through other search strategies and provided me with many of the articles for the 
literature review. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 In this study, I sought to examine the connection between the provision of 
infrastructure and public services and the phenomenon of vote-selling through the 
theoretical lens of reciprocal determinism. This theory helps readers to understand the 
interrelationship between environmental instrumentalities, elected political office holders, 
and voters’ personal experiences and circumstances.  
 Bandura (1974) reported that there was a growing concern among members of the 
public regarding the predominance of manipulation and control in the field of 
psychology. He expressed that the members of the general public viewed behavioral 
theory as “conditioning” (Bandura, 1974). Bandura (1974) noted that conditioning refers 
to learning by way of paired experiences and does not explain the occurrence of changes 
(Bandura, 1974).  
Finan and Schechter (2012) linked vote-selling with pleasure and argued that 
“voters who are offered money or material goods in exchange for their votes reciprocate 
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because they experience pleasure in increasing the material payoffs of the politician who 
has helped them” (p. 1). Gingerich and Medina (2013) took the view that local elites 
control the voting behavior of a subset of voters. The level of influence that local elites 
have on voting behavior may result in the conception that local elites’ influence on voters  
amounts to the conditioning of the behavior of the electorate. Balwin (2013) argued that 
local chiefs influence the voting behavior of the electorate because of their relationship 
with political office holders. Balwin’s (2013) and Gingerich and Medina’s (2013) 
contention that there is a unidirectional influence or control of voting behavior gives 
credence to Bandura’s (1974) proposition that external consequences are not the sole or 
independent determinant of human behavior and that people create society and equally 
react to environmental factors. 
 Bandura (1974) criticized the mechanistic perspectives of behavioral theory and 
asserted that the intervening influence of cognition changes human behavior. He argued 
that people do not merely react to stimulation from the environment; they play an active 
role in the creation of their society and daily circumstances (Bandura, 1978). In the 
scheme of the electoral process and with regard to behavioral outcomes, external 
consequences are influential, but they do not independently determine human behavior 
(Bandura, 1974).  
 Bandura (1974) proposed that people operate through cognition arising from 
observation of consequences and their personal experiences. He concluded that external 
consequences are most effective and influential on human behavior when they conjoin 
with personal experience (Bandura, 1974). According to Bandura (1974), humans mostly 
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design their actions to take account of future benefits and prevent future adversities. He 
contended that humans are endowed with the capability to create their environments and 
rebut them (Bandura, 1974, 1978).  
 Bandura (1974) argued that the accomplishments of people are not brought about 
solely by the environment but “result from reciprocal interaction of external 
circumstances with a host of personal determinants including endowed potentialities, 
acquired competences, reflective thought, and a high level of self-initiative” (p. 867). He 
pointed out that there is intertwinement between the environment and behavior, in that 
the latter creates the former in part while the former influences the latter reciprocally 
(Bandura, 1974). Bandura (1978) explained that personal and environmental factors do 
not function autonomously but are corroborative determinants. He posited that human 
conceptions, behaviors, and environments determine one another (Bandura, 1978). 
The review of the literature reveals that political corruption leads to the provision 
of low infrastructural quality (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) and that there is a close nexus 
between the level of corruption and provision of infrastructure (Castro, Guccio, & Rizzo, 
2014).  
 Additionally, existing literature confirms that environmental and personal factors 
such as institutions, electoral systems, and cultural and socio-economic factors have been 
causes of vote-selling (Hicken, 2007; Hicken, Leider, Ravanilla, & Yang, 2015; Jensen & 
Justensen, 2014; Onapajo et al., 2015). These scholars, therefore, support the conclusion 
of Bandura (1978) that “by creating structural mechanisms for reciprocal influence, such 
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as organizational systems of checks and balances, legal systems, and due process and 
elective procedures, people can bring their influence to bear on each other” (p. 357).  
Definitional Ambiguity of Vote Buying 
 Researchers use various definitions for vote-buying and vote-selling. Lack of 
uniformity in the definition of vote-buying among scholars has led to definitional 
ambiguity (Nichter, 2014). Nichter (2014) noted that there is conceptual ambiguity in 
how scholars define and study vote-buying as a social science phenomenon.  
Gonzalez Ocantos, Jonge, and Nickerson (2014) defined vote-buying as “the 
exchange of private goods for votes during electoral campaigns” (p. 197). Lahoucq 
(2007) argued that vote-buying involves trading valuable goods for votes on the day of 
elections. Owen (2013) stated that vote-buying is “a process consisting of an offer made 
to purchase the vote of an individual of voting age, who accepts the offer, receives 
compensation, shows up at the polling station, and then votes as paid” (p. 250). Mares 
and Young (2016) contended that vote-buying is a category within positive inducement 
which involves “offers of rewards such as money, goods, or favors” (p. 270).  According 
to Kennedy (2010), vote-buying is “a simple economic exchange” (p. 620).  
Lucky (2013) described vote-buying as the use of cash as an inducement on 
behalf of candidates to persuade voters to vote by the terms of the vote-buyer. Nichter 
(2014) concluded that most “researchers concur that the contingent distribution of cash 
for political support during campaigns constitutes clientelist vote buying” (p. 319). 
However, Vincent and Wantchekon (2009) considered the vote-selling perspective and 
22 
 
succinctly defined a vote seller “as an individual who at least gives the impression to a 
vote buyer or an intermediary that he or she is willing to sell a vote” (p. 250). 
One of the reasons for the complexity of vote-buying as a phenomenon is the 
perception of researchers about its attributes. Wang and Kurzman (2007) contended that 
vote-buying attributes include transactional contingent exchange, occurrence during an 
election, and the use of cash. Kennedy (2010) identified cash, immediate material 
rewards, and promises of future state benefits as the attributes of vote-buying. Nichter 
(2014) noted that vote-buying possesses the following attributes: contingent exchange; 
occurrence during an election; payment of cash; distribution of goods and services, 
distribution of food and alcohol; offer of employment; promises of future benefits and 
public programs; and the reward for turnout. It is therefore important for researchers to 
explicitly define vote-buying or vote-selling and specifically identify attributes to include 
in these definitions in any research regarding the phenomenon (Nichter, 2014).  
Apart from definitional ambiguity, there is no consensus on whether vote-buying 
is condemnable as fraud or excusable as election promises (Hanusch, Keefer, & Vlaicu, 
2016; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011; Mares & Young, 2016; Wong, 2016).  Lippert-
Rasmussen (2011) stated that there is intense controversy concerning whether certain 
actions should be seen as vote-buying or as election promises. He noted that some 
researchers had found that vote-buying is similar to election promises and that election 
promises benefit democracy, whereas other researchers had found vote-buying to “distort 
democratic deliberation” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011, p. 144). Hanusch et al. (2016) noted 
that there is a high degree of variation from one country to another with respect to the use 
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of vote-buying and election promises as electoral strategies, concluding that vote-buying 
takes preference over election promises in countries where political parties have lower 
credibility and there is higher accountability in the electoral process. 
Mares and Young (2016) compared vote-buying and fraud and found that there is 
a significant difference between these events. They concluded that fraud involves 
circumventing voters’ electoral preferences, whereas vote-buying involves influencing 
voters’ preferences (Mares & Young, 2016). Wong (2017) nevertheless argued that 
despite the negativity ascribed to vote-buying, it may enable redistribution of resources. 
Vote-Buying: Influential Factors 
 The introduction of the secret ballot caused a reduction in vote-buying in elections 
to the British parliament in the 19th century when candidates changed their electoral 
strategy from vote-buying to turnout-buying (Kam, 2016). The use of secret ballots 
reduces vote-buying because it makes it difficult for candidates seeking political office or 
their representatives to observe or monitor votes (Finan & Schechter, 2012). Another 
limitation that vote-buying suffers is that the secrecy of voting as a result of secret ballot 
makes it impossible for the vote-buyer to enforce the transaction (Collier & Vicente, 
2012).   
 Secret ballot, therefore, precludes vote-buyers from enforcing the transaction 
between themselves and vote-sellers (Vicente, 2014). Hicken et al. (2015) explained that 
secret electronic voting had more or less eliminated vote-buying because it made it 
impossible for voter-buyers to monitor vote-sellers in the vote transaction. Secret ballot 
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has nevertheless triggered a reduction in electoral bribery in the form of vote-buying 
(Heckleman, 1998).  
 In essence, it is doubtful whether vote-buying as an electoral strategy remains 
efficacious, given that political parties and party candidates find it difficult to monitor the 
performance of their representatives after disbursements of funds and voters’ sincerity 
when they are in polling booths (Larreguy, Marshall, & Querubin, 2014). 
It may, however, be argued that the use of secret ballots has not led to a reduction 
in vote-buying (Khemani, 2015). Jensen and Justesen (2014) argued that secret ballots 
allow voters to renege on their promises or assurances to vote for a political party or 
candidate on the one hand, but because of the difficulties of monitoring voters at the 
polling booth, political parties or party agents have invented various strategies to monitor 
how they vote to counteract the sanctity or inviolability of secret ballots on the other 
hand.  
Notwithstanding voters’ anonymity and the accompanying bottleneck to quid pro 
quo electoral strategy provided by secret ballot, representatives of political parties and 
party candidates use their positions within the social network to identify how voters vote, 
thereby countering the effectiveness of secret ballots (Schneider, 2014). Further, electoral 
results for small groups have shown that brokers or agents for political parties and party 
candidates have found it easy to monitor small groups to sustain compliance with vote-
buying outcomes (Rueda, 2015). 
Additionally, despite the fact that secret ballots enable voters to vote according to 
their conscience and vote preference, brokers or representatives of political parties have 
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always thrived by using vote-buying as an electoral strategy (Gingerich & Medina, 2013). 
Thus, a secret ballot is not necessarily an efficient mechanism for reducing vote-buying 
because even if brokers are able to monitor how voters vote, voters may sell their votes 
irrespective of how vote-buyers expect them to vote (Heckelman, 1998). Monitoring how 
voters vote is only effective where the social network enables agents to monitor voters or 
where voters are identifiable in small groups (Gingerich & Medina, 2013; Heckelman, 
1998). 
On the one hand, secret ballot as opposed to an open ballot system causes an 
increase in vote-buying because it enables a sizeable number of voters to vote in keeping 
with the expectations of vote-buyers, and on the other hand, secret ballot may lead to a 
reduction in funds expended on vote-buying (Morgan & Vardy, 2012). Morgan and 
Vardy (2012) concluded that the impacts of a secret ballot on vote-buying are 
paradoxical. In any event, vote-buying thrives irrespective of secrecy because voters feel 
morally obliged to adhere to their part of the vote transaction (Collier & Vincente, 2012). 
Time and context of a particular democracy shape democracies (Adeney & 
Taggart, 2015). Therefore, time and context invariably determine the prevalent electoral 
strategies in new democracies. Shin (2015) described patronage politics which includes 
vote-buying as a key electoral strategy in developing countries. It is, nevertheless, 
arguable that vote-buying is a product of the political practices, and the prevalent 
electoral rules and laws of a country (Onapajo et al., 2015).  
Essentially, advancement in the level of democratization in newly democratic 
states enables and fortifies vote-buying as an electoral strategy because other electoral 
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strategies or manipulation such as intimidation becomes more expensive and less cost-
effective with democratic development (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015; Kitschelt & 
Kselman, 2013). Vote-buying increases as new democracies progress from low to 
medium levels of democratic development. At the early stage of democratic 
development, competition, representativeness and the introduction of limited political 
rights increase the popularity and enhance the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes (Sun, 
2014). Thus, in autocracies with pseudo new democratic tendencies, regimes engage in 
vote-buying or turnout buying to showcase their democratic character or legitimize their 
governments in the face of potential agitation for democratic governance at a rudimentary 
level of democracy (González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, & Nickerson, 2015).  
Kennedy (2010) asserted that although vote-buying is considered intrinsically 
undemocratic, it thrives in new democracies with a higher level of democracy where 
elections are free and fair to a reasonable extent.  Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) explained 
another paradox regarding vote-buying, stating that the perception of unfairness in 
elections by voters leads to a decrease in participation whereas the distribution of 
material gifts as an electoral strategy such as vote-buying correspondingly brings about 
an increase in electoral participation. 
Carreras and İrepoğlu’s (2013) contention was supported by Takeuchi’s (2013) 
findings that an increase in the level of political competition leads to a corresponding 
increase in vote-buying. Hicken et al. (2014) stated that vote-buying becomes more 
intense when elections are highly competitive to the extent that vote-sellers go into 
further rounds of vote-buying if the opposition offered to buy votes for an amount that 
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was lower than they had previously offered the voters. It is, therefore, noteworthy that 
vote-buying increases when elections are closely contested (Jensen & Justesen, 2014). 
Moreover, vote-buying is prevalent where elections are highly competitive (Harvey, 
2016). 
Vote-buying equally functions as a springboard for vote-switching. Voters switch 
their preferences from their originally preferred candidates or political parties to 
alternative vote-buyers when they are offered more money (Hicken et al., 2015). Political 
parties and candidates use vote-buying to switch votes in weaker geographical areas 
(Hicken et al., 2015). It is, however, instructive that despite the fact that vote-buying 
enables vote-switching it has an inverted impact by leading to a decrease in vote-
switching when it reduces (Hicken et al., 2014). 
Urbanization has a high degree of influence on what vote-buyers take into account 
in determining to use vote-buying as an electoral strategy to influence the vote markets 
(Hicken, 2007).  The process of urbanization has a concomitant impact on the prevailing 
electoral strategies of political parties, in particular, the urbanization process results in the 
switch from open ballot to secret ballot as a result of the effects of, urbanization, rising 
education standards and increasing income of the electorate in urban communities (Aidt 
& Jensen, 2016). Accordingly, urbanization is one of the main factors that brought about 
reform in the electoral practice that led to the introduction of the secret ballot (Aidt & 
Jensen, 2016). 
Cinar (2016) argued that the electoral strategies that political parties use in the 
urban areas differ from the one they use in local areas. Cinar (2016) contended that the 
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mode of clientelism in the local areas, centers on respect for traditional authority 
(Weberianism) and the cultural bond and norms based on deference and loyalty, whereas 
the mode of clientelism in urban areas rests on competitive orientation (Dawnsianism). 
Thus, weberianism and dawnsianism define the electoral strategies that political parties 
use in the rural and urban areas. 
 Vote-buying and other forms of electoral malpractices affect democratic 
institutions adversely and erode trust in democracies (Chang & Chu, 2006). They impact 
on democratic accountability (Barreda, 2014). Democracies with a high electoral integrity 
have strengthened democratic institutions and better infrastructural development (Norris, 
Frank & i Coma, 2014). Even in authoritarian regimes, the perception of free and fair 
elections has a significant positive impact on the electorate’s trust in the governments 
(Sun, 2014). Nevertheless, given that secret ballots make it difficult for vote-buyers to 
monitor how voters’ votes, it is arguable that the effectiveness of vote-buying is 
determined by trust, and reciprocity (Hicken et al., 2015). 
Intrinsic reciprocity is a principal factor that sustains vote-buying because voters 
experience pleasure in the success of political favorites and reciprocate by voting for 
them when they receive money for votes from them (Finan & Schechter, 2012). Chong 
(2016) and Fossati (2016) found that reciprocity is one of the main driving forces in 
clientelism in new democracies because it plays a pivotal role in influencing voters to sell 
their votes in exchange for political support. Intrinsic reciprocity propels vote-buying 
notwithstanding other factors that might make it less feasible (Finan & Schechter, 2012). 
It has been found that vote-sellers exhibit a propensity to reciprocate the supposedly good 
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gesture by vote-buyers by voting for the preferred candidate of the vote-buyers that 
patronize them (Pan & Xiao 2014). 
Lawson and Greene (2014) contended that reciprocity has an overreaching impact 
on voters’ behavior because it makes vote-sellers feel obliged to abide by the dictates of 
the vote-buyers, and it is the feeling of obligation to vote-buyers that propels their 
inclination to vote as paid, even if the voting system is secret ballots. However, economic 
development and welfare programs can undercut the influence of reciprocity on vote-
selling. Swamy (2016) argued that government intervention in the welfare of the 
electorate by implementing social protection policies can weaken the operation of 
clientelism with respect to voters that have the propensity to sell their votes taken account 
of all the enabling factors.  
Further, incumbency plays an influential and determining role in vote-buying. 
Research on the phenomenon showed that incumbents are more likely to engage in vote-
buying as opposed to the opposition (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). Incumbents engage 
more in vote-buying because they are exposed to real resources and are in a position to 
spend more funds on vote-buying compared to the opposition that does not have similar 
access to real resources (Collier & Vicente, 2012). Consequently, an unbalanced 
exposure to funds or financial resources between political parties invariably induces 
incumbency advantage (Hanusch et al., 2016). Apart from incumbency, the political 
strongholds of political parties equally influence the potency and efficiency of vote-
buying. Rosas, Johnston, and Hawkins (2014) argued that local politicians buy votes in 
constituencies where they are less popular and distribute public goods in areas where they 
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enjoy considerable support. Conversely, Vicente (2014) argued that vote-buying occurs 
when there is an increase in political competition, and it consequently limits the 
advantages of incumbency during elections. It is arguable that in circumstances where 
there is political competition, vote-buying may have an adverse impact on the electoral 
success of an incumbent government and reduce its incumbency advantage (Devadoss & 
Luckstead, 2016). 
According to Gingerich and Medina (2013), one of the strategies that agents or 
representatives of political parties employ is to target social groups to make vote-buying 
effective. Politicians rely on social ties and target particular ethnic community 
strongholds with vote-buying to mobilize own strongholds and weaken opposition 
strongholds (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014). Cruz (2013) asserted that vote-buyers use social 
ties as the basis for targeting voters because of the advantages it offers them. First, social 
ties enable vote-buyers to target specific individuals or groups that will be amenable to 
vote-buying. Second, social ties enable representatives or agents of political parties to 
monitor how individuals vote because their close social connection makes it easy to 
uncover how individuals voted (Cruz, 2013). Hicken (2007) held that cultural norms and 
pervasiveness of patron-client social networks are some of the major factors that enable 
vote-buying. However, notwithstanding the influence of social network, it is not 
uncommon for vote-buyers to have regard to voters’ preferences when they engage in 
vote-buying (Smith & De Mesquita, 2012).  
There is a close link between vote-buying and credibility (Hanusch & Keefer, 
2013). Hanusch and Keefer (2013) argued that politicians engage in more vote-buying in 
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areas where their credibility is in question or low. Hanusch et al. (2016) maintained that 
vote- buying is more prevalent in democracies where politicians apparently had failed to 
make credible commitments and where political and democratic accountability is getting 
higher. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) found that the costs of improving the credibility of 
politicians result in an increase in vote-buying and lower investment in infrastructure and 
public services. Aside from the link between vote-buying and credibility, vote-buying is 
equally connected to electoral credibility in that its use as an electoral strategy by 
political parties in Nigeria impacts negatively on electoral credibility (Alfa & Marangos 
2016). 
 Politicians use vote-buying as an electoral strategy to build support base (Hicken, 
2011; Smith & De Mesquita, 2012). They use interest associations as conduits for vote-
buying and the interest associations, in turn, negotiate their relationship with the political 
parties in the intervening election periods (Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015).  
Onapajo et al. (2015) argued that voting methods impact on the feasibility of vote-
buying during elections. Vote-selling is, therefore, a product of the prevailing method of 
voting. Mares and Young (2016) noted that electoral rules such as secret ballot, electoral 
laws, and the system of government determined the extent, or affect the prevalence of 
vote-buying. The entrenchment of sound electoral rules makes the manipulation of the 
electoral system more difficult, but it also provides a more enabling environment for 
vote-selling (Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). 
In Nigeria and other developing democracies where vote-buying is prevalent, the 
phenomenon corrupts the electoral process (Echegaray, 2015). Devadoss and Luckstead 
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(2016) explained that vote-buyers engage in corrupt practices by obtaining funds at the 
start of the election cycle to maximize vote-buying during elections. Corruption and the 
expectation of the voters that politicians were willing to spend money to buy votes 
consequently fuel vote-buying (Alfa & Marangos, 2016). In particular, voters expect that 
politicians are willing to buy their votes, and acquiesce because of the perception that 
selling their votes provides them with an opportunity to partake in the sharing of the 
“national cake” (Onapajo et al., 2015).  
Pande (2011) pointed out that it is practically impossible to shape voters’ behavior 
positively in a corrupt electoral system that provides limited information about the 
performance of elected public office holder.  
Vote-Selling 
 There is no specific factor that causes or influences voters to sell their votes 
(Hicken, 2007). The nature of the electoral systems, the electoral process, and voting 
rules dictate the occurrence of vote-buying and vote-selling (Mares & Young, 2016; 
Onapajo et al., 2015; Pande; 2011). Vote-buying “is a function of a mix of 
socioeconomic, cultural and institutional factors” (Hicken, 2007, p. 58). Vote-buyers 
largely target voters based on their microeconomic conditions (Jensen & Justesen, 2014). 
Also, they target individuals and their political behavior (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). 
Fundamentally, the vote-buying strategy focuses on the socio-economic factors by 
targeting vulnerable persons (Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015). 
Khemani (2015) posited that poor voters placed more value on immediate benefits 
such as monetary benefits as opposed to long-term public services. Hicken (2007) argued 
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that the gross neglect of the poor was the main reason poor voters sell their votes. The 
poor who were aware of the huge resources at the disposal of the politicians believed that 
it is beneficial for them to sell their votes to obtain their share of the state’s resources 
(Onapajo et al., 2015). It is instructive that vote-buyers target poor voters because they do 
not enjoy the benefits of public services such as health services, clean water, good roads 
and other infrastructure that may be subject to election promises during elections (Jensen 
& Justesen, 2014). Shin (2015) took the view that demand and supply mechanisms 
dictate vote-selling and, that a greater demand for individualistic goods, as opposed to 
good policies leads to an increase in vote-selling.  
Owen (2013) asserted that poverty had a significant impact on the decision of the 
poor to sell their votes. It is not unusual for poorer voters, therefore, to perceive vote-
buying as part and parcel of politics or electoral strategy (Gonzalez‐Ocantos, De Jonge, 
Meléndez, Osorio, & Nickerson, 2012). Most importantly, poverty had led to the 
perception that vote-buying is a legitimate electoral strategy by political parties during 
elections (Jensen & Justesen, 2014). 
Owen (2013) suggested that age of the voters may affect their decision to accept 
offers to buy their votes because of their vulnerability. Hicken (2007) identified the 
income level of voters as having a significant effect on the decision to sell votes. 
Khemani (2015) stated that uneducated voters prefer immediate monetary benefits 
because they do not know how good governance can translate to good public services. As 
opposed to uneducated voters, educated voters recognize the value of the abstract societal 
costs attributed to vote-buying (Borang, Cornell, Grimes, & Schuster, 2014). It is, 
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however, right to say that education influences the vote-sellers’ perception of vote 
transactions (Hicken, 2007). In any event, illiteracy as one of the socio-economic factors 
that fueled vote-buying (Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007; Onapajo et al., 2015). It is hard to 
recognize the effects or costs of vote-selling because of its long-term impact. It might 
take a couple of electoral cycles for its negative effects to become apparent. Thus, the 
abstract nature of the cost of vote-buying to the society makes it acceptable to individuals 
that sell their votes (Borang et al., 2014). 
Consequences of Vote-Selling 
The negative consequences of vote-selling are not apparent because they attack 
the heart of democratic governance and unnoticeably erode its essence (Lucky, 2013). 
Jenson and Justesen (2014) noted that the consequential impact of vote-selling has been 
to cast doubt on the value of the practice of democracy because of its paradoxical 
disposition. On the one hand, democratic election enables voters to choose freely the 
candidates that they want to govern or rule over their affairs, while it equally allowed the 
use of vote-buying as an electoral strategy that influences the outcome of elections 
thereby corroding the essential character of democratic governance (Jenson & Justesen, 
2014). 
Vote-buying impacts policy outcomes from the source because policies emanate 
from an adverse selection of unsuitable politicians with lower qualities who are the 
products of vote-buying (Leight et al., 2015). Vote-buying has been found to diminish 
and corrode democratic essence of elections and governmental accountability (Gonzalez 
Ocantos et al., 2014).  
35 
 
Khemani (2015) noted that political economists have argued that elite capture 
caused underinvestment in public services that are beneficial to the poor. Vicente (2014) 
stated that worse public policies and public services were a consequence of vote-buying. 
Jenson and Justesen (2014) argued that vote-buying results in the reduction of supply of 
public goods. Gomez and Hansford (2012) maintained that vote-buying amounts to 
silencing the voice of the voters, and that it is destructive mainly because it adversely 
impacts on public services. 
 Hicken et al., (2014) associated vote-buying with inefficiencies in the public 
sector. Vote-buying as an electoral strategy leads to governmental and economic 
inefficiencies (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Vicente (2013) noted that vote-buying occurs 
where there is high political competition, and it invariably results to poor public welfare. 
Hanusch and Keefer (2013) observed that when vote-buying decreases public welfare 
increases.  
Vote-buying erodes public trust in political institutions because it exposes the 
institutions’ inability to regulate the electoral system (Hicken et al., 2014). Carreras and 
Irepoglu (2013) explained that vote-buying is linked intrinsically with voters’ perception 
of the trustworthiness of elections to the extent that when they raise questions about the 
election, they do not expect political institutions to deliver citizens’ demands for good 
public services (Carreras & Irepoglu, 2013). 
Vicente (2014) stated that vote-buying hinders policy accountability because of 
the manner policy makers were elected. Vote-buying corrodes the accountability that 
should derive from democratic elections (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Leight et al. (2015) 
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pointed out that vote-buying may hinder electoral accountability by the failure of voters 
to hold incumbent politicians accountable by trading their votes for money during 
elections. 
Election Strategies in Nigeria 
Nigerian elections have been controversial and fraught with election violence, 
fraud and massive rigging (Awopeju, 2011; Danjibo & Oladeji, 2007; Onapajo, 2014; 
Oni, Chidozie & Agbade, 2013). All the political parties tend to use various means to 
checkmate one another (Ajayi, 2006). It is difficult to extricate electoral fraud or 
manipulation from the history of elections in Nigeria. According to Awopeju (2011), 
election rigging dates back to the pre-independence when Nigeria was a British colony, in 
particular, the 1959 election and got worse when it became an independent country in 
1960. Danjibo and Oladeji (2007) claimed that electoral irregularities characterized all 
the elections that have been conducted in Nigeria. Awopeju (2011) noted that the 1961 
regional elections, 1964 general election, 1965 Western House of Assembly, 1979, 1983, 
1979, 1999, 2003 and 2007 general elections were flawed and characterized by various 
forms of electoral malpractices. Murana, Salaha, and Ibrahim (2014) pointed out that the 
different forms of election malpractices include but not limited to election rigging, ballot 
boxes’ snatching and stuffing, political intimidation, electoral violence including political 
thuggery and assassination.  
Kwasau (2013) enumerated the strategies political parties use to rig elections in 
Nigeria which include: bribing electoral officials, the police, and other enforcement 
officials to collude in the acts of rigging; diverting ballot papers to private residence for 
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thump-printing and falsification of electoral papers; multiple voting; using under-aged 
children as voters; distribution of voting cards to unregistered voters to vote on election 
days; bribing agents of other political parties to collude with the political party offering 
the bribe to falsify election results; and distributing food and other goods to induce voters 
to vote for a particular party. 
Vote-selling, one of the rigging methods is pervasive in Nigeria where about 20% 
of voters normally sell their votes, and sizeable numbers of voters are exposed to vote-
buying (Bratton, 2008; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter, 2014). Vote-buying became an 
electoral strategy in Nigeria after independence and reached a crescendo during the 1993 
primary and presidential elections (Lucky, 2013). It is no more limited to general 
elections but has extended to primary elections (Olarinmoye, 2008). In recent elections, 
vote-selling has become the most prominent electoral strategy amongst political parties in 
Nigeria because of voters’ perception that election provides them with opportunities 
partake in the sharing of the “national cake” (Onapajo et al., 2015). The voters’ 
perception was fashioned by the apparent and speedy transformation of elected political 
office holders after assumption of office to very wealthy individuals (Onapajo et al., 
2015).  Invariably, voters hold skeptical view of the integrity of elections in Nigeria, pay 
little or no regard to election promises and are willing trade their votes “to the highest 
bidder” (Lucky, 2013). It is, therefore, instructive that voters do not consider vote-selling 
unethical (Onapajo et al., 2015). 
Owen (2013) defined vote-buying “as a process consisting of an offer made to 
purchase the vote of an individual of voting age, who accepts the offer, receives 
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compensation, shows up at the polling station, and then votes as paid.” In the vote-buying 
process, money is at the “center stage” (Lucky, 2013). The Nigerian vote-buying process 
begins with the creation of budgets for separate funds that they refer to as “logistics” for 
the purpose of vote-buying by political parties (Onapajo et al., 2015). The political parties 
in Nigeria engage in the following vote-buying strategies in the process of executing their 
election budgets for vote-buying: 
1. Door-to-Door campaigning by local representatives or agents of candidates 
for political offices and political parties. The Nigerian “door-to-door” 
campaign is unique in its operation because it involves the distribution of cash 
to registered voters with the expectation that the electorate who receive cash 
will reciprocate by voting for the preferred candidates or political parties of 
the vote-sellers on the election day; 
2. Mobilization for Voters’ Cards Registration. Political parties and political 
leaders in the local communities pay cash to individuals of voting age during 
voters’ registration exercises to register to vote in future elections, and 
3. “See and Buy” vote-buying strategy. The strategy involves the monitoring of 
actual votes of vote-sellers at the polling booths by individuals representing 
political parties or the contestants who position themselves strategically in 
locations where they could confirm how the voters voted (Onapajo et al., 
2015). 
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Election as a Democratic Vehicle 
 An election is a developmental vehicle in new democracies that drives the 
nations’ economies and advance their economic policies insofar as they are free and fair 
(Chauvet & Collier, 2009). Collier and Vicente (2014) argued that elections in Africa are 
peculiar because they do not, in general, impact positively on the economies except 
where oppositions won, and incumbent governments lost elections. In Nigeria, elections 
have not transformed the political space or advanced its economy because of questionable 
electoral integrity resulting from clientelism, vote-buying and other electoral malpractices 
that have brought about poor political leadership and poor public service delivery 
(Omotosho, 2014). The pervasiveness of vote-buying in the new and emerging 
democracies resultantly has only had negative effects on good governance and 
accountability (Kramon, 2013). 
 In the last few decades, there has been a renaissance of clientelism whereby voters 
decide on whether or not to vote for particular candidates or political parties on the basis 
of immediate or future payoffs as opposed to their political conviction or election 
promises made by candidates (Cornell & Grimes, 2015). It is noteworthy that election 
strategies develop in stages. Electoral history of most democracies shows that clientelism 
normally metamorphoses to vote-buying (Pellicer et al., 2014). Carreras and Irepoglu 
(2013) argued that another election strategy that leads to vote-buying in new democracies 
is outright vote-rigging.  
 Kennedy (2010) argued that democratic development takes place in stages, and 
that vote-buying occurred in the early stages of democracy and provided an interesting 
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example of vote-buying at play at the early stages of democracy in the United States of 
America: 
On Election Day, July 24, it is a warm summer morning, and rural voters come to  
the polling site ready to vote. Before eligible voters cast their ballots, however, 
they are treated to an endless flow of beer and wine compliments of a wealthy 
candidate. Indeed, this candidate is a newcomer to the political stage, and he is 
spending a large sum of money to challenge the incumbent (i.e., the gift of beer 
and wine to influence voters). Of course, the affluent candidate is pouring the 
wine himself. His representative pours the beverages and reminds voters who is 
providing the drink. The new candidate beats the incumbent and receives the most 
votes in a competitive, “free and fair” election. The actual date of this election is 
July 24, 1758, for a seat in the Virginia House of Burgesses, and the rich 
candidate is American’s first president, George Washington (Abbott, 1993). (p. 
617) 
Jensen and Justesen (2014) pointed out that it is not unusual for new democracies 
to experience vote-buying at the early stages of their democracy but that the phenomenon 
usually fades away with economic development. It is arguable, having regards to the 
democratic experience of the United States of America and Great Britain where vote-
buying took place in the early stages of their democratization, that vote-buying does not 
necessarily subvert democracy (Kennedy, 2010).  
Kennedy (2010) asserted that vote-buying in another sense is an important 
indicator of democratic development because it takes place in democracies where there is 
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a reasonable degree of free and fair elections. Hicken et al. (2014) acknowledged that 
vote-buying and vote-selling are prevalent in most developing countries. Jensen and 
Justesen (2014) described vote-buying in developing democracies as “an integral feature 
of electoral politics” (p. 220). It has, therefore, been concretized and standardized as an 
electoral strategy by political parties in most African developing democracies (Collier & 
Vicente, 2014; Cruz, Keefer & Labonne, 2015, Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Kramon, 2013; 
Onapajo et al., 2015).  
The prevalence of vote-buying in developing democracies and its hindrance on 
democratization has adverse effects on governance and public service delivery 
(Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2011). To this extent, Collier and Vicente (2012) 
described vote-buying and other illegitimate electoral strategies in developing 
democracies as a “new degenerate form of democracy” (p. 118).  
 Many researchers were of the view that vote-buying is antithetical to democratic 
development, and hamper the advancement of democratization in new democracies 
(Kennedy, 2010). Lippert-Rasmussen (2011) concluded that vote buying “distort 
democratic deliberation” (p. 144). Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) found that vote-buying 
contradicts the principle of electoral fairness and hampers democratic development. The 
phenomenon favors the incumbent candidates for public offices that have access to 
government resources, against opposition candidates that do not have access to the same 
resources, therefore, creating unequal resources on the electoral playing field (Carreras & 
Irepoglu, 2013). Leight et al. (2015) maintained that vote-buying subverts democracy and 
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hinders democratic accountability because it defeats the intent and purpose of regular 
controls associated with cyclical elections.  
 In any event, vote buyers marshaled enormous financial and organizational 
resources to vote-buying for it to be efficacious, and they used the strategy as a last resort 
in circumstances where other electoral strategies of manipulation would be ineffective 
(Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). 
Corruption and Infrastructure 
Corruption is prevalent in Nigerian politics, and it is common knowledge that 
politicians illegally convert public funds for personal gains and discard their 
responsibility to provide roads, healthcare, electricity, good education and other 
necessary infrastructure (Ajisebiyawo, 2016). Political corruption emanates from the 
perpetration of electoral fraud by political parties and candidates seeking to hold public 
offices. Consequently, the electoral fraud inhibits the electoral process (Kurer, 2002). It 
affects public administration adversely and distorts the democratic process (Hicken et al., 
2015). 
Rose-Ackerman (2001) argued that corruption has its root in the organization of 
the electoral process, the organization of the legislative process, and influence of wealthy 
groups. The three factors “affect politicians’ willingness to accept illegal payoffs, voters’ 
toleration of such payoffs, and the willingness to pay off wealthy groups” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2002, p.35). These factors play a determinative role to the incidence of 
corruption for the following reasons: 
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1. The willingness of wealthy individuals or groups to seek award of large-scale 
contracts from the government and the willingness of the elected public office 
holders to receive illegal payoffs or bribes from wealthy groups. 
2. The willingness of the elected public office holders to satisfy the interests of 
the wealthy groups by manipulating the legislative process and outcomes for 
the wealthy interests. 
3. The readiness of voters to tolerate the illegal collaboration between the elected 
public office holders and wealthy groups impact on the electoral process by 
way of vote-buying and other rigging strategies. (Rose-Ackerman, 2001) 
Keig, Brouthers, and Marshall (2015) asserted that there is formal corruption 
environment (FCE) and informal corruption environment (ICE) components in an 
operating environment. According to them, FCE involves large-scale corruption that is 
embedded in the institutional structure while ICE involves small-scale corrupt activities 
by individuals in their everyday lives (Keig et al., 2015). The governing political parties 
have access to enormous resources that they use to facilitate vote-buying during elections 
(Collier & Vicente, 2012). They use the enormous government resources to create the 
FCE and engage in large-scale corruption by placing more emphasis on projects that have 
less social or economic value to the electorate (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). 
The elected public officer holders in the developing democracies do not make 
credible commitments regarding the provision of adequate infrastructure as a result of 
lack of transparency and accountability or political corruption in general (Hanusch et al., 
2016).These bad public policies and the resultant inadequate infrastructure are traceable 
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to vote-buying that consequently brings about lack of policy accountability (Vicente, 
2014). Vote-buying does not only bring about reduced or lack of accountability, but it 
also enables political corruption that causes inefficient public administration (Hicken et 
al., 2015).  
 Kennedy (2010) contended that there are different stages of democratic 
development. At the lowest level of democratic development, there is a correlation 
between political corruption and the level of democracy (Assiotis & Sylwester, 2014). It 
is at the early stage of democracy that vote-buying occurs (Kennedy, 2010). It is, 
nevertheless, arguable that political corruption and vote-buying hinders the process of 
democratization, inhibits good governance and affects the provision or allocation of 
infrastructure and the delivery of public service (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2011). 
The lack of good governance leads to political corruption while good governance has 
been found to result in a significant reduction in corruption (Yusuf, Malarvizhi, 
Mazumder, & Su, 2014). It is rather unfortunate that global corruption enables corruption 
in developing democracies and consequently, contributes to electoral corruption and bad 
governance in developing democracies (Makinde, 2013).  
 Lippert-Rasmussen (2011) found that political corruption and vote-buying, in 
particular, distorts the democratic process. Consequently, electoral fraud and vote-buying 
invariably inhibit the democratic process because democracy, political corruption and 
electoral corruption are antithetical to democratic development (Kurer, 2002). Given that 
corruption distorts the democratic process in developing democracies, it is arguable that it 
hinders economic growth because of the effects of corruption on the allocation of 
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resources (Jain, 2015). Assiotis and Sylwester (2014) contended that corruption is 
directly linked to the level of democracy and economic growth. It is, however, inversely 
related to economic development and growth (Shuaib, Ekeria, & Ogedengbe, 2015). 
Accordingly, Assiotis and Sylwester (2014) found that the correlation between corruption 
and economic growth is negative. Dridi (2013) however, found that the adverse 
consequences of corruption on economic growth reflect on human capital and political 
instability. The general conclusion is that political corruption is an essential deterrent to 
economic growth and development (Jain, 2015). 
It follows that in developing democracies, elected public office holders tend to 
provide narrowly-focused goods and services rather than broad-based public services 
because of corruption induced public policies (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Corruption fuels 
their tendency to make policy decisions that place more value on high-value and large-
scale construction projects and less value on social beneficial and growth-enhancing 
projects (Jain, 2015). Political corruption, thus, dictates public spending in new 
democracies. It makes elected public office holders to divert public spending to less 
productive projects instead of growth-enhancing projects (Ogunlana, Bakare, & 
Omobitan (2016). Odo (2015) argued that corruption induced public spending 
undermines capital development. He explained that political corruption obscures financial 
information regarding public spending to prevent the electorate from understanding the 
allocation of financial resources (Odo, 2015).  
Corruption has adverse effects on socio-economic policies and government 
projects and deters the execution of developmental projects (Odo, 2015). Mainly, elected 
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public office holders prioritize projects in which they derive personal gains as opposed to 
infrastructure that have socio-economic benefits (Jain, 2001). They favor projects that 
will enable them to enrich themselves personally rather projects that have social benefits 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2002). Jain (2001) explained that corruption influences the allocation 
of public funds and the choice of projects that the elected public office holders choose to 
execute, and that they place considerations for their personal gains above the socio-
economic value of the projects. 
Political corruption, in particular, electoral fraud has negative effects on policy-
making and the allocation of capital projects or infrastructure (Odo, 2015). Electoral 
fraud has its root in the post-election activities of the elected public office holders 
(Devadoss & Luckstead, 2016). It is prevalent at the start of an election cycle because 
political parties need wealthy interests to finance elections and wealthy persons target 
government and policy outcomes for their business interests (Rose-Ackerman, 2002). 
Hence, elected public office holders engage in corrupt practices at the early stages of the 
election cycles to fund future elections and maximize vote-buying (Devadoss & 
Luckstead, 2016).   
Another destructive effect of political corruption is its tendency to undermine 
public trust (Odo, 2015). Fundamentally, the lack of public trust enables corruption to 
permeate the electoral system and governmental activities (Odo, 2015). Thus, political 
corruption invariably leads to poor infrastructure (Gillanders, 2014). 
Ogbuagu and Effiom (2014) found that there is a close nexus between political 
corruption and inadequate provision or decadence of infrastructure. They opined that lack 
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of accountability and transparency invariably lead to the inadequate provision of 
infrastructure (Ogbuagu, & Effiom, 2014). Thus, the lack of accountability and 
transparency are causally linked to political corruption and leads to the provision of low 
infrastructural quality (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). Tanzi and Davoodi’s (1997) assertion 
supports Castro,  Guccio and Rizzo’s (2014) finding that there is a close connection 
between the level of corruption and the provision of efficient and quality infrastructure. 
There is, therefore, a close connection between political corruption and inadequate 
provision of infrastructure on the one hand, and political corruption and low quality of 
infrastructure on the other hand (Castro et al., 2014; Ogbuagu & Effiom, 2014). In any 
event, corruption leads to inefficient public service delivery and provision of inadequate 
infrastructure (Gillanders, 2014).  
The findings by Castro et al., (2014), Gillanders (2014), Ogbuagu and Effiom 
(2014), and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) give credence to the theory of reciprocal 
determinism by asserting the interactions between environmental and personal factors. 
The above studies show that political corruption, lack of accountability and transparency 
lead to the provision of inadequate infrastructure. However, the studies did not explore 
whether the state of infrastructure could lead to political corruption. This 
phenomenological study seeks to explore the connection between the state of 
infrastructure and vote-selling, by providing textual descriptions of the circumstances that 
influenced voters’ behavior during the election.  
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Eliminating Vote-Selling 
 Vote-buying and vote-selling are products of electoral systems, the electoral 
process, and voting rules (Mares & Young; 2016; Onapajo et al., 2015; Pande; 2011). 
Developing democracies would be well advised to reform their electoral system and 
voting rules to reduce or eliminate vote-buying and vote-selling, and facilitate good 
governance, economic growth, and prosperity. However, politicians that subscribe to 
vote-buying objects to electoral reform that will limit or destruct their electoral strategy 
(Cruz & Keefer, 2015). 
 Economic development can have a positive effect on an electoral practice that will 
consequently lead to the eradication of poverty with the resultant effect of reducing or 
eliminating vote-selling (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Further, educating voters on the 
adverse consequences of vote-buying may reduce voters’ propensity to sell votes 
(Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009). 
Summary and Conclusions 
Owen (2013) suggested that scholars need to explore the vote-buying process 
from the vote-sellers’ perspectives. This study sought to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating common and lived experiences of voters in Akoko North Federal 
Constituency through the voters’ perspectives and explore the connection between the 
provision infrastructure and vote-selling during the elections.  
Khemani (2015) maintained that although there have been findings linking the 
principle of elite capture with underinvestment in developing democracies, and proposed 
that there is the need to examine other factors, in particular, “the equilibrium 
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consequences for public policy performance when governments gain or (or lose) office in 
elections with widespread vote buying” (p.85).  
Cruz et al. (2015) considered the effect of voter information with regard to the 
provision of public services on vote-buying. They concluded that voter information led to 
an increase in vote buying and suggested that there is a need for future research to find 
out whether candidates would have reacted to voter information by providing more public 
services rather than increasing vote-buying, if the voters had been provided with the 
information earlier in the election cycle (Cruz et al., 2015). Bardhan et al., (2015) took 
the view that public services that provide recurring benefits would ordinarily translate to 
an increase in voter support. They did not consider whether public services that provide 
recurring benefits have any impact on vote-selling. 
Khemani (2015) noted that it is important to examine specifically how vote-
buying adversely affects political incentives to invest on pro-poor public services. 
Khemani (2015) observed that there is evidence showing that when politicians purchase 
votes, they trade the votes off against the provision and delivery of public services. 
Khemani (2015) concluded that there is a strong correlation between vote-buying and 
underinvestment and poor delivery of public services. Onapajo et al. (2015) maintained 
that there is a strong connection between the political economy of a state and vote-
buying. The overarching perspective or submission of the available research is that a link 
exists between vote buying and public service delivery.  
  Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2011) noted that voters do not engage in vote-
selling where it is apparent that elected political office holders are delivering public 
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services. They were of the view that in new democracies, political parties are usually 
slow in delivering good public services and the lack of public services fuels vote-buying 
(Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2011). Baldwin (2013) took the view that voters’ 
behavior is predicated on the expectation that local chiefs will exert their influence on the 
political office holders to provide them with public services. Weghorst and Lindberg 
(2013) contended that clientelism reduces when voters have the perception that 
politicians can produce good public services.   
Gilbert and Allen (2014) found a connection between good governance and 
democratic practice and concluded that the missing link in the Nigerian democratic 
experience is good governance. Despite the agreement by researchers that there is a 
connection between the provision of public services and vote-buying or clientelism, none 
of the literature examined the connection between infrastructure and public service 
delivery, and vote-selling.  
 In the next chapter, I provide a detailed methodology employed in the study. In 
the first section, I present an overview of the research design and rationale for the design. 
In the second section, I address the role of the researcher in the research process. In the 
following sections, I discuss the sampling frame, sampling description, sampling strategy, 
and explain the data collection protocol. In the fifth section, I describe the Moustakas’s 
(1994) transcendental phenomenological approach to data analysis and the main steps the 
study will use to analyze the data.  I address the issues of trustworthiness and ethical 
considerations in the subsequent sections. In the final section, I provide a summary and  
conclusion of the research methodology. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences with respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, delivery of public services, and voting during elections in Akoko North 
West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. Khamani (2015) used a quantitative 
method to provide “the first direct evidence in the literature of a robust correlation 
between vote buying and low investments in broad, untargeted public services which are 
particularly valuable for the poor” (p. 90). None of the existing literature explored the 
connection between public service delivery and vote-selling or used the qualitative 
method to explore the lived experiences of voters who experienced the vote-selling 
phenomenon (Cruz et al., 2015; Khemani, 2015; Onapajo et al., 2015). This study, 
however, used the qualitative method with a phenomenological approach to explore what 
voters experienced about vote-selling, and what circumstances influenced individuals’ 
experiences of vote-selling (Moustaka, 1994). 
Creswell (2013) pointed out that researchers employ qualitative inquiry to explore 
social and human phenomena. The qualitative paradigm enables researchers to explore 
concepts and phenomena that are difficult to understand or that require better 
understanding (Hoang-Kim et al., 2014). Qualitative research helps researchers to study 
nonphysical phenomena such as “people’s motivations, perceptions, behaviors, or 
lifestyle” (Hoang-Kim et al., 2014).  Further, the qualitative method helps researchers to 
turn the search lights on systemic issues to find potential solutions (Patton, 2015). 
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Researchers, therefore, use qualitative methods to explore, illuminate, and interpret 
concepts and phenomena by focusing on natural settings and individuals (Creswell, 2013; 
Patton, 2015).  
Researchers use qualitative inquiry to have in-depth understanding of phenomena 
in natural settings. Marshall (1996) explained that qualitative studies provide 
“illumination and understanding of complex psychological issues and are most useful for 
answering humanistic ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ questions” (p. 522).  Neuman (2014) submitted 
that “in general, qualitative research is suitable for studies designed to expand our 
knowledge of the substrata of complex phenomena” (p. 71).  
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the transcendental phenomenological 
paradigm. I explain how Moustakas’s (1994) phenomenological method of inquiry 
applies to the study and provide the rationale for chosen the approach. I clarify my role as 
the researcher in the study, describe the sampling strategies, and outline the rationale for 
the chosen sample size.  Additionally, I explain the interviewing procedures and provide 
a detailed explanation of how the data will be analyzed.  
Research Design and Rationale 
This study employed the transcendental phenomenological approach to return the 
voters participating in the research to their experiences and elicit relevant information 
from them to gain insight into the phenomenon of vote-selling and its connection with 
infrastructure and public services. The research question for this study was the following: 
“How do individuals who participated in the most recent elections describe their lived 
experiences of vote-selling in relation to the provision of infrastructure and public 
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services in Akoko North West Local Government?” Patton (2015) contended that 
researchers use the phenomenological approach to identify the essence of human 
experience about a phenomenon based on how individuals who experienced it describe 
their experiences. A phenomenological study uses the lived experiences of several 
individuals concerning a phenomenon as described by them to identify a common 
meaning for the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). Accordingly, Moustakas (1994) asserted 
that “phenomenology is committed to descriptions of experiences” (p. 58).  
Researchers in phenomenological studies have to derive their evidence from 
direct reports by individuals who have experienced the phenomenon under study 
(Moustakas, 1994).  Moustakas (1994) explained that “in accordance with 
phenomenological principles, scientific investigation is valid when the knowledge sought 
is arrived at through descriptions that make possible an understanding of the meanings 
and essences of experience” (p. 84). The focus of this phenomenological study was the 
experiences of individuals about vote-selling and the description of their experiences of 
the phenomenon. 
 The study explored common meanings ascribed to vote-selling by capturing and 
describing the lived experiences of individuals about the phenomenon (Patton, 2015). 
Moustakas (1994) stated that “phenomenology is committed to descriptions of 
experiences” (p. 58). The phenomenological approach was best suited for the research 
question of this study, which involved explicating the meanings and common experiences 
of individuals in relation to the phenomenon of vote-selling.  
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Moustakas (1994) argued that the investigation in a phenomenological study 
focuses on carefully formulated research questions. The research questions in turn guide 
the investigation. He concluded that “every method relates back to the question, is 
developed solely to illuminate the question, and provide a portrayal of the phenomenon 
that is vital, rich, and layered in its textures and descriptions” (p. 59). The research 
question for this study using phenomenology as a method of inquiry was the following: 
“How do individuals who participated in the most recent elections describe their lived 
experiences of vote-selling in relation to the provision of infrastructure and public 
services in Akoko North West Local Government?” 
According to Moustakas’s (1994), empirical phenomenological inquiry takes 
individuals back to their experiences to develop detailed descriptions of these 
experiences, thereby portraying or deriving essences or structures of the experiences. It 
follows that the phenomenological approach helps researchers gain insight into 
phenomena and develop fresh understandings of lived experiences of phenomena through 
first-hand accounts by persons who have experienced them (Wilson, 2016).  
The purpose of the phenomenological approach is to discover the meaning and 
essence of an experience for individuals by conducting interviews in which participants 
provide detailed descriptions of their experiences to derive the essence of the experience 
(Moustakas, 1994). The qualitative approach to research that was best suited to capturing 
the essence of the phenomenon of vote-selling by eliciting rich information from 
individuals who had experienced the phenomenon was the phenomenological approach.  
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Moustakas (1994) pointed out that researchers conducting phenomenological 
studies need to ask two general questions: What have individuals experienced regarding 
the phenomenon? How have individuals experienced the phenomenon, or what 
circumstances have influenced their experience? He described the two main questions as 
involving the textual and structural components of experience (Moustakas, 1994). 
Moustakas (1994) explained that researchers should determine “the textual components 
of experience, the ‘what’ of the appearing phenomenon” (p. 78), and the structural 
components of the experience, which entail “conscious acts of thinking and judging, 
imaging, and recollecting, in order to arrive at the core structural meanings” (p. 79).  
The overarching research question for this study and the interview questions were 
formulated in line with Moustakas’s transcendental phenomenological approach to elicit 
textual descriptions from the voters and the structural components of what influenced 
their behavior during the election. Accordingly, the focus of the investigation during data 
collection was the central research question (Moustakas, 1994). 
Appropriateness of the Design 
I considered other main approaches (narrative, grounded theory, ethnography, and 
case study) to employing the qualitative method but found the phenomenological 
approach best suited for this study. Narrative research involves the collection of “stories 
from individuals (and documents, and group conversations) about individuals’ lived and 
told experiences” (Creswell, 2013, p. 84). Narrative research would not have been 
suitable for the study because it is limited to collecting stories, in contrast to a 
phenomenological approach, which enabled me to explore the vote-selling phenomenon. 
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When using the grounded theory approach, researchers seek to develop or generate a 
theory to explain “a process, an action or interaction shaped by the views of a large 
number of participants” (Creswell, 2013, p. 92). Grounded theory uses a deductive 
inquiry process. Patton (2015) contended that grounded theory emphasizes theory 
construction or theorizing based on research findings. I was unable to use grounded 
theory because I did not seek to generate a causal theory from views of individuals who 
had experienced vote-selling. I considered ethnography but found it unsuitable because it 
is limited to the study of a culture-sharing group or a subset of a group in order to 
describe and interpret the group’s shared values, behaviors, and beliefs (Creswell, 2013). 
A case study involves observing and collecting data regarding a real-life activity or 
process from an individual, a group, an organization, a decision-making process, or a 
project (Creswell, 2013). Case study was not appropriate because I sought to explore 
what the individuals had experienced in relation to the vote-selling phenomenon and the 
circumstances that influenced the individuals’ experiences.  
Role of the Researcher 
 The role of the researcher in a phenomenological study is fundamental and critical 
to the overall outcome of the research or the research findings. Moustakas (1994) asserted 
that there is overlap between viewing something from a personal perspective and viewing 
something as a whole. He claimed, however, that researchers can place the focus of the 
research in a bracket and set aside everything “so that the entire research process is 
rooted solely on the topic and question” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 97).  
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I have been actively involved in Nigerian politics for the last 6 years and 
participated in the most recent elections in Ondo State, Nigeria. My participation in 
politics and my personal experience might have influenced my assumption that the 
nonfulfillment of electoral promises, inadequate provision of infrastructure, and poor 
delivery of public services as a result of corruption might shape voters’ behaviors. I 
isolated my own personal experiences and perceptions to focus the study solely on the 
research question.  
 I set aside all extraneous considerations and preconceptions during the 
interviewing process to purify the information that I received from the participants. I 
ensured that I perceived and understood the participants’ descriptions of the phenomenon 
and all of the information they provided during the interview. Additionally, I used 
probing and follow-up questions in addition to the open-ended questions. The probing 
and follow-up questions enabled me to delve deeper into the participants’ personal 
experiences and allowed them to provide in-depth information regarding the phenomenon 
under study. 
Sampling Frame and Sampling Description 
Sampling involves the researcher choosing individuals as informants (Wilson, 
2016). It is paramount to identify the unit of analysis before commencing case selection 
or making decisions regarding sample size (Patton, 2015). Additionally, in order to 
determine the appropriate sample size, the researcher needs to take account of the 
research question, research purpose, sample size that will positively impact the credibility 
of the study, and time and available resources (Patton, 2015).  
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The population studied was Akoko North West Local Government. This local 
government has 168 polling units, 10 wards, and 64,735 eligible voters (“Independent 
National Electoral Commission,” 2015; “Ondo Elections,” 2016). It was estimated that a 
sample of 10 to 15 individual participants would be appropriate to answer the research 
question sufficiently and creditably (Creswell, 2013). In qualitative research, an 
appropriate sample size enables a researcher to fulfill research objectives sufficiently and 
creditably (Marshall, 1996), elicit information leading to insights, and identify themes 
and categories for cross-case theme analysis (Creswell, 2013). The purpose of using a 
small sample is to allow the researcher to describe sufficiently and in detail what the 
phenomenon means for individuals who experienced it (Creswell, 2013).  
 I selected one individual from each of the 10 wards in the local government to 
gain in-depth knowledge of the lived experiences of voters in Akoko North West Local 
Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. Participants were expected to have resided 
continuously in Akoko North West Local Government for at least 5 years and be able to 
share their personal experiences about vote-selling as well as about the state of the 
infrastructure and delivery of public services in the local government. They were 
expected to have participated in past elections for the local government and to have been 
exposed to vote-selling. It is noteworthy that vote-selling is prevalent in Nigeria. Most 
voters have been exposed to vote-selling, and a sizable number are cynical vote-sellers 
(Lucky, 2013).   
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Sampling Strategy 
 The sampling method adopted for this study was purposeful sampling. Purposeful 
sampling is the deliberate selection of information-rich individuals who have in-depth 
knowledge about the phenomenon under study and will be able to provide illuminating 
information that will enable researchers to reach credible conclusions or make credible 
findings (Creswell, 2013; Maxwell, 2013). Patton (2015) asserted that the aim of 
purposeful sampling is the identification and selection of information-rich individuals to 
undertake in-depth research. Purposeful sampling therefore involves the active selection 
of the most appropriate sample that will answer the research question (Marshall, 1996).  
Purposeful sampling helps researchers to ensure that the selection of the sample 
aligns with the research question, research purpose, and data (Patton, 2015). I used 
purposeful sampling to select individuals who had been approached for vote-selling and 
had participated in the most recent elections. Purposeful sampling was most suitable for 
this phenomenological study because the participants had experienced the phenomenon 
and they were willing to describe their experiences in an interview (Moustakas, 1994). 
The following purposeful sampling selection strategies were employed to 
deliberately select individuals who had experienced the phenomenon to provide 
illuminating information. 
Group Selection 
The group selection strategy involves discretionary selection of individual 
participants from major subgroups of a population (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). 
The maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling strategy is used to capture themes that 
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are common to diverse situations or people (Patton, 2015). I used the maximum variation 
(heterogeneity) sampling strategy to undertake discretionary selection of the sample, 
giving regard to the following factors: gender, age, level of education, and employment 
status. The strategy enabled the selection of participants with different profiles. The 
strategy brought forth common themes from individuals with diverse backgrounds. The 
credibility of the findings was enhanced because the data emerged from a heterogeneous 
sample (Patton, 2015). 
Time-Location 
The time-location sample strategy was used to locate and select individuals who 
had first-hand experience of vote-selling because they had participated in the most recent 
elections in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria, and had been 
approached for vote-selling. 
Criterion Sampling 
 The criterion sampling strategy was used to select potential participants who 
satisfied the following inclusion criteria: (a) individuals who participated in the most 
recent elections—that is, registered voters who voted in the 2012, 2015, and 2016 
elections; (b) individuals who had been exposed to vote-selling; and (c) individuals who 
had continuously resided in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria 
for at least the last 5 years. 
Participant Selection 
I sought to identify individuals who could shed light on the interview questions 
and the vote-selling phenomenon. I used purposeful sampling to select individuals who 
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had knowledge about vote-selling because they had participated in the most recent 
elections, had been approached for vote-selling, and had continuously resided in Akoko 
North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria, for the last 5 years. 
I used lists from the Independent National Electoral Commission, Nigeria (INEC) 
indicating registered voters for the 2012, 2015, and 2016 elections to identify individuals 
who met the inclusion criteria and to select three individuals from each ward in Akoko 
North West Local Government. 
Available research shows that vote-selling is a product of social, economic 
cultural and institutional factors (Hicken, 2007). It follows that the level of education of 
the interview participants may have a significant impact on their perception and how they 
describe their lived experiences. Also, age, gender, and income level may affect their 
perception of the vote-selling phenomenon. Therefore, I paid attention to some essential 
characteristics and used the maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling strategy to 
select the potential participants from the following groups – gender, age, level of 
education, and employment status because various factors such as poverty, 
unemployment, age, low level of education and income may affect the perception of 
voters on the vote-selling phenomenon.  
The sampling selection strategies enabled me to select potential participants with 
the required essential characteristics. I initially selected three individuals from each of the 
10 wards in the local government for the interview. Subsequently, I deliberately selected 
one out of three individuals from each ward as participants by using criterion sampling, 
group sampling, and time-location selection strategies. The size of the sample enabled me 
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to answer the research objectives sufficiently and creditably. The individuals who were 
not selected at this stage remained as alternate participants to replace any participant who 
may drop out of the study in the event of any unforeseen circumstances.  I contacted 
potential participants by telephone numbers and visit them at their homes. I introduced 
myself to them. I asked them whether they were willing to participate in the study and 
asked them the following demographic information: age, gender, employment status, and 
level of education.  
I handed the letter of invitation and informed consent form to them. The invitation 
letter include the following information: request to participate in the study, purpose of the 
study, researcher’s details, criteria for participation, voluntary nature of the participation, 
right to withdraw at any time from the interview, duration of the interview, venue of the 
interview, confidentiality statement, digital voice-recorder to record the interview, 
verification of recorded responses to questions by the interviewees, benefit of the study to 
participants, compensation, storage of data and request to sign consent form. Again, I 
made a verbal explanation of the purpose of the study so that they fully understand the 
purpose and nature of the interview. I explained that the interviews would only take place 
if they agreed verbally to proceed and sign the consent form. I verified that all the 
participants satisfied the criterion of having participated in the most recent elections by 
checking their voters’ cards. I asked whether they have resided continuously in the local 
government for at least 5 years. Vote-selling is prevalent in Nigeria (Lucky, 2013). I 
asked the potential participants whether they have been exposed to vote-selling and 
informed them that I would not proceed with any individual that has not been exposed to 
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vote-selling. I re-visited them after seven days of handing them the invitation letter and 
informed consent form to confirm their willingness to participate in the study and 
collected the signed informed consent form. 
I arranged a mutually convenient serene venue, such as town halls, community 
centers, and their private residence, for the interviews. Also, I arranged the date and time 
of interview. I gave the interview questions to the participants in advance. I prepared 
notebooks, digital voice-recorder, and batteries in readiness for the interview. I conducted 
a face-to-face interview.  
I verified that the individual participants had resided in Akoko North Local 
Government, had participated in the most recent elections, and had been exposed to vote-
selling before the interview commenced. I sought permission from the participants to 
record the interviews. I masked the participants’ names and personal details by assigning 
them with codes, P1 to P15. I took detailed notes and use a digital recorder to record the 
interviews. The face-to-face interviews were extensive and detailed.  
Data Collection 
  I used interviewing as the data collection tool and relied on information from 
individuals who possess an in-depth knowledge about the vote-selling phenomenon in 
this transcendental phenomenological study. Interviewing involves a meeting of two 
persons whereby the interviewer uses questions to elicit information from the interviewee 
(Janesick, 2011). In research studies, interviewing involves the collection of information 
that the researcher conceives to be relevant to the study from the interviewee (Patton, 
2015). I sought to elicit information from the interviewees using the interview protocol 
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(Appendix A) as a guide. Moustakas (1994) asserted that “the phenomenological 
interview involves an informal, interactive process and utilizes open-ended comments 
and questions” (p. 114). Interviewing is, therefore, the most appropriate method of data 
collection for this phenomenological study because it enabled me to gather information 
about vote-selling by way of informal and interactive interviews. Also, the interviews 
enabled the participants to reveal or disclose their personal experiences with respect to 
the provision of infrastructure, delivery of public services, and vote-selling during 
elections. 
 The overarching research question was open-ended, and the interview questions 
were semistructured open-ended questions. Semistructured, open-ended questions help 
researchers to use the same predetermined sequence to ask the interviewees the same set 
of open-ended questions (Patton, 2015). The interviewees were asked probing questions 
from issues arising from their responses as the interview evolved. The open-ended 
questions gave the interviewees liberty to share their stories without any inhibition from 
the interviewer. Essentially, the open-ended questions helped the participants to feel 
unrestrained to tell their stories. The semistructured questions enable researchers to direct 
and guide the participants during the interview (Chan, Yuen-ling, & Wai-tong, 2013). It 
enabled the researcher to concentrate on important issues regarding the phenomenon.  
 Patton (2015) explained that researchers use probes to lead the interviewees to 
expatiate on their responses to the interview questions. He classified probing questions 
under three main headings, detailed-oriented probes, elaboration probes and clarification 
probes. Patton (2015) suggested that the probes that can elicit the details of some activity 
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or experience are who, where, what, when, and how. The probing questions were 
prepared with the object of gaining detailed supplemental information from issues arising 
from the responses of the interviewees to the open-ended questions.  
The follow-up questions include: Please elaborate on that issue. Please give more 
detail on that. What was your involvement? Tell me about it? What influenced your 
decision? What do you mean? What are your reasons? How did that affect you? Follow-
up questions were asked after the interviewees’ respond to the open-ended questions by 
probing deep into their responses to the questions. The protocol that contains the details 
regarding the conduct of the interview, which is located at Appendix A will be used as a 
guide.  
Interviewing Procedure 
According to Patton (2015), emphasis on inductive strategies distinguishes much 
of qualitative research as opposed to other strategies that emanate from logical a priori 
assumptions. Phenomenological studies and much of qualitative methods utilize inductive 
strategies in data collection. I used inductive strategy to conduct interviews with the 
participants to elicit information that would give meaning to the vote-selling 
phenomenon. It follows that the purpose of interviewing in this phenomenological study 
was to penetrate the interviewees’ perspectives to make them describe their experiences 
more explicitly. The interview questions were meaningful to enable the participants to 
share their stories about the vote-selling phenomenon (Patton, 2015).  
Moustakas (1994) described the state of epoche as the condition of the state of 
mind where the researcher sets aside his prejudgments, biases and preconceptions, and 
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ideas about things or phenomena. He stated that “epoche includes entering a pure internal 
place, as an open self, ready to embrace life in what it totally offers” (p. 86). I was aware 
of my biases and consciously attempted to set aside my personal experience, past 
association, understandings, prejudgments, biases, and preconceptions at the start of the 
interview. 
Having undergone the epoche stage, I then bracketed the focus of the study to 
ensure that I concentrate on the interview questions within the ambit of the research 
question and research purpose. Moustakas (1994) asserted that “the focus of the research 
is placed in brackets, everything else is set aside to root the entire research process on the 
topic and question” (p. 97). I centrally focused the open-ended and follow-up questions 
on the vote-selling phenomenon, and the experiences of the interviewees. Creswell 
(2013) pointed out that researchers undertaking phenomenological studies ought to 
acknowledge and bracket their experiences in the course of their studies. I, therefore, 
acknowledged my experience and knowledge about the local politics by putting them 
aside and bracketed them during the interview and throughout the course of this study.  
Interviewing in phenomenological studies involves various steps (Creswell, 
2013). Thus, it is pertinent for researchers using a phenomenological approach to design 
and use an interview guide or interview protocol. Patton (2015) explained that an 
interview guide consists of a list of questions and issues that the researcher will explore 
and use in the course of the interview. An interview protocol (located in Appendix A) 
was prepared to guide the researcher before, during and after the interview. The interview 
protocol enabled the researcher to prepare in the best manner to use the limited time 
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allocated for the interview (45 minutes); ensure that there is a degree of similarities in the 
lines of inquiry; focus on predetermined issues relating to the phenomenon under study; 
and use it as a checklist during the interview (Patton, 2015). 
The interview protocol consists of the following: name of the interviewer, name 
of the interviewee, place of the interview, time and date of the interview, duration of the 
interview, the purpose of the study, open-ended and follow-up questions, and concluding 
statements. 
By placing the focus of the research study in a bracket, I prepared the interview 
questions in a manner to ensure that interviewees understood that vote-selling is the 
central phenomenon. The aim of the interview protocol was to enable me to ask the 
interviewees similar questions in the same sequence with variation in the form of probing 
or follow-up questions. I used semistructured open-ended questions as tools to invite the 
interviewees to think seriously about their experiences, and how it impacted on their life 
(Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Maxwell (2013) contended that researchers need to be able 
to anticipate how the interviewees will comprehend the interview questions and their 
likely responses. I anticipated how the interviewees would understand and respond to 
questions on the vote-selling phenomenon. The open-ended interview questions were 
similar, and they followed the same sequence, but there were slight variations in the 
follow-up questions. 
I sought permission from the participants to record the interviews. It was intended 
to replace any participant that declined to be electronically recorded, with another 
participant that will be willing to be recorded because it was important to have a verbatim 
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record their statements. I took detailed notes and record the interviews. The anticipated 
duration of the interview was 45 minutes. I reviewed the interview notes and 
subsequently transcribed the recorded interviews myself. I provided copies of the 
transcriptions to the participants for verification and compare the transcriptions with the 
recorded audio interviews for correctness.  
Data Analysis 
 The study sought to uncover voters’ behaviors by investigating their common and 
lived experiences with respect to the provision of infrastructure and delivery of public 
services, and voting during elections in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo 
State, Nigeria. According to Patton (2015), research design reflects research purpose and 
research question frames data analysis. The central question in this study is: How do 
individuals who participated in the most recent elections describe their lived experiences 
of vote-selling in relation to the provision of infrastructure and public services in Akoko 
North West Local Government? Researchers use analysis in qualitative studies to make 
sense of the data collected and transform the data into findings, by sifting through 
relevant information, reducing voluminous information, noting patterns, identifying 
themes and consolidating the data to arrive at the essence of the data (Patton, 2015).  
 Researchers in phenomenological studies utilize, inductive reasoning by seeking 
patterns from data to generate new explanations from specific data and, thematic analysis 
to reduce data and make sense from it (Patton, 2015). Gibbs and Taylor (2005) explained 
that “coding is the process of combing the data for themes, ideas, and categories and then 
marking similar passages of text with a code label so that they can easily be retrieved at a 
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later stage for further comparison and analysis” (para. 1). It is imperative to identify 
categories or themes by creatively recognizing meaningful and significant statements 
from the data (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 2014).   
I used Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental phenomenological data analysis process 
in this phenomenological study to analyze the data collected from the participants and 
made meaning of the vote-selling phenomenon from the data.  
Epoche 
Moustakas (1994) stated that the first step of the transcendental phenomenological 
data analysis process is the epoche stage. At this stage, researchers undertake a personal 
inward search to identify their personal bias and prejudice to eliminate them from 
interference with the research (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). Accordingly, I 
consciously attempt to set aside my prejudgments, biases and preconceptions, and ideas 
about the vote-selling phenomenon. Moustakas (1994) pointed out that “in the epoche, 
the everyday understandings, understandings, judgments, and knowings are set aside, 
from the vantage point of a pure or transcendental ego” (p. 33). He explained that the 
“epoche includes entering a pure internal place, as an open self, ready to embrace life in 
what it totally offers” (p. 86). Fundamentally, researchers must ensure that they do not 
determine any conception or hold any position about the phenomenon in advance 
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 87). I consciously strived to eliminate my personal bias and 
prejudice by giving regard to my past political experience and knowledge that might 
influence my understanding of the information I received from the participants and the 
common meaning expressed by them.  
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Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction 
The second step of Moustakas’s transcendental phenomenological process is the 
transcendental phenomenological reduction stage. Moustakas (1994) referred to this stage 
as transcendental, because the researcher has to move “beyond the everyday to the pure 
ego in which everything is perceived freshly, as if for the first time” (p. 34). According to 
Schmitt (as cited in Moustakas, 1994), the process “is called ‘phenomenological’ because 
it transforms the world into mere phenomena. It is called ‘reduction’ because it leads us 
back (Lat. Reducere) to the source of the meaning and existence of the experienced 
world” (p. 34). I reflected on the phenomenon with the view of making clear the meaning 
of the vote-selling phenomenon.   
At the transcendental phenomenological reduction step, Moustakas (1994) 
identified four stages: bracketing, horizonalizing, clustering the horizon into themes, and 
organizing the horizons and themes into a coherent textual description of the 
phenomenon. 
The first stage of transcendental phenomenological reduction is bracketing. 
Moustakas (1994) asserted that at this stage, “the focus of the research is placed in 
brackets, everything else is set aside so that the entire research process is rooted solely on 
the topic and question” (p. 97). I bracketed out extraneous considerations and 
preconceptions to purify the data from the participants before the commencement of data 
analysis. 
Moustakas (1994) referred to the second stage of transcendental 
phenomenological reduction as horizonalizing. Researchers commence data analysis by 
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reading the interview notes thoroughly and listening to the audiotapes of the interviews 
(Maxwell, 2013). Reading the interview notes enables researchers to develop provisional 
ideas, make initial comments and identify the emerging themes, patterns or categories. 
The initial reading allows researchers to make comments, while the subsequent readings 
enable the commencement of the formal coding process (Patton, 2015). 
Moustakas (1994) argued that horizonalizing involves treating every statement as 
having equal value and the sifting of significant statements from irrelevant statements to 
achieve the “Horizon (the meanings and invariant constituents of the phenomenon)” 
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 97). Creswell (2013) explained that the coding process involves the 
classification of passages of text into codes and categories. He pointed out that in 
phenomenological studies, researchers code the common experiences of individuals by 
developing codes, forming themes from the codes and organizing the themes into 
categories to understand the meaning of the data or phenomenon under study (Creswell, 
2013). I began the coding process at this stage by treating every statement with equal 
value and sifting the interviews of the participants to develop codes. 
The third stage of transcendental phenomenological reduction is clustering the 
horizon into themes. Moustakas (1994) contended that researchers have to horizonalize 
the data by listing the meaning or meaning units and cluster the horizonalized statements 
into common categories or themes. Undertaking data analysis at this stage is an inductive 
process that enables researchers to develop themes or categories from the codes (Gibbs & 
Taylor, 2005). I put together the significant statements and clustered them into main 
categories. 
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The fourth stage of transcendental phenomenological reduction concerns 
organizing the horizons and themes into a coherent textual description. According to 
Moustakas (1994), “the challenge of description is to determine the textual components 
of experience, the ‘what’ of the appearing phenomenon” (p. 78). Essentially, I used the 
categorization of the themes to describe the participants’ experience of the vote-selling 
phenomenon.  
Imaginative Variation 
The third step of Moustakas’s transcendental phenomenological process is 
imaginative variation. Moustakas (1994) explained that the “structural description 
involves conscious acts of thinking and judging, imagining and recollecting, to arrive at 
core structural meanings” (p. 79). Moustakas (1994) pointed out that: 
The aim is to arrive at structural descriptions of an experience, the underlying and 
precipitating factors that account for what is being experienced; in other words, 
the “how” that speaks to conditions that illuminate the “what” of experience. How 
did the experience of the phenomenon come to be what it is? (p. 98)  
In line with Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental phenomenological process, I undertook a 
deep reflection of the interviews to describe the essential structures using the textual 
description that would have been derived from the phenomenological reduction  
Synthesis of the Meanings 
 The fourth step of the transcendental phenomenological process is the synthesis of 
the meanings and essences. Moustakas (1994) asserted that the synthesis of the textual 
description and structural description “represents the essences at a particular time and 
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place from the vantage point of an individual researcher following an exhaustive 
imaginative and reflective study of the phenomenon” (p. 100). Following Moustakas’s 
(1994) transcendental phenomenological process, I brought the structural and textual 
essences together to integrate the meanings and essences of the vote-selling phenomenon.  
The Main Steps in the Data Analysis 
 I employed the four main steps of Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental 
phenomenological data analysis process - Epoche, Transcendental Phenomenological 
Reduction, Imaginative Variation and Synthesis of the Meanings – to analyse the data in 
this study.  
First, I ensured that I set aside my prejudgments, biases, and preconceptions about 
vote-selling, the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko North West Local 
Government. Secondly, I read the transcripts of all the participants carefully and 
reviewed them thoroughly taking account of their perceptions and descriptions of their 
lived experiences about vote-selling, the state of infrastructure and public services in 
Akoko North West Local Government. At this stage, I bracketed out all extraneous 
considerations. I sifted through the transcripts one by one and selected the significant 
statements having regard to the participants’ descriptions of their lived experiences and 
perceptions about vote-selling, the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko 
North West Local Government. Subsequently, I made a list of the significant statements. 
I then categorized the significant statements by clustering them into themes and sub-
themes. The themes consisted of significant statements that were common to all or most 
of the participants, and the sub-themes were significant statements by some of the 
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participants. The themes and sub-themes were expressed as words, phrases or short 
sentences.  I had regard to the significant statements and the themes to make textual 
descriptions of the participants’ experiences. Thirdly, I reviewed the transcripts again and 
undertook a deep reflection of the interviews with a view to reaffirming the 
understanding of the participants’ descriptions of their lived experiences and perceptions 
as reflected in the transcripts. I then undertook structural descriptions of the factors that 
precipitated the participants’ experiences. Fourthly, I synthesized the textual descriptions 
and the structural descriptions of the participants' lived experiences about vote-selling, 
the state of infrastructure, and public services in Akoko North West Local Government. I 
undertook the synthesis of the textual descriptions, and the structural descriptions of the 
participants' lived experiences by describing each theme as a heading and sub-themes as 
sub-headings under a theme. 
 There was a disconfirming case during data analysis. I, nevertheless, provided 
clarifications for the discrepant case. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
 Evidence of quality in a qualitative study refers to evidence that the research 
findings are credible, trustworthy and accurate (Creswell, 2013). The aim of the study 
was to ensure that the research findings are credible, transferable, dependable and 
confirmable to make the findings acceptable to the scholarly community and the public at 
large. Various strategies were employed to ensure that the findings are valid, that is well-
founded and sound (Creswell, 2013).  
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Credibility 
  Moustakas (1994) emphasized that in the course of interviews in 
phenomenological studies, there is a high probability of misconceptions because of the 
conversational and open-ended nature of the interviews. Therefore, I listened attentively 
to the interviewees during the interviews, asked probing questions to clarify probable 
misconceptions arising from the questions and responses and clarified all misconceptions 
arising from the interviews from time to time to ensure that the findings are credible.  
A member checking process was undertaken by obtaining the correct 
transcriptions of the interviews, spending extensive time with the interviewees and 
requiring them to confirm the transcriptions of the interviews to prevent distortion of 
their description of their experiences. In phenomenological studies, interviewees should 
“review and confirm or alter the research data to correspond to her or his perception of 
their experience” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 110). The interviewees were presented with the 
analysis of the interviews - the analytic codes, and categories or themes, and conclusions.  
The interviewees were afforded an opportunity to confirm the authenticity of the 
transcriptions of the interviews. The interviewees were given an opportunity to confirm 
that the conclusions reflect their common experiences of the vote-selling phenomenon. 
They were, therefore, able to examine and confirm their description of their common 
experiences (Moustakas, 1994). 
Transferability 
The study ensured that its findings are transferable. The fundamental goal of this 
research design was to enable the researcher to make credible findings and enable the 
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transferability of the study. Fundamentally, detailed description of the interviewees’ 
essential characteristics and the entire research design were given to enable other 
researchers to apply the study in other contexts.  
Dependability 
Triangulation involves collecting and analyzing multiple perspectives (Patton, 
2015). The participants’ description of their personal experiences were cross-checked and 
corroborated by asking probing questions during the interview, cross-checking the 
transcriptions, arranging follow-up interviews for clarification and realistically evaluating 
emerging themes during analysis from multiple perspectives. Also, the dependability of 
the findings was enhanced by using a digital voice-recorder. 
Confirmability 
 I employed the reflexivity strategy to ensure that the findings are confirmable. 
According to Creswell (2013) reflexivity allows researchers to re-examine and clarify 
their biases through deep reflections. I was conscious of my social and political 
background, and how they might impact on the interpretation of the data and approach to 
the research (Creswell, 2013). I ensured that I did not influence the interviewees’ 
perceptions by bracketing out all extraneous considerations. 
Ethics 
 The interviewees were provided with consent forms and asked to sign them. The 
consent forms were prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). The consent form contain the following information: the purpose of 
the study, liberty of the interviewee to discontinue their involvement in the interview 
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whenever they wish, agreement of a mutually convenient setting, duration of the 
interview, privacy of the interviewees, storage of data, publication of the findings, 
verification of the transcribed materials and, assurance that their responses will remain 
confidential. Personal experiences of the researcher concerning vote-selling were not 
shared with the interviewees because it might preclude bracketing that is fundamental to 
the construction of meanings and essences of the phenomenon in a phenomenological 
study (Creswell, 2013). 
 Researchers need to maintain ethical standards at all stages of the research 
process- through data collection, data analysis, data reporting up to publication (Creswell, 
2013). High ethical standards were maintained at all stages of the study. More 
importantly, the purpose of the study was explained at the outset of the interview and it 
was confirmed that the privacy and confidentiality of the interviewees would be 
maintained. The interviewees were informed that they were free to terminate their 
involvement in the study anytime without explanation. 
The loss of privacy was a potential risk associated with the study because of the 
risk of accidental loss of personal data and potential embarrassment if accidental 
disclosure of personal information occurred during the interview. The records of the 
names and personal details of the interviewees were not kept to preclude inadvertent 
disclosure of the interviewees’ identities (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008). Also, the 
names and other details of the interviewees were masked to prevent the disclosure of their 
personal information or identities.  
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There is a view that qualitative research findings were mostly a product of the 
researchers’ predispositions and preconceptions (Patton, 2015). I therefore set aside all 
extraneous considerations, predispositions, and preconceptions through bracketing at all 
stages of the study to avoid researcher’s bias.  
The physical records would be stored in a locked file cabinet, while the electronic 
records would be stored on a removable disk and kept in a secured file cabinet for at least 
5 years. The digital voice-recording of the interviews were erased after transcriptions. I 
informed the participants that their names and contact information would be kept 
separately from the interview records and destroyed on completion of this study. Further, 
I informed the participants that the transcriptions will be encrypted and protected by 
passwords. The researcher would be the only person that will have exclusive access to the 
passord and the data. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences concerning the provision of 
infrastructure, delivery of public services, and voting during elections in Akoko North 
West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria.  The approach of the study was to discover 
voters’ perceptions of the connection between the provision of infrastructure and delivery 
of public services, and vote-selling by interviewing them to provide a detailed description 
of their experiences with a view of deriving the essences of their experiences (Moustakas, 
1994). 
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The suitability of five of the main approaches (narrative, grounded theory, 
ethnography, phenomenology and case study) to qualitative research was considered, and 
the phenomenological approach was found as most appropriate for this study because of 
the need to obtain information from individuals that have rich information about the vote-
selling phenomenon.  Particularly, the phenomenological approach was chosen because 
of the need to derive information-rich data regarding the vote-selling phenomenon from a 
direct report by the individuals that had the experience (Moustakas, 1994).   
 The sample contained persons who had participated in past elections in the local 
government, had been approached for vote-selling and had a common experience of the 
phenomenon of vote-selling, and the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko 
North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria.  
Purposeful sampling was used to select information-rich individuals who have the 
knowledge about vote-selling phenomenon deliberately to provide illuminative 
information and undertake an in-depth research about the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2013; 
Patton, 2015). The group sampling, criterion sampling, and time-location selection 
strategies were employed for sample selection. 
The research question, research purpose, the estimated duration of the interview 
and available resources were taken into account in determining the most appropriate 
sample size. In selecting the sample, I had regard to the essential factors that will help to 
answer the research objectives creditably and sufficiently (Marshall, 1996).  A sample 
size of 10 individual participants will be selected as recommended by Creswell (2013) for 
a phenomenological study.  
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Interviewing concerns the meeting of two persons (interviewer and interviewee) 
in which the interviewer asks the interviewee some questions to elicit information on 
some issues or phenomenon (Janesick, 2011). Moustakas’ empirical phenomenological 
inquiry was used to take the interviewees back to their experience to give an in-depth 
description of their experiences. Interviews were used as the data collection tool to elicit 
information from the interviewees who possess an in-depth knowledge about the vote-
selling phenomenon. The use of interviewing as the data collection method allowed 
information about vote-selling to be obtained from individuals who had experienced the 
phenomenon. The intent of the interview was for the interviewees to reveal their common 
experiences. Interview protocol was used as a guide before, during and after the 
interview. Semi-structured, open-ended questions were employed to elicit information 
from the interviewees during the interviews. 
The following Moustakas’ (1994) transcendental phenomenological data 
analytical process was used to analyze the data collected from the interviewees: 
1. Epoche: This process involved looking inward to identify personal bias and 
prejudice, and endeavoring to eliminate or subdue them. 
2. Phenomenological Reduction: All extraneous considerations, preconceptions, 
and presuppositions were bracketed to bring about data purity before 
commencing the analysis of the data from the participants. 
3. Imaginative Variation: Equal values were attached to the data collected during 
the interviews; the data were organized into meaningful clusters; data that 
were irrelevant and overlapping were eliminated; invariant themes will be 
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identified; imaginative variation were performed; and the common experience 
of the participants were abstracted. 
4. Synthesis and Essence: The textual descriptions and structural descriptions of 
the data were synthesized to integrate the essence of the vote-selling 
phenomenon (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014). 
It was ensured that the study passed the test of reliability, credibility and 
trustworthiness by clarifying every misconception during the interview, allowing the 
participants to verify the transcripts of the interview, presenting the results of the data 
analysis to the interviewees, describing the essential characteristics of the participants and 
the entire research method in detail to enable transferability by other researchers. 
In chapter 4, I present a detailed analysis of the research findings. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences in respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, poor delivery of public services, and vote-selling in Akoko North West 
Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. Researchers employ the qualitative paradigm to 
explore concepts and phenomena that are difficult to understand or that require better 
understanding (Hoang-Kim et al., 2014). I used a qualitative transcendental 
phenomenological approach to gain greater understanding of the connection between the 
inadequate provision of infrastructure, poor delivery of public services, and vote-selling. 
According to Moustakas (1994), “phenomenology is committed to descriptions of 
experiences” (p. 58). Researchers therefore use the phenomenological approach to derive 
evidence for studies through direct reports by individuals who have experienced the 
phenomenon under study (Moustakas, 1994). 
 The central research question in this study was the following: “How would 
individuals who participated in the most recent elections describe their lived experiences 
of vote-selling in relation to the provision of infrastructure and public services in Akoko 
North West Local Government?” This study used the phenomenological approach to 
explore what voters experienced in relation to vote-selling and what circumstances 
influenced individuals’ experiences of vote-selling. For this study, I gathered rich 
narrative data from interviews with 10 selected participants. The interviews were digitally 
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recorded and subsequently transcribed. The central research question and interview 
questions guided the interpretation and analysis of the data arising from the interviews. 
 In this chapter, I present an analysis of the data collected through interviews 
following Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental phenomenological data analysis 
methodology, as explained in chapter 3. The chapter consists of nine sections. In the first 
section, I describe the research settings. In the second section, I describe the demographic 
features of the participants. In the third section, I explain the data collection process. In 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections, I describe the use of Moustakas’s (1994) 
transcendental phenomenological data analysis (epoche, bracketing, horizonalizing and 
clustering the horizons or statements into themes, organizing the horizons and themes 
into a coherent textual description, imaginative variation, and synthesis of meanings). In 
the next section, I examine the factors that were taken into account and the steps taken to 
ensure that the research findings were trustworthy. In the eighth section, I explain the 
nonconfirming comment that was found during the data analysis. In the final section, I 
provide a brief overview of the methodological procedures employed and a summary of 
the results. 
Research Setting 
 The research was conducted in Akoko North Local Government, Ondo State, 
Nigeria. The common experiences of the voters with respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, the delivery of public services, and their behaviors during the elections 
conducted by the INEC in Akoko North West Local Government between 2012 and 2016 
(i.e., the 2012 Governorship election; 2015 House of Assembly, House of 
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Representatives, Senate, and Presidential elections; and 2016 Governorship election) 
constituted the subject of this qualitative transcendental phenomenological study.  
According to Moustakas (1994), “evidence from phenomenological research is 
derived from first-person reports of life experiences” (p. 84). The interviews were 
conducted face to face and in depth. The interviews were scheduled and conducted at 
different times and locations that were chosen by the participants. Eight interviews were 
conducted in town halls, and two were conducted in community centers. The interviews 
lasted an average of 45 minutes each. An interview protocol (see Appendix A) was 
employed for guidance and consistency. The participants were engaged in an introductory 
discussion leading to the disclosure of demographic data—gender, age, level of 
education, and employment status—at the beginning of the interview. The introductory 
discussion also helped in establishing rapport with the participants. It enabled them to 
feel unhindered in talking about their perceptions and experiences. The participants 
reiterated their willingness to take part in the interviews, and they were informed that 
they were at liberty to withdraw from the interview at any time. The interviews took 
place in a conducive environment for each participant, and there were no disruptions or 
distractions at the time. It was ensured that the electronic recorder was in good condition. 
I had a duplicate functioning electronic recorder and spare batteries at all times during the 
interviews.  
Demographics 
The population under study consisted of voters in Akoko North Local 
Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. I began to initiate contact with potential participants 
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after obtaining Walden University’s IRB approval to collect data for the study. The 
process for recruiting participants lasted 1 week. I commenced recruitment by identifying 
potential participants. The study adopted purposeful sampling as its sampling method. 
Criterion sampling, group sampling, and time-location selection strategies are three of the 
various purposeful sampling strategies (Patton, 2015). The group selection strategy 
enables the discretionary selection of participants using demographic profiles or drawing 
from major subgroups of the population (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). Maximum 
variation (heterogeneity) sampling strategy is a form of group sampling strategy that 
seeks to capture common themes from narratives of individuals from different 
backgrounds (Patton, 2015).  I used criterion sampling, group sampling, and time-
location selection strategies to select the interviewees. The sampling method and 
selection strategies were essential to gather rich data and develop in-depth understanding 
of the perceptions and experiences of the participants.  The maximum variation 
(heterogeneity) sampling strategy enabled the disclosure and emergence of common 
themes from participants with different profiles or diverse characteristics (Creswell, 
2013; Patton, 2015). 
 The participants’ demographic profiles are depicted in Table 1. The ages of the 
selected participants ranged from 32 to 73 years. There were four female and six male 
participants. Two were employed, three were self-employed, and five were unemployed. 
Three did not have any formal education, and seven were educated. 
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Table 1 
Participants’ Demographic Information 
Assigned  
code Age 
Employment  
    status 
Level of  
education Gender 
P1 41 Unemployed Educated Male 
P2 32 Unemployed Educated Male 
P3 69 Self-employed No formal education Male 
P4 33 Self-employed Educated Female 
P5 67 Unemployed No formal education Female 
P6 73 Unemployed No formal education Male 
P7 32 Unemployed Educated Female 
P8 52 Employed Educated Male 
P9 65 Self-employed Educated Male 
P10 42 Employed Educated Female 
 
Data Collection 
I commenced the data collection process by selecting potential participants for the 
study. The participants were recruited within 1 week of obtaining approval from the 
Walden University IRB (IRB, no. 08-01-17-0471326) to collect data for the study. I used 
three purposeful sampling strategies (criterion sampling, group sampling, and time-
location selection) to select the participants.  To meet inclusion criteria for the study, 
individuals needed to have (a) participated in the most recent elections (i.e., needed to be 
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registered voters who voted in the 2012, 2015, and 2016 elections), (b) been exposed to 
vote-selling, and (c) continuously resided in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo 
State, Nigeria, for at least 5 years. Criterion sampling was used to identify registered 
voters who met the inclusion criteria. The group sampling strategy was used to select 
participants with different profiles or demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, level of 
education, and employment status), and the time-location strategy was employed to select 
persons who had resided continuously in the community for at least 5 years. 
Lists of registered voters for the 2012, 2015, and 2016 elections were obtained 
from Nigeria’s INEC and used to identify individuals who met the inclusion criteria. I 
made copies of the relevant pages of lists of registered voters, which contained voters’ 
phone numbers and addresses. The lists of registered voters were used to identify (a) 
individuals who had participated in the elections of 2012, 2015, and 2016, and (b) 
individuals who had continuously resided in Akoko North West Local Government, 
Ondo State, Nigeria, for at least the last 5 years. Three individuals from each of the 10 
wards in Akoko North West Local Government were selected. I assigned unique 
identification codes (P1–P30) to the selected participants to mask their identities. 
I contacted potential participants whom I identified through the list of registered 
voters by telephone; I visited others who did not have telephones at their residential 
addresses. I briefly explained the purpose of the study to potential participants. I had 
informal discussions with potential participants in which I asked them individually 
whether they were willing and able to participate in a study, in which they would describe 
their experiences regarding infrastructure, public services, and vote-selling. The 
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participants confirmed their willingness to participate in the study. They confirmed that 
they satisfied the inclusion criterion by having participated in the most recent elections. 
Additionally, they provided the following demographic information: age, gender, 
employment status, and level of education.  
Thirty potential participants were initially identified. However, I deliberately 
selected one out of three potential participants identified in each ward by using the 
maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling strategy to purposefully select individuals 
from groups defined by gender, age, level of education, and employment status, given 
that factors such as poverty, unemployment, age, educational level, and income may 
affect individuals’ perceptions of the vote-selling phenomenon. Ten participants were 
eventually selected for the interview. The individuals who expressed willingness to 
participate in the study but were not selected from the initial 30 potential participants 
were informed that they were alternate participants and would be eligible to replace 
participants who dropped out of the study. 
There are no rigid rules or guides pertaining to the appropriateness and adequacy 
of sample size in qualitative research. Sample size is determined by the research question, 
purpose of the research, need for credible research findings, and available time and 
resources (Patton, 2015). In qualitative research, the sample size should not be too large 
as to dispossess the study of the capability to obtain information-rich data (Onwuegbuzie 
& Leech, 2007). Although the goal was to select 10 to 15 participants, I selected a sample 
size of 10, which I felt would enable me to answer the research objectives sufficiently 
and creditably (Creswell, 2013; Marshall, 1996). I decided that data saturation had been 
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achieved given the depth of the data that I had collected, which I found to be sufficient to 
answer the research objectives when I could not obtain new information after 
interviewing the selected 10 participants.  
In one of the 10 wards, the selected participant was unable to take part in the 
interview as arranged as a result of personal circumstances, and an alternate participant 
had to be contacted to replace her. I telephoned the alternate participant and arranged a 
mutually convenient time to visit him at his residential address. During my visit to his 
residential address, he confirmed that he had participated in the most recent elections and 
presented his voter’s card to support this claim. Additionally, the participant confirmed 
that she has been exposed to vote-selling and stated that he had resided continuously in 
the Akoko North Local Government for at least 5 years. He was subsequently presented 
with the invitation letter and informed consent form. 
I visited the selected participants at their homes, where I handed the letter of 
invitation and informed consent form to them. I presented a verbal explanation of the 
purpose of the study so that they fully understood the purpose and nature of the interview, 
and I explained that the interviews would only take place if they agreed verbally to 
proceed and signed the informed consent form. I verified that the participants satisfied the 
criterion of having participated in the most recent elections by checking their voters’ 
cards, and I asked whether they had been exposed to vote-selling. I visited the selected 
participants 7 days after handing them the invitation letter and informed consent form to 
confirm their willingness to participate in the study and collect the signed informed 
consent letter. Mutually convenient, quiet venues for the interviews were arranged. Eight 
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of the participants wanted the interview to take place in a town hall, and two preferred 
their community centers. The participants were given the interview questions in advance. 
On various dates before the commencement of the interviews, all of the 
participants orally confirmed that they were willing to be interviewed for the study and 
agreed that the interviews could be electronically recorded. They were reassured that 
their statements and identities would remain confidential and that their real names would 
be masked with assigned codes. Codes P1 to P10 were assigned to the participants. I 
confirmed to the participants that the interviews would last for a maximum of 45 minutes. 
They were told that they could signify an intention to withdraw from the interview at any 
time and would be able to leave. The interview questions were open-ended and 
semistructured. They were contained in an interview protocol (see Appendix A). The 
open-ended and semistructured interviews enabled the participants to talk freely about 
their perceptions, focus on pertinent issues raised by the interview questions, and 
illuminate their lived experiences. I asked the participants probing questions related to 
issues arising from their responses as the interviews evolved.  
The interview protocol was used for all participants to ensure that the data 
collection method was unambiguous and consistent. Notes were taken during the 
interviews. The participants were informed that they would be contacted again if further 
clarification was required regarding their responses. Following the interviews, the 
interview notes were reviewed, and the digital recordings were transferred to removable 
disks. I transcribed the recorded interviews and compared the transcriptions with the 
digitally recorded interviews. The transcripts were presented to the participants at their 
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respective addresses for verification and confirmation that they were a true reflection of 
their perceptions and lived experiences regarding vote-selling and the state of 
infrastructure and public services in Akoko North Local Government, Ondo State. 
Data Analysis 
I used the four main steps of Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental 
phenomenological data analysis process - Epoche, Transcendental Phenomenological 
Reduction, Imaginative Variation and Synthesis of the Meanings –to analyze the 
interview data in this study. I discussed the transcendental phenomenological data 
analysis steps - Epoche, bracketing, horizonalizing and clustering the horizons or 
statements into themes - in the data analysis section. I discussed the remaining steps - 
organizing the horizons and themes into a coherent textual description, imaginative 
variation, and synthesis of the meanings - in the result section. 
The data contained the participants’ descriptions of the state of infrastructure, 
voters’ needs or expectation, the extent to which the needs or expectations were 
addressed, their perceptions about election promises, vote-selling and the relationship or 
connection between vote-selling and provision or improvement of infrastructure and 
public services.  
Epoche 
According to Moustakas (1994), “in the epoche, the everyday understandings, 
understandings, judgments, and knowings are set aside, from the vantage point of a pure 
or transcendental ego” (p. 33). I consciously set aside my prejudgments, biases, and 
preconceptions about vote-selling, the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko 
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North West Local Government. I eliminated my personal bias by noting my past political 
experience and knowledge that might influence the comprehension of the information I 
receive from the participants. I consciously set aside  my position about the vote-selling 
phenomenon in advance (Moustakas, 1994, p. 87). 
Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction 
I followed four stages: bracketing, horizonalizing, clustering the horizon into 
themes and organizing the horizons and themes into a coherent textual description of the 
phenomenon as propounded by Moustakas (1994) for the Transcendental 
Phenomenological Reduction step. 
Bracketing. According to Moustakas (1994) at this stage “the focus of the 
research is placed in brackets, everything else is set aside so that the entire research 
process is rooted solely on the topic and question” (p. 97). I bracketed out extraneous 
considerations and preconceptions to purify the data I wanted to collect from the 
participants before the commencement of data analysis.  
Horizonalizing. The second stage of Moustakas’ (1994) transcendental 
phenomenological reduction is horizonalizing. I commenced the data analysis at this 
stage by reading the transcriptions of the interviews of all the participants. I re-read the 
transcripts several times and went through the statements of each participant line by line. 
The detailed reading of the transcripts enabled me to have a holistic comprehension of the 
participants’ experiences and make a provisional mental identification of the significant 
statements (Maxwell, 2013). I began the coding process at this stage by treating every 
statement with equal value and sifting the interviews of the participants to develop codes. 
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Moustakas (1994) pointed out that the process of horizonalizing involves treating every 
statement as having equal value and the sifting of significant statements from irrelevant 
statements to achieve the “horizon (the meanings and invariant constituents of the 
phenomenon)” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 97).  
The overarching consideration in sifting through the transcripts to select 
significant statements was the central research question. The central research question is: 
How do individuals who participated in the most recent elections describe their lived 
experiences of vote-selling in relation to the provision of infrastructure and public 
services in Akoko North West Local Government? I focused on the research question and 
interview questions to eliminate statements that were not related to the purpose of the 
study. I had regard to the research question and purpose of the study. I read the 
transcriptions several times and sifted through the statements one by one to select the 
significant statements from the descriptions of the lived experiences of the participants 
about vote-selling, the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko North West 
Local Government. I stored the list of significant statements in a Microsoft Word 
document for ease of analysis.  
Clustering the horizon into themes. I used the perceptions expressed and the 
experiences described by the participants in response to the interview questions and the 
phenomena under study to categorize each significant statement. I followed this process 
with each participant by putting together the significant statements made by them and 
then clustered the significant statements into themes and sub-themes.  
 
94 
 
Significant Statements/Horizons and Themes 
The themes consisted of significant statements that are common to all or most of 
the participants, and the sub-themes consisted of the significant statements made at least 
five of the participants. Moustakas (1994) described the procedures as including 
“horizonalizing the data and regarding every horizon or statement relevant to the topic 
and question as having equal value” (p. 118). I clustered the significant statements of 
each participant that are relevant to the central research question and interview questions 
(that is vote-selling, infrastructure, and public services) into common categories. I listed 
the significant statements made by each of the participants and common to them under 
each theme and sub-theme. The themes and sub-themes were expressed as words, phrases 
or short sentences.  
The following were the seven themes and four sub-themes that emerged from the 
significant statements: (a) inadequate and bad state of infrastructure and public services, 
and (b) infrastructure and public services; (c) insensitivity to voters’ needs and 
expectations; (d) non-fulfillment of promises, corruption, and self-enrichment; (e) 
disappointments, lack of trust and voters apathy and, sub-themes (poverty and the share 
of public funds); (f) voters engaged in vote-selling and, sub-themes (the openness of 
vote-selling, and party agents’ vote-buying strategies); and (g) Good governance. The 
themes and sub-themes that emerged were inter-related, and they were listed in Table 2.  
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Table 2 
 
Themes and Subthemes That Emerged From Open-Ended, Semistructured 
Interviews 
 
No. Themes Participants 
1 Inadequate and bad state of infrastructure and public services 10 of 10 
2 Infrastructure and public services 10 of 10 
3 Insensitivity to voters’ needs and expectations 10 of 10 
4 Nonfulfillment of promises, corruption and self-enrichment 10 of 10 
5 Voters engaged in vote-selling 10 of 10 
 Subthemes  
 The Openness of vote-selling  8 of 10 
 Party agents’ vote-buying strategies 7 of 10 
6 Disappointments, lack of trust, and voters’ apathy 10 of 10 
 Subthemes  
 Poverty 6 of 10 
 The share of public funds 5 of 10 
7 Good governance 10 of 10 
 
The seven themes and four subthemes that emerged from the significant 
statements are as follows:  
Inadequate and Bad State of Infrastructure and Public Services 
 The interview question “What is your opinion about the state of infrastructure and 
public services in your local government?” was intended to elicit information regarding 
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what the participants experienced about the state of the of infrastructure and public 
services in Akoko North West Local Government. The theme derived from this question 
was “poor infrastructure and inadequate public services.” There was a striking consensus 
among the participants on the theme. The following significant statements from the 
transcribed interview notes support the notion that infrastructure and public services in 
Akoko North West Local Government are inadequate and in a bad state. 
P1: The condition of infrastructure is very terrible. It is like we don’t have a 
government… The government has abandoned its responsibilities. There are 
no good roads. There is no electricity. The hospitals are badly managed and 
funded. All the infrastructure are bad and dilapidated. Nothing is working. It 
is so bad that we haven’t had electricity and pipe-borne water for so many 
years. We are suffering.   
P2: The state of infrastructure in this local government is very bad. Residents are 
always complaining about the lack of good public services and infrastructure. 
There are no good public services from the government in my local 
government. There are no government programs. We don’t have good roads, 
electricity and employment opportunities. The government has failed to 
provide an enabling environment for business and employment… Everything 
is bad and remains the same before and after elections. 
P3: The state of infrastructure is nothing to write home about in this local 
government… Most of the infrastructure in this local government are 
outdated. Most of the infrastructure in the local government predated 
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democratic government in Nigeria that is they were constructed before 1999 
by the past military regimes… In fact, it is fair to say that public services are 
not only poor but nonexistent. I cannot point at any functional public services 
in this local government. The roads are poor, there is no electricity for some 
years, and we do not have pipe borne water.   
P4: The state of infrastructure in this local government is very bad…Most of the 
existing infrastructure are dilapidated, and the public services are nothing to 
write home about. All the roads in the local government are very bad. Some of 
the roads are so bad that vehicles cannot pass through them... We don’t have 
pipe borne water at all. Most of our schools’ buildings are falling. The 
schools’ roofs are leaking. We haven’t had any electricity for some years in 
this local government… We don’t have government presence. 
P5: The infrastructure and public services in this local government are in a very 
bad condition. The successive governments have failed to give serious 
attention to the infrastructural development in our area. There are no good 
roads, no pipe borne water, and our schools are not well maintained. We have 
a numbered of abandoned infrastructural projects that governments had 
disregarded to complete over the years.  
P5: Our schools are not being maintained… We now have many private schools. 
Government schools are no longer good. The students that attend government 
schools are children whose parents are poor and cannot afford private school’s 
fees. The children of the politicians don’t attend government schools, so they 
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don’t care to allocate funds to maintain them… Our hospitals are not 
maintained at all. Everybody went to private hospitals when they got sick. The 
government hospitals are not well maintained. Only poor people go to 
government hospitals. The wealthy individuals and politicians do not go to 
government hospitals. 
P6: The state of infrastructure in Akoko North West local government is 
pathetic… The politicians have failed to provide us with good roads, 
electricity and pipe-borne water. They have failed to maintain the public 
facilities. New governments would abandon old and existing projects. 
P7: Our infrastructure are bad in this local government. We don’t have electricity, 
water, good roads. Our schools are not well maintained… The schools’ 
buildings are in bad condition. The schools do not have chairs and tables for 
students. The classrooms have become too dangerous to accommodate the 
students. In some schools, teachers do not have chairs and tables they could 
use to carry out their work. Students are being taught in the open air, under the 
trees in some primary schools. Accidents which resulted in the loss of lives 
occurred frequently on our roads because of the bad condition of the roads.    
P8: The infrastructure and public services are very bad. We are suffering in this 
local government…We have very bad roads. Our hospitals are not 
functioning. The doctors and nurses do not have the necessary equipment. The 
buildings in our schools are in a very bad state. We do not have electricity 
supply and pipe-borne water… There is so much corruption.   
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P9: Infrastructure are nonexistent, and public services are not functioning… The 
politicians have failed to execute infrastructural projects, and they have also 
failed to maintained existing services… We don’t have electricity, good roads, 
adequate market stalls, pipe-borne water and good schools. 
P10: There’s serious deficiency of infrastructure in this local government. The 
essential public services are not available… All the roads are very bad and 
almost unusable. We find it difficult to move from one town to the other. We 
don’t have access to good medical care. Many young mothers die during 
childbirth because of lack of good medical services. Motor accidents with 
fatalities frequently occur on our roads because the roads are bad… We don’t 
have any single good infrastructure in this local government. 
Infrastructure and Public Services 
 The interview question: “What do people need or expect from elected public 
office holders?” was aimed at illuminating voters’ needs or expectations from elected 
public office holders. The theme derived from this question was “infrastructure and 
public services.” All the participants expressed similar needs and expectations regarding 
infrastructure and public services from elected public holders. They all made references 
to the need to provide and improve infrastructure and public services. The following 
significant statements from the interview data support the notion that the voters expect 
elected public office holders to invest in infrastructure and public services. 
P1: We expect them to provide us with good public services. We expect them to 
provide us with public services that will improve our standard of living and 
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enable us to lead a better life…We want them to communicate our needs to 
the government and with our needs. We expect them to take care of our 
welfare. 
P2: We need many things in this local government…They promised us 
employment, eradication of poverty, provision of roads, pipe-borne water and 
electricity. We want them to fulfill these promises… We expect public office 
holders to execute projects that will bring about an improvement in our lives. 
P3: We expect them to undertake projects that will improve the welfare of the 
people… Also, we need a sense of belonging... We want the elected public 
officials to come to this constituency frequently. For example, we voted for 
politicians to represent us at the House of Assembly, House of Representative 
and the Senate, but they have not been visiting us to listen to our problems… 
They received constituency allowances but never embarked on any 
constituency project… They only come home at the time of elections to seek 
re-elections. 
P4: We need the politicians to address our problems and put things rights… We 
need them to make policies that will increase the number of people in 
employment… I can say that a sizable number of people are unemployed. 
They need to curb corruption and spend the state’s resources to provide us 
with roads, electricity, hospital and other infrastructure and public services. 
P5: We expect our politicians to provide us with the enabling environment that 
will make way for employment for the people, good infrastructure, and public 
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services… We need good transportation system, pipe-born water, good roads, 
new schools and so on. We expect them to maintain and repair the old and 
dilapidated school buildings, roads, and other infrastructure. 
P6: We want dividends of democracy… We expect elected public office holders 
to provide us with good public services. We want good roads, electricity, 
well- maintained schools and hospitals, good public transportation, and 
telephone services. 
P7: We need good roads, pipe-borne water, and electricity. We need good schools 
and hospitals. We need good social policies for the elderly, women, and the 
children. Also, we need an orphanage. 
P8: We want the politicians to sort out all the problems relating to bad 
infrastructure...We want them to provide us with good schools, hospital, 
roads, electricity and pipe-borne water… They would raise our hopes, but 
they disappointed us at the end of the day. 
P9: We need the infrastructure and public services I mentioned earlier that we do 
not have… Our hardship and suffering will be ameliorated if they could make 
them available… We need good roads, pipe-borne water, electricity and other 
public services that will enhance employment opportunities. 
P10: We need good infrastructure that will bring about an enabling environment 
for employment opportunities. 
102 
 
Insensitivity to Voters’ Needs and Expectations 
 The interview question: “Have elected public office holders addressed these needs 
or expectations while in office?” was aimed at eliciting the voters’ needs and 
expectations. The theme derived from this question was “insensitivity to voters’ needs 
and expectations.” There is a unity of opinions by all the participants that the elected 
public office holders failed to address their needs. The following significant statements 
from the interview data support the notion that the elected public office holders are 
insensitive to voters’ needs and expectations. 
P1: No, they have not been addressing our needs. This is because it is the 
government’s responsibility to provide us with good infrastructure… I believe 
that it is the government’s primary duties to provide us with public services. 
Rather the reverse is the case… The politicians enrich themselves with public 
funds and flaunt their wealth as soon as they get elected instead of using the 
funds to provide us with good roads, pipe-borne water, and electricity. 
P2: No, the public office holders never addressed our needs. For example, our 
senators and house of representative members obtained constituency 
allowances, but they always failed to execute any project but diverted the 
funds to themselves. 
 P2 explained, 
Constituency allowances are funds provided by the federal  
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government to senators and house or representative members to execute 
projects in their constituencies with a view to providing physical and social 
development in their constituencies. 
P3: No, not at all. They do not care about our needs. They do not regard us as 
human beings. They regard us as spanners to be used and dumped. They 
regard their positions as a means of enriching themselves and their family. 
P4: No, they have failed woefully to address our needs… They care for 
themselves. They are very corrupt. They divert public funds to themselves. 
They will award contracts for infrastructural projects and will not execute 
them. Sometimes, they will cajole us by commissioning uncompleted or badly 
executed projects. They will allocate substantial funds to execute projects in 
the budgets, and at the end of the year they will not carry out work on the 
projects. 
P5: They will tell us about their plans and that they intended to address our needs, 
especially during the election campaign. But they always failed to address our 
needs… There are so much dishonesty and corruption by the politicians. 
Nigerian politics is dependent on wealthy individuals. Politicians perceive 
politics as an investment. When they get elected, they think about profiting 
from their positions which they considered as investments rather than 
addressing our developmental needs. 
P6: Public office holders have not addressed our needs in this local government. 
The politicians use their positions to enrich themselves. Most of them believe 
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in using their offices for personal gains than using their offices to create 
public wealth or make policies that will improve our lives... They diverted 
public funds to themselves through various corrupt means to the detriments of 
the voters. 
P7: The politicians are not ready to do anything. They are not even ready to listen 
to our demands and needs. They disappeared from their constituencies after 
the election and only return during elections… I have been involved 
community activities for some time. Recently, I raised some concerns with the 
Local Government Chairman. He simply responded that there was no budget 
to cover the issue and did not say how the matter could be dealt with in the 
future… It is very frustrating. Our elected representatives do not care for us… 
Also, on another occasion, we went to the state capital, Akure with some 
disabled persons. The state governor’s representatives did not attend to us and 
did not give us any other appointment to return. 
P8: The public office holders never addressed our expectations and needs. They 
do not do anything. They can be deceptive at times… They would commence 
preliminary works on infrastructural projects shortly before the elections so 
that voters will assume that they were about to address their needs. They 
would then stop and abandoned the work after they have been re-elected to 
their positions. They would also do a facelift on some infrastructure before 
elections to deceive the electorate… We can’t trust politicians. 
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P9: No, they have not addressed our needs. That’s why the state of infrastructure 
is very bad. They don’t care about us. They only care about themselves. They 
don’t care whether we have electricity insofar as they have big generators in 
their homes. They don’t care whether we have water because they have 
boreholes in their compound. 
P10: The elected public office holders have not dealt with our problems and 
concerns… They are selfish… They know our problems, but they are 
interested in their pockets rather than public welfare. 
Nonfulfillment of Promises, Corruption, and Self-Enrichment 
The interview question: “What do you think about the election promises by 
elected public office holders to provide or improve infrastructure and public services?” 
was aimed at understanding the participants’ perception of election promises by the 
elected public office holders. Non-fulfillment of promises, corruption, and self-
enrichment was the theme that emerged from the interview data. All the participants 
claimed that the elected public office holders failed to fulfill election promises they made 
when they were seeking political offices. The following significant statements from the 
interview data support the notion that the elected public office holders are corrupt, enrich 
themselves and do not fulfill their election promises. 
P1: The elected public office holders usually make promises when they were 
campaigning, but those promises never translated to actual deeds… We hear 
their promises, but we don’t see their actions… They would always promise 
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to provide or improve services and infrastructure, but there has not been any 
transformation in our wellbeing... We continue to lack basic public services.  
P2: The politicians would come to us during elections as if they would do the 
right thing if elected but forgot about us and the promises they made to us 
after they got elected... They are only interested in their purses. They are very 
selfish and wicked... Most of them are evil incarnate. 
P3: The politicians are in in the habit of making false promises that they probably 
knew they would not fulfill. They never fulfilled their pre-election promises. 
They will even promise to build bridges where there are no rivers (laugh)… 
The politicians do not live up to expectations… They do not have regards for 
the voters. The problem is that we have leadership problems… Embezzlement 
by politicians is the order of the day. The politicians are supposed to provide 
services that will improve our well-beings are corrupt… All they do in 
government is to enrich themselves. 
P4: My experience is that, during the electioneering campaign, the politicians will 
make a lot of promises which they never fulfilled… Rather than executing 
projects, they promised us during the campaigns that they would execute; they 
would embezzle the funds meant to provide infrastructure… They use their 
positions in government to gather wealth. They use their positions to buy 
houses for themselves and their family members within and outside the 
country. They buy top of the range cars. 
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P5: The politicians only make promises during elections. They made lofty 
promises. There were always promises galore during elections. But they 
forgot about their promises after they have been elected into offices… They 
are very corrupt... The concentrate on using their offices to enrich themselves 
after the election instead of performing their duties in the interest of the voters 
or fulfilling the pre-election promises that they made. 
P6: It is one thing to promise, it is one thing to fulfill. The politicians always 
made promises but always failed to fulfill their promises. That is one of the 
reasons why they had to bribe voters with cash when they sought re-election. 
If they fulfilled their promises, voters would appreciate their performance, and 
they would not have to bribe us during elections. 
P7: When the politicians were campaigning, they promised heaven and earth. 
They would promise to construct roads, provide pipe-borne water, build 
schools, and so on and so forth. However, they always failed to fulfill the 
promises they made during elections as soon as they get to power… The 
politicians are self-centered and very selfish. They are only interested in 
themselves.   
P8: Most politicians are liars… I don’t know, but I think there is some spirit that 
possesses them as soon as they get elected to public offices. They would 
appear to be honest and sincere when they were seeking votes before the 
election… They change as soon as they get elected. For example, a lady 
wanted to contest for an elective position some time ago. She came to meet 
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with us in the town hall. She told us her intentions and what she would do if 
she got elected. We did not see her again after the election having been 
elected. She did not fulfill any of the promises she made. 
P9: The politicians made so many promises to get elected… They will promise to 
rehabilitate bad roads, renovate schools, provide pipe-borne water and so on... 
It is not like they don’t make promises, but the reality is that all the promises, 
are empty promises. They normally don’t fulfill their pre-election promises. 
P10: The elected public office holders usually made promises when they were 
campaigning, but those promises never translated to actual deeds... We hear 
their promises, but we don’t see their actions… They would always make 
promises to provide or improve services and infrastructure, but there has not 
been any transformation in our wellbeing. We continue to lack basic public 
services. 
Voters Engaged in Vote-Selling 
The interview questions: “Do voters engage in vote-selling in your local 
government? If yes, have you or do you know anyone who had been approached for vote-
selling, or accepted cash for votes?” and “What do you think about the election promises 
by elected public office holders to provide or improve infrastructure and public 
services?” were aimed at eliciting information about the participants’ experiences 
concerning vote-selling. A major thread that ran through their responses was that vote-
selling was prevalent and many voters were paid for their votes. The theme derived from 
the interview data was that “voters engaged in vote-selling.” Additionally, two sub-
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themes derived from the questions. The sub-themes derived were, “openness of vote-
selling and witness of cash collection” and “party agents’ vote-buying strategies.”  
P1: Voters engage in vote-selling...yes, of course. I took money for  
voting for the candidate I voted. Also, all my friends collected money to vote 
for the candidates they cast their votes for in the last election. 
P2: “Voters did accept votes for cash. They collected money… Nobody hides it… 
They made it clear they were willing to collect the money. They collected 
various amount of money.” He further stated that “it was apparent we 
accepted cash during the last elections.” 
P3: “I received cash for votes, and many other voters received cash for votes…” 
He added that “many voters engaged in vote-selling in the just concluded 
gubernatorial election in Ondo State…We were given cash for votes in my 
polling-unit.”  
P4: “Yes, I have approached and offered cash for votes by party agents at the 
polling units when on the queue to register for accreditation.” P4 asserted that 
“voters sell their votes during elections.”  
P5: We need to be sincere. We accepted cash for votes.” She added that “voters 
engage in vote-selling. The politicians were prepared to give money to voters 
and the voters were prepared to collect the money  
P6: Yes, my friends and I accepted cash for votes on the day of the last 
governorship election…I’m sorry to say that election these days is all about 
which candidates spent the most money on the day of the election. 
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P7: Yes, voters collect money from politicians because they are of the opinion 
that when the get elected, they do not remember them…I know many voters 
that collected money from party agents on election days. 
P8: Voters engaged in vote-selling. It has even become part of the culture during 
elections. It is so bad that voters look forward to being bribed for votes during 
elections…I’ve been approached for vote-selling and I have witnessed many 
voters collecting cash for votes on Election days. Some voters would collect 
cash from more than one political party and eventually vote for the candidate 
whose party agent paid the highest amount of money. 
P9: Voters accepted cash from the party representatives and voted as 
instructed…I was approached for vote-selling on the day of the last 
governorship election outside the polling center before the start of 
accreditation. 
P10: Voters sell their votes to the highest bidder during elections. In fact, it was 
very common during the last governorship election… The politicians exhibit 
their new-found wealth after they got elected which made voters feel it was 
alright to take money from them as well…They approached me to sell my 
vote, and I saw other voters collecting cash for votes. 
Subthemes 
 The openness of vote-selling. Eight participants reported that they witnessed 
cash collection and that vote-selling occurred publicly. The following significant 
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statements from the interview data support the notion that participants witnessed cash 
collection and that vote-selling occurred publicly. 
P1: I saw party agents giving voters money at the polling centers during elections.  
P2: Nobody hides it…Even the security officers were aware that voters were  
collecting cash for votes from the party agents. In fact, the party agents gave 
the security officers at the polling centers cash for refreshments… It was so 
bad that it became an open act during the last election when the popular 
slogan was “Edibo esebe” which means in English accept cash for the vote to 
enable you to make good soup. ..It was public knowledge that party agents 
were distributing cash to voters on the day of the election… Some of the 
voters that I had interactions with were boastful of collecting cash from more 
than one party agents. 
P3: Some collected five thousand naira while others collected seven thousand  
naira just for a vote… This just concluded gubernatorial election in Ondo 
State was a monetized election. Many voters voted for the highest bidder. 
 P3: Monetized election a common term that voters and politicians use to describe  
vote-buying. It means the act of voting in an election has become 
transactional. It means buying votes with money, and that money determines 
who voters voted for in the election. 
P5: In some case, the transactions occur openly while in other cases they do it 
around the corner where the party agents would sit to give out cash before or 
after voting. 
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P7: I saw cash exchanging hands between party agents and voters. Everybody  
knew it was happening. It was an open secret.   
P8: I had witnessed voters telling party agents before the Election Day that they 
were expecting cash and gifts from their political parties. They told the party 
agents openly that they would not vote for their candidates on the Election 
Day if arrangements to give them cash for votes were not made. 
P9: I saw many voters collecting cash immediately after they cast their votes  
during the last election. Many voters whom I know very well told me that 
they accepted payment of cash to vote. The three main political parties 
distributed money, for votes but the amount of money they offered was 
different. 
 P10: Everyone saw them and knew that voters were going to the place to collect 
the money they had promised them before they voted. Many voters said it 
openly that they have collected their share of government money. 
Party agents’ vote-buying strategies. Seven participants described some of the 
vote-buying strategies used by the party agents. The following significant statements 
from the interview data support the notion that party agents employed vote-buying 
strategies. 
P1: The party agents would make prior internal arrangements with voters before  
the voting took place. The arrangement would include getting paid after 
voting had taken place…Internal arrangement is the kind of agreement that 
party agents have with voters to pay them outside of the polling center 
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environment after voting had taken place and confirmation that the voters had 
voted for their preferred candidates as arranged. 
P4: Yes, I have approached and offered cash for votes by party agents at the 
polling units when on the queue to register for accreditation. In some cases, 
the head of a family will negotiate with party agents and collect the cash on 
behalf of the voters in his family. In other cases, voters collect cash by 
themselves and vote as instructed by the party agents. 
P5: We received cash from party agents or the representatives of the candidates 
on the day of the election. 
P6: The party agents distributed cash to voters on the day of the election and 
voters accept the cash and vote as directed by the agents by voting for the 
agents’ preferred candidates rather than voting for any other candidates of 
their choice. 
P8: The political parties and the party agents use different strategies. Sometimes 
they would distribute cash and goods. Sometimes they would distribute goods 
on the eve of the election by going from house to house and distribute cash on 
the day of the election. Some would distribute cash at the polling-centers 
before voting commenced while others would monitor voters and give them 
the cash after voting had taken place. 
P9: The representatives of the political parties will tell them what to do to ensure 
that they have voted as instructed. Most of the time, the voters will be told to 
hold their ballot paper in a manner that the agent of the candidate in the 
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polling center will be able to see how they voted and the representative will 
then send a signal to the party agent outside the polling center that a particular 
voter has voted as instructed. The voters will then go and collect their money 
outside the polling center. Party agents use different strategies on election 
days to monitor voters and pay them for voting as directed. 
P10: The transaction between the party agents and voters were carried out in the 
open while the collection of cash after voting had taken place occurred under 
a tree about 30 meters away from the polling center. 
Disappointment, Lack of Trust, and Voter Apathy 
The interview question: “What reasons would you give for acceptance of cash 
instead of voting on the basis of political parties’ manifestoes?” was aimed at 
understanding the reasons voters accept cash from political parties and candidates. The 
theme that was derived from the interview data was that “disappointments, lack of trust 
and voters apathy.” Nine participants reported that voters sell their votes because they 
were disappointed with the performance of the elected public office holders; they no 
longer trust them and have become apathetic. Also, two sub-themes emerged from the 
questions. The sub-themes were “poverty” and “share of public funds.”  
P1: I will say that the voters are disappointed with the performances of the 
politicians in government. When the politicians campaigned, they promised 
heaven and earth, but at the end of the day, the reverse is the case. The voters 
prefer to take something from them rather than voting on the basis of the 
political parties’ manifestoes. 
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P2: Voters accepted cash for votes instead of voting on the basis of political 
parties’ manifestoes because politicians always failed to fulfill their election 
promises. We only see our politicians during election time. Immediately after 
the election, they will all vanish from the public. You cannot blame the voters 
for accepting cash for votes during elections because they know the politicians 
will never return to provide necessary infrastructure and public services for 
them, so they have to take advantage of the circumstances to collect their 
dividends of democracy. 
P3: Like I have said earlier the elected political office holders are not living up to 
expectation. 
P5: Further, if there is good government and the good governance is visibly 
demonstrated, many voters will not collect cash for votes. They will want to 
votes for candidates that will execute projects that will improve their well-
beings. Also, voters accept cash for votes because they think all politicians are 
corrupt and the same. Some people think that vote-buying is better than other 
forms of election rigging, such as ballot snatching, intimidation of voters, and 
other violent conduct. They think offering cash for votes is preferable to other 
means of election rigging. 
P6: Everybody believes that those governing us are corrupt. We can see that the 
politicians live in opulence beyond their income or earnings. We, therefore, 
believe that elections are an opportunity to get something from the politicians 
rather than consider voting for candidates who could provide us with good 
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governance because none of them can provide us with good governance 
anyway. 
P7: I think the most important reason why the voters collected money is that the 
politicians do not stand by their words. The voters no longer trust them… 
P8: I will say that voters are already tired of failed and unfulfilled promises by 
politicians. They think they have become wiser. Although, it is ironic. They 
think that it is their money anyway. They believe that it is better to collect 
cash for votes during the elections because the politicians would only enrich 
themselves after they get elected. Their experiences have shown that the 
politicians do not give them any consideration after the elections. 
P9: I think the main reasons for the acceptance of cash are poverty and lack of 
trust. The voters are very poor, and they do not trust the politicians that they 
will perform their duties. They told me that politicians do not get elected to 
make any positive impact in the community. 
P10: Voters no longer trust the politicians. They do not feel that political parties’ 
manifestoes have any meaning because politicians don’t remember 
manifestoes after they have been elected. All they do is to use their political 
offices to amass wealth by corrupt means. We no longer have access to them 
after the election. When you call them on the telephone, they won’t answer 
your calls. Most of them will change their telephone numbers after elections. 
They disregard the voters… The majority of the voters were unemployed, and 
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most of those who were employed had outstanding salaries of about six 
months. 
Subthemes 
Poverty. Six participants reported that voters accepted cash from political parties 
and candidates because of poverty.  The following significant statements from the 
interview data support the notion that voters accept cash for votes because of poverty. 
P2: The public office holders did not pay workers’ salaries for about three to four 
months, so residents were poor and desperate for money. We had to collect 
cash for votes because we felt they needed the cash. We needed the money to 
buy food because we were hungry people. 
P3: Yes, many voters engaged in vote-selling in the just concluded gubernatorial 
election in Ondo State. We were given cash for votes in my polling-unit.  
Most of us are poor. Some of us find it difficult to feed so we do not hesitate 
to accept cash for votes. Imagine if you were hungry and you were given five 
thousand naira to vote for a particular party. Certainly, you will collect it. 
P3: The kind of hardship we are currently experiencing is so tough that many 
people find it difficult to have their daily meal. The government has not paid 
workers salary for about seven months. A majority of us are very poor. We 
were in a position where we felt we needed the money and had no choice. 
P4: The economy of Ondo State is based or guided by salaries received by 
government workers because we do not have any big factory or private 
company that employs workers. Before the last election in Ondo State, the 
118 
 
state government has not paid workers’ salaries for about seven months. We 
are hungry because we struggle to have food.  So the politicians knowing that 
people were hungry distributed cash to voters during the elections to buy 
votes. Many voters are of the opinion that they have no option than to sell 
their votes for cash because their votes might not count anyway or that 
whoever won the election would act like others and would not carry out any 
project or make policies to improve their living conditions. 
P4: I think poverty is the major reason for their actions... 
P5: The main problem is poverty. The majority of the voters are very poor.  So 
they accept to accept cash for votes because they want money even though it 
is not substantial. 
P9: I think the main reasons for the acceptance of cash are poverty and lack of 
trust. The voters are very poor, and they do not trust the politicians that they 
will perform their duties. 
P10: Another reason why they accepted cash for votes was the level of poverty. 
The share of public funds. Six participants claimed that voters perceived the 
collection of cash for votes as their share of public funds. The following significant 
statements from the interview data support the notion that voters accept cash for votes 
because they believed the elected public office holders embezzle public funds and that 
they were only collecting their share of public funds. 
P1: The voters prefer to take advantage of the circumstances to collect their 
dividends of democracy. 
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P6: We, therefore, believe that elections are an opportunity to get something from 
the politicians rather than consider voting for candidates who could provide us 
with good governance because none of them can provide us with good 
governance anyway. 
P7: The voters no longer trust them and collecting money from them during the 
election was seen as their monetary benefit from the government. 
P8: They think that it is their money anyway. 
P9: They perceived the money received from the politicians as free money from 
public funds. 
P10: The voters, therefore, expressed it openly that it was worthwhile to accept 
cash for votes rather than losing out altogether. 
Good Governance 
The interview questions: “Do you think those who accepted cash for votes would 
have voted differently in some cases if the state of public services was good?” and “Do 
you think those who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently in some cases 
if the elected public office holders have improved public services in your local 
government?” The questions were aimed gathering information relating to the 
participants’ experiences and perceptions about infrastructure and public services, and 
vote-selling. The theme that was derived from the questions was “good governance.” The 
theme was common to all the participants. The following significant statements support 
the perceptions of the participants that vote-selling will be significantly reduced if there 
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was good governance that facilitates the provision of good infrastructure and public 
services. 
P1: I think they will vote differently if the public services were good but at the 
same time some voters will still collect money from party agents because of 
poverty and voted for cash. 
P1: I think many of the people will not accept cash for votes if the condition of 
public services and infrastructure were good. They will prefer to have good 
public services to accepting the cash they will get on election days. At the 
same time, very few people may still get money from party agents and vote 
for cash even if the public services were good. 
P1: I think the majority of the voters that accepted cash for votes would have 
voted differently if the elected public office holders fulfilled the promises 
made before the elections and improved the state of public services. The 
voters will surely prefer to vote for those who had carried out projects or 
implemented public services that improved their standard of living rather than 
voting for cash. However, some very few greedy ones may still accept cash 
irrespective of the improvement in public services. 
P1: The politicians need to address some certain things. They should be able to 
give a good account of their stewardship to the people. The politicians should 
try to improve the public services. They should try to do things to improve the 
standard of living of the people so that people will prefer to vote for them on 
the basis of their policies rather than voting for cash. 
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P2: Yes, I so much believe that most of us would have voted differently in some 
cases if the state of public services was good. I reside in this community and 
can say that many of the voters always regretted their actions within a short 
time after the election. We would always complain about the inadequacy of 
the infrastructure and hoped that public office holders change their attitude 
towards the community.  
P2: I can say that voters who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently 
if the elected public office holders have improved public services in this local 
government. I believe that there is nobody on earth that does not know what is 
good. I will say that voters collect cash for votes because we believe that once 
elected the politicians only use their positions to enrich themselves. If the 
government provided good public services most of the voters will not accept 
cash for votes. 
P3: Of course, most of us would have voted differently in some cases if the state 
of public services was good. Most of my friends that accepted cash and voted 
as instructed by the party agent told me that they would have voted differently 
but for the seven thousand naira per vote that they were offered. 
P3: We would have voted differently if the state of public services they attempted 
to improve our infrastructure.  I am certain that if the government starts 
providing us with water, road, and electricity, we would prefer to vote for 
politicians that will main good public service as opposed to those who wanted 
to buy our votes. I will say that this applies to job creation as well. I mean if 
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we have jobs and there are good public services most of us would not accept 
cash for votes. 
P4: Yes, those who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently if they 
received their salaries or the public office holders are doing well by providing 
good infrastructure and public services. 
P4: Those who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently by voting for 
the candidate of their choice if elected public office holders were doing the 
right thing by improving the public services in the local government. Some of 
the voters who voted for cash had previously voted on the basis of party 
manifestoes, but they realized that the politicians that they voted for did not do 
well by initiating public policies that could bring about improvement to their 
well-beings.  
P4: Generally, I will like to state that - if our public services are improved; if the 
government pays the government workers regularly; if the salary were 
increased regularly; and the working environment is improved – many vote 
sellers will vote for the candidates or parties of their choices and shun vote-
selling. 
P5: Indeed, I believe that if the state of infrastructure and public services was 
good, voters will vote for the candidates of their choice rather than voting as 
paid. The voters will prefer to enjoy good governance as opposed to accepting 
cash and suffer ban governance. 
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P5: Do you think those who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently 
in some cases if the elected public office holders have improved public 
services in your local government? 
P5: Yes, I think if the politicians did well in the past, voters would vote for them 
to sustain their good deeds, but they accept cash for votes because they have 
not seen improvement in public services and infrastructure and believed that it 
does not make any difference whether or not they accept cash for votes. I 
think there cannot be any improvement by the politicians except by way of 
God’s intervention. The politicians cannot change. It is even getting worse. 
P6: Yes, certainly, certainly. If everything is in place, and politicians perform well 
in government majority of us who accepted cash for votes would have voted 
differently. Certainly, if the state of public services were good, we would have 
done the right thing by voting for those who will maintain or provide public 
services rather than accepting cash for votes. 
P6: Yes, they would have voted differently if the politicians did well in 
government because if they improved public services that would have been 
sufficient to convince the voters that they should vote for those who can 
continue to improve public services instead of collecting cash for votes. 
P7: I believe that most voters will not collect money to vote for any candidate or 
candidates they were instructed to vote for if the state of the public services 
was good. 
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P7: Yes. I think that most of them would have voted differently and would not 
have collected cash if they could trust the politicians. They do not trust the 
politicians because they never fulfilled the promises made during elections. I 
think vote-selling will be reduced drastically if the politicians use their offices 
to improve our standard of living.  
P8: With my experience and what those who collected cash for votes had 
discussed with me, I can say that they would have voted differently if the state 
of infrastructure and public services was good and the politicians who had 
held electives offices in the past had fulfilled their election promises.  
P8: Those who accepted cash for votes understand the importance of good 
governance and do not like the state of infrastructure and public services in 
the local government. They are more or less hopeless. Most of them always 
lamented the state of infrastructure and hoped that politicians would be 
trustworthy and develop our infrastructure for us. The majority of the voters 
will prefer to have good infrastructure and public services as opposed to the 
cash they collect during elections. 
P9: Without any doubt, most voters that got paid and voted as instructed would 
not have done so if the state of public services was good. The majority of 
them did what they did as a result of frustration with the politicians and 
government. They knew what they did was bad but felt the politicians will 
embezzle the money or kept the money for themselves if they didn’t accept it. 
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In some cases, none of the candidates would make any difference to their 
welfare whether or not they accepted the cash for votes. 
P9: I think vote-sellers will vote differently if the elected public office holders 
have improved public services I have heard voters complaining that the 
politicians are rogue. They normally justified collecting cash and other goods 
from those seeking elective positions because they would not improve their 
welfare when they get to the offices being sought. For example, some time 
ago in this local government, funds meant for widows, and vulnerable people 
were not used for that purpose but were diverted the personal bank account of 
one of his family members. They will embezzle funds meant for 
infrastructural projects. If they used these funds for public services majority of 
the voters will not vote for cash. 
P10: They would have voted differently if the state of public services was good. 
Many voters who accepted cash were saying that the politicians were useless. 
They complained that the state of infrastructure was too bad and that it was a 
waste to vote for them. We feel the effects of the lack of infrastructure, so if 
there were good infrastructure, most people would have good reasons to trust 
the politicians and voted for the best candidate without collecting cash for 
vote. We all wanted good government but are frustrated by the actions of the 
politicians, and many voters who were mainly unemployed and uneducated 
took their frustration too far by collecting cash for votes. Unfortunately, the 
majority of the voters were unemployed. 
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P10: Voters always complained about the state of public services. They only 
collected the cash because they felt it doesn’t make any difference if they 
didn’t collect it. They will have voted differently if the elected public office 
holders have improved public services because they will prefer to continue to 
enjoy good services. 
Results 
 Moustakas (1994) explained that the textual description is: What the individuals 
experienced regarding the phenomenon? While the structural description is: How the 
individuals experienced the phenomenon or what circumstances influenced their 
experience? The significant statements made by the participants in their interviews and, 
the themes and sub-themes that emerged from the clustered statements were used to make 
textual descriptions of the participants’ experiences, structural descriptions of the factors 
that precipitated the participants’ experiences, and synthesize what they experienced and 
the circumstances that influenced their experiences. The data analysis revealed a 
connection between infrastructure and public services, and vote-selling.  
Organizing the Horizons and Themes Into a Coherent Textual Description 
Moustakas (1994) explained that “the challenge of description is to determine the 
textual components of experience, the ‘what’ of the appearing phenomenon” (p. 78). The 
composite textual description is, therefore, constructed from the aggregate of the 
significant statements and themes that emerged from the participants’ experiences 
(Moustakas, 1994). I made composite texture descriptions of the participants’ experiences 
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of vote-selling and the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko North Local 
Government. 
Composite textual descriptions. The participants freely expressed their 
experiences of vote-selling and the state of infrastructure and public services in Akoko 
North Local Government. There was a congruence of perceptions that infrastructure was 
inadequate, delivery of public services was poor, and vote-selling was rife and 
increasingly prevalent. 
 The participants described the state of infrastructure and public services in the 
local government as terrible, bad, outdated, dilapidated and pathetic. They claimed that 
the roads were not good, electricity was lacking, pipe-borne water was not available, 
schools were badly funded and managed, and health services were poor. P1 said “it is like 
we don’t have a government…Nothing is working.” For many of the participants, public 
services are non-functional or non-existent. P10 expressed that “many young mothers die 
during childbirth because of lack of good medical services.” Describing the condition of 
schools in the local government, P7 stated that: 
The schools’ buildings are in bad condition. The schools do not have chairs and 
tables for students. The classrooms have become too dangerous to accommodate 
the students. In some schools, teachers do not have chairs and tables they could 
use to carry out their work. Students are being taught in the open air, under the 
trees in some primary schools. 
The participants reported that the government had not executed any infrastructural 
project in the local government. They noted that elections did not bring any 
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improvements to the state of infrastructure and public services. They claimed that they 
had similar experiences of bad infrastructure and public services under successive 
democratic governments. They claimed that the government had abandoned 
infrastructural projects that were commenced by previous governments. The participants 
said that they were suffering as a result of the bad infrastructure and poor delivery of 
public services.  
 All the participants had common and shared experiences of vote-selling. They 
reported their experiences of being approached to sell their votes for cash by party agents 
during elections. Five of the participants expressly disclosed that they accepted cash for 
votes and gave various reasons for their behaviors. The other participant acknowledged 
that they were privy to other voters accepting cash for votes. The participants that 
confirmed that they received cash for votes did not express any regrets for doing so. They 
somewhat justified their actions and criticized the elected public office holders for bad 
governance.  
Many of the participants stated that vote-selling occurred publicly. According to 
P2 “It was so bad that it became an open act during the last election when the popular 
slogan was “Edibo esebe” which means in English, accept cash for the vote to enable you 
to make good soup. They reported that the politicians were willing to offer cash for votes 
and a sizeable number of the voters were prepared to accept cash for votes. The 
participants described how the transactions between vote- buyers, and vote-sellers took 
place. They equally explained vote-buying strategies that party agents employed in 
buying votes and monitoring compliance.   
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Imaginative Variation 
I reviewed the transcripts and undertook a deep reflection of the interviews to 
reaffirm my understanding of the participants’ descriptions of their lived experiences and 
perceptions. I made composite structural descriptions of the factors that precipitated the 
participants’ experiences - the underlying factors that accounted for the vote-selling 
phenomenon.  
According to Moustakas (1994), the structural descriptions of an experience are “ 
the underlying and precipitating factors that account for what is being experienced; in 
other words…How did the experience of the phenomenon come to be what it is (p. 98). 
The composite structural description is, essentially, the “vivid account of the underlying 
dynamics of the experience” of the participants as a group.  
Composite structural descriptions. The participants described the underlying 
factors that accounted for the vote-selling phenomenon. The participants reported that the 
elected public office holders neglected infrastructural projects and public services. P3 
claimed that “they received constituency allowances but never embarked on any 
constituency project…They only come home at the time of elections to seek re-
elections.” P9 said that they “need good roads, pipe-borne water, electricity and other 
public services that will enhance employment opportunities.” The participants reported 
that the elected public office holders did not address their needs, in particular, their 
infrastructural and public services’ needs. P4 stated that the elected public office holders 
“will allocate substantial funds to execute projects in the budgets and at the end of the 
year they will not carry out work on the projects. P8 stated that “they would commence 
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preliminary works on infrastructural projects when shortly before the elections so that 
voters will assume that they were about to address their needs.”  They claimed that the 
elected public office holders did not have considerations for their welfare.  
The participants expressed their disappointments with the actions of the elected 
public office holders, claimed they do not trust them any longer and that the voters have 
become apathetic. Resultantly, according to P1, “the voters prefer to take something from 
them rather than voting on the basis of the political parties’ manifestoes.” P6 said that 
“elections are an opportunity to get something from the politicians rather than consider 
voting for candidates who could provide us with good governance because none of them 
can provide us with good governance anyway.” P8 explained that the voters “believe that 
it is better to collect cash for votes during the elections because the politicians would only 
enrich themselves after they get elected.” They reported that the voters were disappointed 
in the elected public office holders and had to collect cash for votes as they do not trust 
them.  
For some participants, poverty was a significant influencing factor. They 
represented their disappointments in the elected public office holders in respect of their 
disregard in providing them with good infrastructure and public services, but they stated 
that poverty drove the voters to exchange their votes for cash. They said that many of the 
voters were poor. P3 explained that “the kind of hardship we are currently experiencing is 
so tough that many people find it difficult to have their daily meal.” P2 added that “we 
needed the money to buy food because we were hungry people.” P2 reported that “some 
of us find it difficult to feed so we do not hesitate to accept cash for votes.” P9 said that 
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many voters were poor, and they accepted cash for votes because of the lack of trust in 
the elected public office holders. 
Also, most of the participants noted that disappointments in the elected public 
office holders, cynicism on the part of the voters, and poverty led to the willingness of 
voters to seek a way in benefitting in their little way from the public funds by accepting 
cash for votes during elections.  
Synthesis of the Meanings 
The themes and sub-themes were used to synthesize the composite textual 
descriptions and the composite structural descriptions of the participants' lived 
experiences about vote-selling, the state of infrastructure, and public services in Akoko 
North West Local Government.   
Moustakas (1994) described  the textual components of experience as “the ‘what’ 
of the appearing phenomenon” (p. 78), and the structural components of the experience 
as involving “conscious acts of thinking and judging, imaging, and recollecting, in order 
to arrive at the core structural meanings” (p. 79).  
Textual-structural synthesis. On the one hand, the themes “inadequate and poor 
state of infrastructure and public services,” and “voters engaged in vote-selling,” and sub-
themes “openness of vote-selling and witness of cash collection” and “party agents’ vote-
buying strategies” emerged from the participants’ descriptions of what they experienced 
regarding the phenomenon. On the other hand, the themes – “insensitivity to voters’ 
needs and expectations,” “non-fulfillment of promises, corruption and self-enrichment,” 
and “disappointments, lack of trust and voters’ apathy” as well as the sub-themes 
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“poverty” and “share of public funds” emerged from the participants ‘description of the 
factors that precipitated or influenced their experiences. The themes and subthemes, 
therefore, embodies the textual and structural components of the participants’ experiences 
(Moustakas, 1994). The participants described the poor state of infrastructure and public 
services, insensitivity of the elected public office holders and their penchant for 
nonfulfillment of promises. They perceived the elected public office holders as corrupt, 
untrustworthy and expressed their disappointment in them. They stated that voters had 
become apathetic. They reported that poverty and the perception that the politicians were 
handing them their share of public funds propelled them to accepting cash for votes.    
The following findings were, therefore, derived from the emergent themes and the  
overall data: (a) infrastructure and poor public services are inadequate and in a bad state; 
(b) the elected public office holders are insensitive to voters’ needs and expectations; (c) 
the elected public office holders are corrupt; (d) vote-sellers’ justified and reacted to the 
elected public office holders’ actions and the environment; (e) vote-selling and vote-
buying were widespread, and prevalence; and (f) good governance that provides and 
maintains infrastructure and public services may eliminate vote-selling. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
 The instrument used for data collection in this phenomenological study was 
interviewing. The interviews were conversational and open-ended. Interviewing may be 
prone to misconceptions (Moustakas, 1994). However, I employed various strategies to 
ensure that the result of the study is credible, transferable, dependable and confirmable. 
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Credibility 
I employed Moustakas’ (1994) transcendental phenomenological data analysis 
that is an established phenomenological method of inquiry to ensure credibility. I 
established rapport with the participants and gave them an opportunity to withdraw from 
the study at any time to improve the credibility of the research. I listened attentively to 
the participants and asked probing questions - such as: Please elaborate on that issue. 
Please give more detail on that? Tell me about it? What do you mean? - to clarify some of 
their responses to the interview questions to ensure the credibility of the findings. 
Moustakas (1994) explained that in phenomenological studies, interviewees should 
“review and confirm or alter the research data to correspond to her or his perception of 
their experience” (p. 110).  
I undertook member checking strategy by confirming the transcriptions of the 
interviews with the participant to ensure the credibility of the statements made and 
recorded. I contacted some of the participants during data analysis to confirm the 
accuracy of the description of their experiences of the vote-selling phenomenon. P2 was 
recorded as saying “it was apparent we accepted cash during the last elections.” While P5 
was recorded as saying “we need to be sincere. We accepted cash for votes.” I contacted 
P2 and P5 to confirm whether they accepted cash because of the use of “we” in their 
responses. Also, I contacted P4 to confirm her response that “voters are generally poor 
and cannot reject cash when offered by party agents during elections” to the interview 
questions: “what reasons would you give for acceptance of cash instead of voting on the 
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basis of political parties’ manifestoes?” I had to contact her to confirm her response 
because it was not in consonance with the other participants. 
Transferability 
Thick descriptions in qualitative research enable readers to assess the extent to 
which the research findings can be transferred to other settings (Lincoln & Guba, 2005). I 
ensured that I gave a thick description of the sampling strategies employed, data 
collection process, data analysis protocol, research findings and the entire research 
design. I vividly described the participants’ selection process, the interview procedures 
and how I undertook the four main steps of four main steps of Moustakas’ (1994) 
transcendental phenomenological data analysis process - Epoche, Transcendental 
Phenomenological Reduction, Imaginative Variation, and Synthesis of the Meanings. I 
carefully and thoroughly read the transcriptions of the interview. I treated every statement 
as having equal value and sifted significant statements from irrelevant statements. I sifted 
statements that related to the provision of infrastructure, delivery of public services and 
vote-selling from the responses of the participants. I clustered the significant statements 
made by each of the participants into themes. I described the meanings ascribed by the 
participants to their common experiences based on the themes that emerged from the 
significant statements made by them. The thick description will enable the application of 
the research to other contexts.   
Dependability 
I cross-checked and corroborated the participants’ description of their personal 
experiences by asking probing questions during the interview and cross-checking the 
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transcriptions. I used digital voice-recorder and notebooks for data collection and 
transcribed the interviews for data analysis to enhance the dependability of the research 
findings. I will keep an audit trail of all the data and store all the physical records 
including the transcribed records, and removable disk for at least five years after 
completion of the study for any potential audit to ensure dependability.   
Confirmability 
 Bias is a source of concern in a qualitative study because it could easily intrude to 
a qualitative study given that data collection is undertaken by human beings (Baker, 
2014). However, the use of Moustakas (1994) transcendental phenomenological method 
of inquiry in this study enabled me to be reflexive by clarifying and re-examining my 
biases, prejudgments, and preconceptions through deep reflections at the epoch stage of 
the transcendental phenomenological process. I did not influence the participants at any 
time during the study with my personal experiences and made conscious attempts to 
bracket out all extraneous considerations at the bracketing stage of the data analysis. 
Discrepant Cases 
 A comment by one of the participant was non-confirming having regards to the 
substantial similarity in the responses of all the participants to the interview question: 
“What reasons would you give for acceptance of cash instead of voting on the basis of 
political parties’ manifestoes?” P4 stated that “voters are generally poor and cannot reject 
cash when offered by party agents during elections.”  P4’s response contradicts all the 
other responses because of her position that insofar as voters are poor they will sell their 
votes. 
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Summary 
 The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences in respect of the provision of 
infrastructure, poor delivery of public services and vote-selling in Akoko North West 
Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. The objective of the study was to provide a 
better understanding of the connection between the provision of infrastructure and public 
services, and vote-selling. In this chapter, I presented a detailed analysis of the research 
findings and specifically addressed the research problem, research purpose, and research 
question. I provided an in-depth description of the data collection process, data analysis 
used in the study, and presented the research findings that were distilled from the data 
analysis. The research employed Moustakas (1994) transcendental phenomenological 
method of analysis and based its findings on the selected significant statements and the 
themes that were derived from the significant statements. Seven themes emerged from 
the interview data. The themes revealed common and substantial similarity in the 
perceptions of the participants. 
 The first theme revealed that infrastructure and public services are inadequate and 
in a bad state. The second theme showed that voters’ main expectations and needs from 
the public office holders are infrastructure and public services. The third theme revealed 
that voters perceive the elected public office holders as insensitive to their welfare. The 
fourth theme revealed that the elected public office holders are corrupt, use their offices 
to enrich themselves and never fulfilled their election promises. The fifth theme revealed 
that voters engaged in vote-selling, and that vote-selling was prevalent and carried out in 
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public. It further revealed some of the strategies employed by the party agents to buy 
votes. The sixth theme disclosed that voters were disappointed with the elected public 
office holders and are apathetic. The last theme explained the perception of the voters 
that good governance by primarily investing in infrastructure and public policies may 
lead to substantial reduction in vote-selling. 
I discuss the research findings in full and explain how the themes support the 
literature, draw conclusions, make recommendations and address the implications of the 
study for future research in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences in respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, poor delivery of public services, and vote-selling in Akoko North West 
Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. The study was triggered by the need to 
understand the connection between the provision of infrastructure and public services, 
and vote-selling. The central research question that guided the study was the following: 
“How do individuals who participated in the most recent elections describe their lived 
experiences of vote-selling in relation to the provision of infrastructure and public 
services in Akoko North West Local Government?” I used Bandura’s theory of reciprocal 
determinism as a theoretical lens to examine the phenomenon of vote-selling. The theory 
indicates that there is a connection between the environment and behavior and that the 
environment influences human behavior (Bandura, 1974).  
The research aimed to collect information-rich data by using the 
phenomenological approach to qualitative research to explore and capture voters’ lived 
experiences concerning the provision of infrastructure, poor delivery of public services, 
and the phenomenon of vote-selling. The phenomenological approach was most suited 
for the study because it enabled individuals who participated in the most recent elections, 
resided continuously in the community for at least 5 years, and had been exposed to the 
phenomenon of vote-selling to describe their common experiences. Semistructured, open-
ended interviews were used to capture the participants’ perceptions and descriptions of 
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their lived experiences. Moustakas’s (1994) transcendental phenomenological method of 
inquiry was employed to conduct the data analysis. A sample of 10 individuals was 
selected for the study. The phenomenological study revealed themes that emerged from 
significant statements made by the participants regarding their lived experiences. The 
findings of the study were presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I present a 
full discussion of the study’s findings and make recommendations.  
Conclusions 
 In this section, I focus conclusions on six areas. Seven themes and four subthemes 
emerged from the data analyses. The themes and subthemes were used to synthesize the 
composite textual descriptions and the composite structural descriptions. The themes and 
subthemes led to the following findings:  
1. Infrastructure and public services were inadequate and in a bad state. This 
finding was derived from two themes: inadequate and bad state of 
infrastructure and public services, and infrastructure and public services.  
2. The elected public office holders are insensitive to voters’ needs and 
expectations. This finding was derived from the theme of insensitivity to 
voters’ needs and expectations.  
3. The elected public office holders are corrupt. This finding was derived from 
the theme of nonfulfillment of promises, corruption, and self-enrichment.  
4. Vote-sellers justified and reacted to elected public office holders’ actions and 
the environment. This finding was derived from the theme of disappointment, 
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lack of trust, and voter apathy and the subthemes of poverty and share of 
public funds.  
5. Vote-selling and vote-buying were widespread and prevalent. This finding 
was derived from the theme of voters engaged in vote-selling and the 
subthemes of the openness of vote-selling and party agents’ vote-buying 
strategies.  
6. Good governance that provides and maintains infrastructure and public 
services may eliminate vote-selling. This finding was derived from the theme 
of good governance. 
Public Office Holders Are Insensitive to Voters’ Needs and Expectations 
 In the literature review, it was disclosed that voters’ behaviors and perceptions 
were predicated on the apparent transformation of the financial status of public office 
holders following their elections to public offices (Onapajo et al., 2015).  All 10 
participants reported that public office holders always became unresponsive to their 
needs after elections, noting that they witnessed a drastic change in their lifestyle. They 
expressed that politicians usually displayed their wealth publicly. All of the participants 
affirmed that elected public office holders have the propensity and proclivity for self-
enrichment. They claimed that elected public officers diverted public funds to their 
private purses and personally enriched themselves with public funds. For instance, P1 
stated that “the politicians enrich themselves with public funds” and P10 claimed that 
they are “interested in their pockets rather than public welfare.” The participants held the 
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view that elected public office holders are self-centered and do not govern in the interest 
of the public. 
 All of the participants affirmed that the elected public office holders exhibited 
their wealth ostentatiously and showed a transformational change in their wealth shortly 
after they were elected to political offices. They expressed that the financial 
metamorphosis of the elected public office holders was traceable to fraudulent self-
enrichment. P1 expressed the instantaneous visible change in the personal circumstances 
of the elected public office holders in the following terms. They “flaunt their wealth as 
soon as they get elected instead of using the funds to provide us with good roads, pipe-
borne water, and electricity.” P2 said that the elected public office holders divert public 
funds to their private bank accounts. P9 reported that they do not care about constituents’ 
needs. The participants expressed that the elected public office holders are deceptive. P3 
put it deridingly, stating that “they regard us as spanners to be used and dumped.”  
Elected Public Office Holders Are Corrupt 
 Nonfulfillment of election promises was one of the main themes generated from 
the data in this study. The finding that elected public office holders are corrupt and do not 
fulfill the election promises they make to the electorate resonated with what was revealed 
in the literature review. The literature on vote-buying disclosed that elected public office 
holders in emerging democracies do not fulfill their pre-election commitments regarding 
infrastructure because of lack of accountability and political corruption (Hanusch et al., 
2016).  
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 The participants were univocal in expressing their perceptions about 
nonfulfillment of election promises by elected public office holders. They reported that 
elected public office holders would promise to provide good infrastructure prior to the 
elections and would disregard their commitments after the elections. According to P5, the 
elected public office holders “made lofty promises … but they forgot about their 
promises after they have been elected into offices.” P3 noted that “the politicians are in 
the habit of making false promises that they probably knew they would not fulfill.” P1 
bluntly stated that “they would always promise to provide or improve services and 
infrastructure, but there has not been any transformation in our wellbeing.” P6 reported 
that “it is one thing to promise, it is one thing to fulfill. The politicians always made 
promises but always failed to fulfill their promises.” P9 referred to politicians as liars and 
said, “there is some spirit that possesses them as soon as they get elected to public 
offices…They change as soon as they get elected.” 
The literature review highlighted controversy concerning vote-buying and 
election promises and lack of consensus regarding whether the two phenomena equally 
distort democracy or whether they are equally excusable (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011; 
Mares & Young, 2016; Wong, 2017). Hanusch et al. (2016) considered vote-buying and 
election promises as electoral strategies.  This study found that vote-buying and election 
promises were equally employed as electoral strategies. It found that nonfulfillment of 
election promises has negative impacts on the electorate.  The participants condemned 
election promises as an electoral strategy. They disdained politicians’ practice of making 
election promises and failing to fulfill them. They believed that it was not excusable to 
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break election promises and linked nonfulfillment of election promises to the poor state 
of infrastructure and public services. They reported that despite pre-election promises, 
elected public office holders failed to provide good infrastructure and public services. P2 
stated that “they always failed to execute any project.” P4 added that “they will award 
contracts for infrastructural projects and will not execute them.” 
The participants were of the opinion that the elected public office holders 
manipulated public policies to enrich themselves. The findings in the literature indicating 
that elected public office holders are corrupt and divert public funds during their terms in 
office to maximize vote-buying during elections supported the participants’ position 
(Devadoss & Luckstead, 2016).  
The literature revealed that political corruption caused the diversion of public 
funds from roads, health care, electricity, education, and other necessary infrastructure 
and public services toward programs or projects that gave politicians personal benefits at 
the expense of the electorate (Ajisebiyawo, 2016). Rose-Ackerman (2001) pointed out 
that politicians manipulated public policies for personal gain by providing narrowly 
focused goods and services rather than broad-based public services. They diverted public 
spending to fewer projects that had little or no socioeconomic benefit (Jain, 2001; 
Ogunlana et al., 2016). This study corroborated the literature review by finding that 
elected public office holders were interested in personal gains as opposed to public 
goods. All of the participants reported that the politicians were self-centered and 
interested in self-enrichment. The participants expressed that the elected public office 
holders were not holding public offices to serve the people but to enrich themselves.  
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Inadequate and Bad State of Infrastructure and Public Services 
 The environment influences human behavior, and human behavior reacts to the 
environment (Bandura, 1974). It is important to comprehend the nature or state of the 
environment to understand how the environment influences human behavior. 
Infrastructure and public services encompass vote-sellers’ environment.  
 As disclosed in the literature review, representative governments by way of 
elections have not had positive impacts on economies in Africa, except in cases where 
incumbent governments lost the election (Collier & Vicente, 2014). In Nigeria, poor 
leadership has denied the people the opportunity to advance their economies or positively 
transform the country (Omotosho, 2014). The participants were in congruence regarding 
their perceptions of the impacts of elections and representative governance in Akoko 
North West Local Government. All of the participants wanted the government to provide 
them with infrastructure and public services. P4 stated that “we need the politicians to 
address our problems and put things rights … They need to … spend the state’s resources 
to provide us with roads, electricity, hospital and other infrastructure and public 
services.” P1 stated that people need good public services that will result in the 
improvement of their standard of living. P3 contended that the government should carry 
out programs that will improve the welfare of the people. P9 and P10 wanted the 
government to provide infrastructure that would create the necessary environment to 
advance the economy. They all expressed that the local government area requires good 
infrastructure and public services.  
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 It is instructive that all of the participants equally maintained that the state of 
infrastructure and public services was bad. The literature review disclosed a link between 
vote-buying on one hand and infrastructure and public services on the other. Kramon 
(2013) claimed that there is a close nexus between vote-buying and negative effects of 
bad governance in emerging democracies. The participants stated that bad governance 
was exhibited in the local government. P1 claimed that lack of infrastructure made the 
voters felt as if they “don’t have a government” and that “the government has abandoned 
its responsibilities.” P2 stated that “there are no good public services from the 
government in my local government. There are no government programmes.” P3 stated 
that there were no “functional public services in this local government.” P8 pointed out 
that “the infrastructure and public services are very bad” and that they “are really 
suffering in this local government.”   
Jenson and Justesen (2014) found that vote-buying accounted for a reduction in 
the supply of public goods. Additionally, Tanzi and Davodi (1997) claimed that vote- 
buying was responsible for the provision of low infrastructural quality. In essence, vote-
buying results in poor public service delivery (Omotosho, 2014; Vincent, 2014) The 
participants’ responses were in congruity with the finding in the literature that vote-
buying brought about the provision of low infrastructural quality, a reduction of supply of 
public goods, and poor public service delivery. P2 expressed that “residents are always 
complaining about the lack of good public services and infrastructure.” P5 reported that 
they “now have many private schools. Government schools are no longer good. The 
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students that attend government schools are children whose parents are poor and cannot 
afford private schools’ fees.” P7 noted, 
The schools do not have chairs and tables for students. The classrooms have 
become too dangerous to accommodate the students. In some schools, teachers do 
not have chairs and tables they could use to carry out their work. Students are 
being taught in the open air, under the trees in some primary schools … 
 P8 indicated that “hospitals are not functioning. The doctors and nurses do not 
have the necessary equipment. The buildings in our schools are in a very bad state. We do 
not have electricity supply and pipe-borne water.” P9 confirmed that the politicians “have 
failed to maintain the public facilities.” P10 added,  
There’s serious deficiency of infrastructure … We don’t have access to good 
medical care. Many young mothers die during childbirth because of lack of good 
medical services. Motor accidents with fatalities frequently occur on our roads 
because the roads are bad … 
 Swamy (2016) asserted that government intervention through the implementation 
of welfare policies had positive effects on voters’ behaviors. The participants reported 
that the government had failed to implement good welfare policies in the local 
government. P1 stated that “we expect them to take care of our welfare.” P3 expressed 
that “we expect them to undertake projects that will improve the welfare of the people.” 
P10 noted that “they know our problems, but they are interested their pockets rather than 
public welfare.” 
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Voters Engaged in Vote-Selling 
 Vote-buying is rampant and ubiquitous in emerging democracies (Jensen & 
Justesen, 2014; Kranon, 2013). Electoral fraud has led to problematic election outcomes 
and has been a continual problem of elections for political offices in Nigeria (Danjibo & 
Oladeji, 2007). The results of this study are in harmony with the findings disclosed in the 
literature indicating that in Nigeria, a sizable percentage of the voting population is 
exposed to vote vote-buying or engages in vote-selling (Gans-Morse et al., 2014).  
All of the participants acknowledged that they had been exposed to vote-buying. 
They confirmed that they had been approached to sell their vote for cash. Four of the 
participants disclosed that they had accepted cash for votes. P1 was categorical in stating 
that he “took money for voting for the candidate I voted. Also, all my friends collected 
money to vote for the candidates they cast their votes for in the last election.” P3 reported 
that he “received cash for votes and many other voters received cash for votes.” P5 
claimed that voters “accepted cash for votes.” P6 added that he and his friends “accepted 
cash for votes on the day of the last governorship election.” All of the participants 
confirmed that a sizeable number of voters received cash for votes during elections. The 
experiences and perceptions of the participants echoed what was found in the literature 
review, which indicated that vote-selling is widespread in Nigeria (Lucky, 2013). 
 The experiences of the participants confirmed that vote-selling was not only 
widespread as revealed in the literature, but vote-sellers brazenly conducted it in the open 
without hindrances. P1 stated that he “saw party agents giving voters money at the 
polling centers during elections.” P2 and P5 reiterated that vote-buyers and vote-sellers 
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were readily conducting the transactions in the open. P7 added that everybody was aware 
of the vote-buying and vote-selling transactions. She described the transactions as “an 
open secret.” P9 expressed that she “saw many voters collecting cash immediately after 
they cast their votes during the last election,” and P10 added that he saw many voters 
collecting cash for votes and that many of them even bragged openly after the election 
that they had accepted cash for votes. 
 The literature highlighted the debate regarding the effectiveness of secret ballots 
as a safeguard to vote-buying and vote-selling. Some proponents of the efficacy of secret 
ballots argued that it is an effective safeguard for vote-buying because it denies vote-
buyers the ability to monitor the voting process and thereby control voters ‘choice or 
enforce the vote-buying transaction (Collier & Vincente, 2012; Finan & Schechter, 2012; 
Vincente, 2014). However, some authors argued that the impacts of secret ballots are 
paradoxical. They asserted that secret ballots on the one hand effectively disables the 
capabilities to vote-buyers to monitor voters’ sincerity in the polling booth and on the 
other hand enables a sizable number of voters to vote in compliance with the vote-buyers’ 
requests which increases vote-buying (Morgan & Vardy, 2012).   
The finding in this study disconfirmed the literature that secret ballots prevents 
monitoring and thereby reduces the effect of the use of monitoring to control voters’ 
choice or enforce the transaction (Collier & Vincente, 2012; Finan & Schechter, 2012; 
Vincente, 2014). It supported an alternative finding in the literature that vote-buyers have 
invented means or strategies to counteract the effect of secret ballot on monitoring of 
voters during the voting process (Jensen & Justesen, 2014). The participants disclosed 
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some of the strategies employed by vote-buyers to monitor how voters’ vote or ensure 
that they voted as requested. P1 stated that the vote-buying transaction involved what he 
termed “internal arrangement.” He described the arrangement as follows: “internal 
arrangement is the kind of agreement that party agents have with voters to pay them 
outside of the polling center environment after voting had taken place and confirmation 
that the voters had voted for their preferred candidates as arranged.”  The participants 
explained the monitoring mechanisms or strategies. P9 described the monitoring process 
as follows:  
The representatives of the political parties will tell them what to do to ensure that 
they have voted as instructed. Most of the time, the voters will be told to hold 
their ballot paper in a manner that the agent of the candidate in the polling center 
will be able to see how they voted and the representative will then send a signal to 
the party agent outside the polling center that a particular voter has voted as 
instructed. The voters will then go and collect their money outside the polling 
center.  
The participants ‘descriptions of the monitoring strategy employed by party 
agents during elections, resonated with the “See and Buy” vote-buying strategy whereby 
political parties’ representatives position themselves strategically at locations where they 
can monitor and confirm how voters vote before payments are made (Onapajo et al., 
2015).  
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Vote-Sellers Justified and Reacted to Elected Public Office Holders’ Actions and the 
Environment 
This research’s finding that vote-sellers’ justified and reacted to the elected public 
office holders’ actions and the environment, is in harmony with Bandura’s (1974) 
proposition that external consequences are not the sole or independent determinant of 
human behavior and that people create the society and equally react to environmental 
factors. The participants reported that vote-selling was a product of disappointment, lack 
of trust and voters’ apathy, willingness to accept their own share of “national cake,” and 
poverty.  It is instructive that the finding in this study disconfirmed the position of some 
scholars that the norm of reciprocity drives voters to sell their votes to their political 
benefactors to sustain them in office (Finan & Schechter, 2012; Lawson & Green, 2014). 
All the participants expressed disappointments in the performance of the elected public 
office holders, and none indicated that their voting choice was influenced by previous 
benefits received from the politicians. 
The literature revealed that vote-buying is prevalent in areas where the credibility 
of politicians is low and where they had failed to fulfill their commitments (Hanusch & 
Keefer, 2013; Hanusch et al., 2016). This proposition is in congruence with the 
participants’ perceptions that they found the performance of the politicians disappointing 
because they failed to meet their expectations. P1 noted that “the voters are disappointed 
with the performances of the politicians in government.” P2 stated that the politicians did 
not leave up to their expectations. P6 stated that they have failed to provide the electorate 
with public goods.   
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Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) found that voters have little expectation that 
political institutions will provide public goods because they believe elections are not 
credible or trustworthy. This position corresponds closely with the participants’ 
perceptions of the elected public office holders. P7 stated that voters do not trust 
politicians and reported that “most of them would have voted differently and would not 
have collected cash if they could trust the politicians.” P9 said that one of the reasons 
why voters accepted cash for votes was because they did not trust politicians to fulfill 
pre-election promises. P10 added that “voters no longer trust the politicians.” The 
research result confirmed that voters are skeptical about the integrity of the elections in 
Nigeria, had little regard to election promises by politicians and did not perceive vote-
selling as unethical (Lucky, 2013; Onapajo et al., 2015).  
Besides the skepticism relating to the credibility of the voting process or 
elections, the voters were willing to accept cash from the vote-buyers because they 
considered it as an opportunity to participate in the sharing of “national cake” (Onapajo et 
al., 2015). P1 stated that “voters prefer to take advantage of the circumstances to collect 
their own dividends of democracy.” P2 reported that voters had “to take advantage of the 
circumstances to collect their own dividends of democracy.” P3 added that elections 
presented them with “an opportunity to get something from the politicians rather than 
consider voting for candidates who could provide us with good governance because none 
of them can provide us with good governance anyway.” P7 expressed that voters 
collected cash from politicians on Election days because they perceive the cash “as their 
own monetary benefit from the government.” According to P8, the cash they collected for 
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votes was “their money anyway.” P9 described the cash for votes “as free money from 
public funds.” While P10 said that “it was worthwhile to accept cash for votes rather than 
losing out altogether.” 
 The literature identified poverty as one of the factors that precipitated vote-
buying. Also, it revealed that political representatives neglected the poor and that poverty 
fundamentally necessitated poor voters’ decision to sell their votes to vote-buyers 
(Hicken, 2007; Owen, 2013). Poverty was pivotal to vote-sellers' inclination to place 
more value on instant financial benefits as opposed to future benefits or future 
commitments contained in election promises (Khemani, 2015). The vote- buyers, 
therefore, recognized that poor voters were vulnerable because of the microeconomic 
conditions and specifically targeted them with the offer of immediate benefits in 
exchange for their votes (Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015; Jensen & Justesen, 2014). Some 
scholars opined that vote-sellers regarded vote-buying as a legitimate electoral strategy 
that political parties used during elections (Gonzalez‐Ocantos et al., 2012; Jensen & 
Justesen, 2014). Accordingly, poverty had a significant influence on how poor voters 
perceived vote-buying. They were aware of the elected public office holders control or 
possess substantial public funds that they had failed to use for their benefits and believed 
that it was in their interest to accept cash for votes by obtaining their own piece of the pie 
or share of the public funds (Onapajo et al., 2015). The responses of some of the 
participants and the findings in the literature were in consonance. The participants 
expressed that most of the voters in Akoko North Local government are poor. P4 
explained that they “are hungry because we struggle to have food.  So the politicians 
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knowing that people were hungry distributed cash to voters during the elections to buy 
votes.” P2 added, 
The public office holders did not pay workers’ salaries for about three to four 
months, so residents were poor and desperate for money. We had to collect cash 
for votes because we felt they needed the cash. We needed the money to buy food 
because we were hungry people. 
According to P3, a number of them struggle to make end means and would 
readily accept cash for votes to ease their suffering albeit temporarily. He stated that “the 
kind of hardship we are currently experiencing is so tough that many people find it 
difficult to have a daily meal.” He surmised that “if you were hungry and you were given 
five thousand naira to vote for a particular party, certainly you will collect it.” 
Good Governance 
 A preponderance of literature on vote-selling supports the finding in this study 
that good governance that provides and maintains infrastructure and public services may 
eliminate vote-selling. Yusuf et al., (2014) contended that there is a link between bad 
governance and corruption, and found that bad governance leads to corruption, while 
good governance significantly reduces corruption. There is equally a close link between 
corruption and inadequate infrastructure (Ogbuagu, & Effiom, 2014). Political corruption 
in particular lack of transparency and accountability were responsible for the inadequate 
provision of infrastructure (Ogbuagu & Effiom, 2014), and provision of low 
infrastructural quality in emerging democracies (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). Also, the 
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literature found that there is a connection between the level of corruption and the quality 
of the infrastructure (Castro et al., 2014).  
The literature review found a connection between vote-buying and delivery of 
public services (Khemani, 2015). It equally found a nexus between vote-selling and good 
public services (Bardhan et al., 2015). According to Vicente (2014), vote- buying results 
in bad public policies and inadequate infrastructure. The findings in this study reaffirmed 
the connection between vote-buying and public services. Also, they harmonized with the 
findings in available research that vote-buying impacts negatively on good governance 
and accountability (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2014; Kramon, 2013). It impacts on good 
governance through the quality of the representations produced and the consequent policy 
outcomes that emanated from the products of vote-buying (Leight et al., 2015).  
Voting and elections are the fundamental ingredients of democratic practices, and 
good governance influences or drives democratic practices (Gilbert & Allen, 2014). Good 
governance is, therefore, linked to a reduction in corruption and level of corruption 
because it is evident that vote-buying does not flourish in places where there is the good 
delivery of public services (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2011; Weighost, 2013).    
The participants’ perceptions of the connection between vote-selling and public 
services were explicitly described. P1 stated that voters “will vote differently if the public 
services were good.”  He added that “they will prefer to have good public services to 
accepting the cash they will get on election days.” P2 confirmed that most of them 
“would have voted differently in some cases if the state of public services was good.” P3 
explained that he was certain “that if the government starts providing us with water, road, 
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and electricity, we would prefer to vote for politicians that will main good public service 
as opposed to those who wanted to buy our votes.” P4 reported that “some of the voters 
who voted for cash had previously voted on the basis of party manifestoes, but they 
realized that the politicians that they voted for did not do well by initiating public policies 
that could bring about improvement to their well-beings.” P5 stated that “the voters will 
definitely prefer to enjoy good governance as opposed to accepting cash and suffer ban 
governance.” He added that “if the politicians did well in the past, voters would vote for 
them to sustain their good deeds, but they accept cash for votes because they have not 
seen improvement in public services and infrastructure.”  
P6 reported that “if everything is in place, and politicians perform well in 
government majority of us who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently.” 
He reiterated that “if the state of public services were good we would have done the right 
thing by voting for those who will maintain or provide public services rather than 
accepting cash for votes.” P7 stated that “vote-selling will be reduced drastically if the 
politicians use their offices to improve our standard of living.” P8 explained that “those 
who accepted cash for votes understand the importance of good governance and do not 
like the state of infrastructure and public services in the local government.” P9 said that 
“majority of them did what they did as a result of frustration with the politicians and 
government.” P10 confirmed that “they only collected the cash because they felt it 
doesn’t make any difference if they didn’t collect it.” All the participants gave credence 
to the connection between vote-selling and public services. 
156 
 
 It is noteworthy that the study equally found that other factors were traceable to 
vote-selling. These findings were in line with the theory of reciprocal determinism that 
recognizes that notwithstanding the influence of external factors, they do not 
independently determine behavior (Bandura, 1974). It equally substantiates the literature 
that found that vote-buying “is a function of a mix of socioeconomic, cultural and 
institutional factors” (Hicken, 2007, p. 58). Factors such as institutions, electoral systems, 
cultural and socio-economic factors facilitated vote-selling (Hicken et al., 2015; Onapajo 
et al., 2015; Jensen & Justensen, 2014). The study found that vote-selling was a product 
of disappointment, lack of trust and voters’ apathy, willingness to accept cash for votes as 
their own share of “national cake.”    
Some of the participants’ statements substantiate the conclusion that poverty, 
disappointment, lack of trust and voters’ apathy were, nevertheless, factors that have a 
close link to the state of infrastructure and public services. Concerning poverty, P4 stated, 
We are hungry because we struggle to have food…  Many voters are of the 
opinion that they have no option than to sell their votes for cash because their 
votes might not count anyway or that whoever won the election would act like 
others and would not carry out any project or make policies to improve their 
living conditions. 
Regarding disappointment, P2 reported, 
Voters accepted cash for votes… because politicians always failed to fulfill their 
election promises…You cannot blame the voters for accepting cash for votes 
during elections because they know the politicians will never return to provide 
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necessary infrastructure and public services for them, so they have to take 
advantage of the circumstances to collect their own dividends of democracy. 
On lack of trust and voters’ apathy, P10 reported that “voters no longer trust the  
politicians. They do not feel that political parties’ manifestoes have any meaning because 
politicians don’t remember manifestoes after they have been elected. As per voters’ 
willingness to accept cash for votes as their own share of the national cake, P3 pointed 
out that “an opportunity to get something from the politicians rather than consider voting 
for candidates who could provide us with good governance because none of them can 
provide us with good governance anyway.” These significant statements and the literature 
concretized the finding that that of disappointment, lack of trust and voters’ apathy, 
willingness to accept cash for votes as their own piece of the pie, and poverty were linked 
to bad governance and inability of the elected public office holders to provide good 
infrastructure and public services. 
Limitations of the Study 
This qualitative transcendental phenomenological study explored the lived 
experiences of individuals who participated in the most recent election in Akoko North 
West Local Government. The study used Moustakas’s transcendental phenomenological 
method of inquiry to collect and analyze data obtained from individuals who had first-
hand information about vote-selling phenomenon and the state of infrastructure and 
public services in Akoko North West Local Government. A sample of ten participants 
was used to obtain detailed and in-depth information about their experiences of the vote-
selling phenomenon 
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The study was confined to Akoko North Local Government. It was highly 
possible that the ten participants did not represent all the socioeconomic circumstances of 
the voters in the local government, and it might not cover some variables. The 
confinement of the study to Akoko North West Local Government and the relatively 
small sample size might make it difficult to transfer or generalize the data from this study 
and research findings to other locations or a larger population. 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech (2007) posited that a sample ought not to be too large to  
dispossess a study of the capability of obtaining information-rich data. The purpose of 
this study was to capture the lived experiences of the participants. A diverse sample of 
participants who satisfied the study’s inclusion criteria and had different personal 
backgrounds or socioeconomic circumstances was deliberately selected. The small 
sample size enabled the researcher to achieve the purpose of the research sufficiently and 
creditably.  
Despite the potential limitations, other researchers may apply the study in other 
contexts, and the research findings are generalizable because of the detailed descriptions 
of the research design, and the insights the qualitative study obtained into the vote-selling 
phenomenon (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007).   
Recommendations 
 A review of literature established a nexus between vote-buying and delivery of 
public services. This study found a connection between vote-selling, and infrastructure 
and public services. Also, it found a reciprocal relationship between vote-selling, and 
infrastructure and public services. The research found that bad governance and 
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inadequate infrastructure catalyzed to voters’ disappointment, lack of trust and voters’ 
apathy, willingness to accept cash for votes as their own share of the national cake and 
poverty. It was found that while the stated resultant effects of bad governance and 
inadequate infrastructure led to vote-selling, the consequent effect of vote-selling was bad 
governance and inadequate infrastructure and public services. There is a need for further 
research to determine the extent or degree to which an improvement in the provision of 
infrastructure and public services will reduce vote-buying and vote-selling. 
 The study examined and explored the vote-selling phenomenon from the 
perspectives of the voters. The agencies that conduct elections need to develop policies 
and encourage initiatives for voters’ education to point out the connection between vote-
selling, and infrastructure and public services and sensitize voters about the import future 
benefits or developmental projects as opposed to immediate benefits in the form of cash 
payments for votes. There is a need to establish non-governmental organizations that will 
champion the dissemination and propagation of the democratic ills associated with vote-
selling to the voters and the consequential adverse effects of vote-selling on governance 
and their general well-beings. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
 The findings of this study have extensive practical implications for positive social 
change in Nigeria and other emerging democracies. This study filled the gap in the 
literature by identifying the connection and reciprocal interaction between vote-selling, 
and infrastructure and public services. It found that the inadequacy infrastructure and 
poor public services impacted on voting, and vote-selling adversely affected 
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infrastructure and public services. The findings provided a greater and broader 
understanding of the connection between vote-selling, and infrastructure and public 
services. The study may, therefore, inspire other researchers to make further exploration 
of the degree to which the provision of infrastructure and public services will reduce 
vote-selling. 
 The findings will lead to positive social change by enabling INEC to concretize 
its focus in ensuring the conduct of free and fair elections by combatting vote-buying and 
vote-selling through a better informed and more strategic enlightenment programs or 
voters’ education that will explicate the reciprocal relationship between vote-selling and 
infrastructure and public services. It will help INEC to redirect its focus to combat vote-
selling by developing policies to combat vote-buying and vote-selling, and promoting 
enactments of regulations/laws against vote-selling. Also, it will help INEC to sensitize 
the political parties to the implications of infrastructure and public services on electoral 
practices, and voters to the relevance of their votes in relation to infrastructure and public 
services.  
Another positive social change implication of the findings is that they may 
galvanize political parties, elected public office holders and aspirants to public offices in 
Nigeria and other emerging democracies to review how they prioritize their policies and 
allocate states’ resources, and place more weight on making and fulfilling election 
commitments on the provision of infrastructure and delivery of public services.  
An additional positive social change implication is that the research findings may 
lead to an increase in voters’ awareness of the great importance or value of votes in a 
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democracy, strengthen democratic practices in emerging democracies, and reduce voters’ 
cynicism and vote-selling in general. 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to uncover voters’ behaviors by investigating their 
common and lived experiences with respect to the provision of infrastructure, delivery of 
public services, and voting during elections in Akoko North West Local Government, 
Ondo State, Nigeria. This study examined the phenomenon of vote-selling through the 
theoretical lens of Albert Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism. Bandura (1977) 
contended that “behavior partly creates the environment, and the resultant environment, 
in turn, influences the behavior” (p. 40), and that behavior creates the environment in part 
while the environment influences behavior reciprocally. He asserted that personal and 
environmental factors are corroborative determinants (Bandura, 1978). 
 Regarding the environmental influences, the finding was that inadequate 
infrastructure catalyzed to voters’ disappointment, lack of trust and voters’ apathy, 
willingness to accept cash for votes as their own share of “national cake” and poverty. 
The resultant consequences of inadequate infrastructure and public services significantly 
contributed to vote-buying and vote-selling. On the behavioral part, the finding showed 
that vote-buying and vote-selling crystalize into bad governance and the provision of 
inadequate infrastructure and public services. The overall finding of this study was that 
bad governance, and inadequate infrastructure led to voters’ disappointment, lack of trust 
and voters’ apathy, willingness to accept cash for votes as their own share of “national 
cake” and poverty that brought about vote-selling. While vote-buying and vote-selling, in 
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turn, created bad governance and inadequate infrastructure. The research identified the 
dialectical interactions between vote-selling, and infrastructure and public services. The 
research findings may help the relevant government agencies to sensitize the voters to 
evaluate their options properly during elections to elect credible political representatives 
that will bring about good governance, and provide better infrastructure and deliver good 
public services rather than continuing to accept cash for votes due to despair, cynicism 
and perverse propensity to partake in sharing the public funds. 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Vote-selling: Infrastructure and Public Services 
Walden University 
Time of interview: 
Date: 
Place: 
Interview: 
Interviewee: 
The purpose of this phenomenological study is to uncover voters’ behaviors by 
investigating their common and lived experiences with respect to the provision of 
infrastructure, delivery of public services and voting during elections in Akoko North 
West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria.   
The interview will commence with preliminary questions followed by the 
interview questions. The preliminary questions consist of enquiries regarding 
demographic profile and criteria for participation. The interview questions are the 
primary research questions. The interviewees will be reassured that their statements and 
identities will remain confidential and that their real names will be masked with assigned 
codes. Their permission to record the interviews will be sought. They will be informed 
that they can withdraw from the interview at any time. 
Demographic information 
1. What is your gender? 
2. How old are you? 
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3. Did you have formal education? If yes, what is your level of education? 
4. What is your employment status? 
Criteria for Participation 
5. How long have been residing continuously in Akoko North Local Government? 
6. Did you participate and vote in all the elections that took place in the local 
government since 2012? 
7. Have you been exposed to vote-selling? 
Interview Questions 
8. What is your opinion about the state of infrastructure and public services in your 
local government? 
9. What do people need or expect from elected public office holders? 
a. Have elected public office holders addressed these needs or expectations while in  
 office? 
10. What do you think about the election promises by elected public office holders to 
provide or improve infrastructure and public services? 
11. Do voters engage in vote-selling in your local government? 
a. If yes, have you or do you know anyone who had been approached for vote- 
selling, or accepted cash for votes? Please do not mention names. 
12. What reasons would you give for acceptance of cash instead of voting on the basis 
of political parties’ manifestoes?  
13. Do you think those who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently in 
some cases if the state of public services was good? 
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14. Do you think those who accepted cash for votes would have voted differently in 
some cases if the elected public office holders have improved public services in 
your local government? 
15. That covers the things I wanted to ask, would you like to add to what you have 
told me? 
16.  (Thank the interviewees and tell them that their responses will remain strictly 
confidential). 
Potential follow-up questions: 
Please elaborate on that issue.  
Please give more detail on that.  
What was your involvement?  
Tell me about it?  
What influenced your decision?  
What do you mean?  
Why did you do that?  
How did that affect you? 
 
 
